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Abstract
In security proofs of cryptographic schemes, various kinds of assumptions have been
used. Among those assumptions, the hardness of the factoring problem, called the
factoring assumption, is one of the most reliable assumptions. In this dissertation,
we study constructions of factoring-based cryptographic schemes. First we study a
cryptographic primitive called a self-bilinear map. We define a relaxed version of
a self-bilinear map, which we call a self-bilinear maps with auxiliary information
(AI-SBM). We construct an AI-SBM based on the factoring assumption and the
existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). We also show that AI-SBM can
be used for constructing cryptographic schemes including multiparty key exchange,
broadcast encryption, attribute-based encryption and homomorphic signatures. As a
side result, we construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption for NC1 circuits based
on the Φ-hiding assumption and the existence of iO. Second we study a cryptographic
primitive called lossy trapdoor function (LTDF). We define a relaxed version of an
LTDF which we call an adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor functions (ad-LTDF).
Then we show that in many applications of LTDFs, we can replace LTDFs with
ad-LTDFs. Moreover, we give a construction of ad-LTDFs based on the factoring
assumption w.r.t. semi-smooth RSA subgroup moduli (SS moduli), which is a special
type of RSA moduli introduced by Groth. As a result, we almost automatically obtain
new constructions of a collision resistant hash function, CPA secure PKE scheme
and DPKE scheme based on the same assumption. Especially, our DPKE scheme
is the first scheme that satisfies the security notion called the PRIV security for
block sources proposed by Boldyreva et al. solely based on the factoring assumption.
Besides direct applications of ad-LTDFs, we construct a CCA secure PKE scheme
based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli whose ciphertext overhead is the
shortest among schemes based on the same assumption.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Cryptography is indispensable to secure information transmissions. While the history
of cryptography dates back to more than hundreds years ago, the concept of public
key encryption (PKE), proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in 1976, has brought
about a revolution in cryptography. In “classical” cryptography before that, it is
assumed that a sender and a receiver share a common key, which is used both for
encryption and decryption. On the other hand, in a PKE scheme, there are two
types of keys called an encryption key and a decryption key. An important feature
of PKE is that the security is ensured even if an encryption key is made public.
By this feature, anyone can encrypt a massage to generate a ciphertext without any
secret information, while only a party who knows a decryption key can decrypt the
ciphertext to recover the message. This enable us to securely communicate with
many and unspecified parties on the Internet. Moreover, it turns out that the idea
of PKE can be used for constructing many other cryptographic primitives such as
digital signatures, identification, commitments, etc.
Security proof and hardness assumptions. For ensuring security of cryptographic
schemes, a commonly used approach is to give security proofs for those schemes. That
is, we prove that breaking the scheme is as hard as solving a certain mathematical
problem that is known to be hard to solve. As a result, we ensure the security of the
scheme under the assumption that the underlying mathematical problem is really
hard to solve. This approach gives us a strong evidence of security because the
security is proven in a mathematical way as long as the underlying assumption is
true. On the other hand, if the underlying assumption is false (i.e., the underlying
mathematical problem is easy to solve), the security of the scheme is no longer
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ensured. Therefore it is important to reduce the security of a cryptographic scheme
to a reliable assumption.
Nowadays, various kinds of assumptions are used for security proofs including the
factoring [RSA78, Rab79], discrete-logarithm [DH76], paring-based [Jou00, SOK01,
BF01], lattice-based [Ajt96, Reg05] assumptions etc. Among them, the factoring
assumption, which claims the hardness of factorizing large composite number, is one
of the most reliable assumptions because no efficient algorithm to solve the integer
factoring problem is known so far though intensive researches on that topic have been
done over several decades [Pol74, Pol75, Len87, CP05]. Therefore if the security of
a cryptographic scheme is proven under the factoring assumption, then we obtain a
strong evidence on the security of the scheme. Thus in this dissertation, we study
constructions of factoring-based cryptographic schemes.
Here, we remark the definition of the term “factoring-based” used in this disser-
tation. When we say “factoring-based scheme”, we do not always mean that the
security of the scheme is reduced to the factoring assumption, but we mean the
scheme is reduced to any assumption which is related to the factoring assumption.
These “factoring-related assumptions” include the RSA [RSA78], strong RSA [BP97],
quadratic residuosity (QR) [GM82], decision composite residuosity(DCR) [Pai99], Φ-
hiding [CMS99] assumptions etc. Though there is no known algorithm to break these
assumptions without breaking the factoring assumption, there is no rigorous reduction
from any of these assumptions to the factoring assumption. Therefore we distinguish
factoring-based constructions and those reduced to the factoring assumption.
1.2 Cryptographic primitives
Here, we review current status of various cryptographic primitives, mainly focusing
on factoring-based constructions. We note that since the theme of this dissertation is
factoring-based cryptography, we omit some important results that is not related to
factoring.
Public key encryption. The first PKE scheme was proposed by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman in 1978 [RSA78], which is called the RSA scheme. The description of the
RSA scheme is as follows. A public key consists of a product N = PQ of two primes
P and Q and a public exponent e ∈ Z. A secret key is a secret exponent d, such
that ed ≡ 1 mod (P − 1)(Q − 1). For encrypting a message M ∈ ZN , we compute
C =Me mod N and output C as a ciphertext. The decryption is done as M = Cd.
The correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that Med = M holds for any
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M ∈ ZN , which can be seen by the Fermat’s little theorem. The security is based
on the RSA assumption, which claims that any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm cannot computeM with non-negligible probability given N , e and C =Me.
Though the RSA scheme was a significant breakthrough, there are still two problems
regarding to the security. The first one is that since the RSA assumption is not reduced
to the factoring assumption so far, the security of the scheme cannot be reduced to
the factoring assumption. Hopefully, we want to obtain a PKE scheme whose security
can be reduced to the factoring assumption. The second one is that though any PPT
adversary cannot compute a message M from a ciphertext C, it may be possible that
C reveals a partial information of M . Hopefully we want to ensure that C does not
leak any information of M .
The first problem is solved by Rabin [Rab79] in 1979, who proposed the first PKE
scheme whose security can be reduced to the factoring assumption. The Rabin scheme
is as follows. A public key is N = PQ as in the RSA scheme, and the secret key is
P and Q. The encryption of a message M is done as C = M2 mod N to generate
a ciphertext C, and decryption is done by finding M that satisfies C = M2 mod N
*1. The scheme can be seen as a variant of the RSA scheme for e = 2, but what
is important is that the security of the Rabin scheme is rigorously reduced to the
factoring assumption.
The second problem is solved by Goldwasser and Mical [GM82] in 1982. They
formalize the notion of semantic security for PKE, which means that any information
of message is not leaked from a ciphertext and a public key. Then they construct a
PKE scheme that satisfies the semantic security under the QR assumption.
Blum and Goldwasser [BG84] proposed the first PKE scheme that solves the these
two problems simultaneously: The semantic security of the scheme can be reduced to
the factoring assumption.
All of the above works only consider the security against chosen plaintext attacks
(CPA) where an adversary only observes public keys and ciphertexts. On the other
hand, there is a stronger security notion called the chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)
security where an adversary in addition to observing public keys and ciphertexts
accesses to a decryption oracle that returns decryption of an arbitrary ciphertext ex-
cept the “target ciphertext” that adversary tries to break. Though the CCA security
had been considered only of theoretical interest for a long time, in 1998, Bleichen-
bacher [Ble98] showed that a (partial) chosen ciphertext attack is possible in the real
*1 In fact, there are 4 possible messages M that satisfies M2 = C, therefore additional two bits
should be included in a ciphertext to specify a message.
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world by demonstrating an attack against PKCS #1 which was a widely used PKE
scheme in the real. Therefore nowadays, the CCA security is considered as a desir-
able security of a PKE scheme. Naor and Yung [NY89] and Dolev, Dwork and Naor
[DDN91] proposed a generic conversion from a PKE scheme with the CPA security to
a one with the CCA security by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems
(NIZKs), but their schemes are too inefficient and far from practical. Fujisaki and
Okamoto [FO99] proposed a practical conversion, but their security analysis relies
on the random oracle model, in which a hash function is modeled as a completely
random function. In 2009, Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09b] proposed the first practical
PKE scheme whose CCA security can be reduced to the factoring assumption in the
standard model. Some variants of the Hofheinz-Kiltz scheme have been proposed
[MLLJ11, LLML11, LLML12, LLL13, YYN+14].
Broadcast encryption. Broadcast encryption (BE) [FN93] is a variant of PKE where
a sender can arbitrary decide a set of receivers, and only designated receivers can
decrypt the ciphertext to obtain a message. Since there is a trivial construction of
a BE scheme whose ciphertext size is proportional to the number of receivers, BE
is meaningful only if a ciphertext size is sublinear to the number of receivers. In
2000, Naor and Pinkas [NP00] proposed a revocation scheme, which can be seen as
a BE scheme whose ciphertext size is proportional to the number of revoked users.
That is, when encrypting a message to n − t receivers out of n potential receivers,
the ciphertext size of the scheme is O(t) instead of O(n). Wee [Wee11] constructed a
factoring-based variant of the Naor-Pinkas scheme. Though these schemes are efficient
when the receiver set is large, when that is small, namely t ≈ n, the ciphertext size
is almost the same as that of the trivial construction. Boneh, Gentry and Waters
[BGW05] constructed a BE scheme whose ciphertext size is O(
√
n) regardless of
the number of revoked users based on a pairing, and Boneh and Silverberg [BS02]
(instantiated by [GGH13a]) proposed a BE scheme whose ciphertext is O(1) based on
a multilinear map. A factoring-based BE scheme with the similar property has been
unknown so far.
Identity-based encryption. Identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84] is a variant of
PKE where an arbitrary string can be used as a public key. Though the concept
of IBE was proposed in 1984, the first constructions were proposed in 2000 and 2001
by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [SOK00] and Boneh and Franklin [BF01] indepen-
dently. Their schemes are based on a pairing, and proven secure in the random oracle
model. Boneh and Boyen [BB04] proposed an IBE scheme proven selectively secure in
the standard model, and Waters [Wat05] proposed an IBE scheme proven adaptively
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secure in the standard model.
As a scheme related to the factoring problem, Cocks [Coc01] proposed an IBE
scheme which is proven secure under the QR assumption in the random oracle model.
Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg [BGH07] proposed an efficient variant of the above
scheme, which is also proven secure under the QR assumption in the random oracle
model. We note that there is no known IBE scheme which is proven secure under
a factoring related assumption in the standard model, or proven secure under the
factoring assumption (even in the random oracle model).
Attribute-based encryption. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an extension of
PKE which enable us an arbitrary access control depending on attributes assigned
to each receiver. The concept of ABE was proposed by Sahai and Waters [SW05],
and there are many constructions of an ABE scheme based on bilinear pairings
[BSW07, GPSW06]. Garg et al. [GGH+13c] constructed the first ABE scheme
for general circuits based on multilinear maps. Boneh et al. [BGG+14] proposed
a variant of the scheme with a compact ciphertext. Gorbunov et al. [GVW13]
constructed an ABE scheme for general circuits based on the standard learning with
errors (LWE) assumption. There is no known factoring-based construction of an
ABE scheme.
Functional encryption. Functional encryption is an extension of ABE where a secret
key skf is associated with a function f , and an encryption of a messagem is decrypted
to f(x) by the secret key skf . The concept of FE is proposed by Boneh, Sahai and
Waters [BSW11]. Garg, [GGH+13b] constructed the first (selectively secure) FE
scheme for all circuits based on an indistinguishability obfuscation. Waters [Wat15]
and Ananth et al. [ABSV15] proposed fully secure FE schemes for all circuits. As an
FE scheme for functions of more restricted class, Abdalla et al. [ABCP15] constructed
selectively FE schemes for innner product based on a PKE scheme with a special
structure, which can be constructed based on various kind of assumptions including
DDH and LWE assumptions. Agrawal, Libert and Stehle´ [ALS16] constructed fully
secure FE schemes for inner products based on the DDH, LWE and DCR assumptions.
There is no known factoring-based construction of an FE scheme for general circuits,
or an FE scheme for inner products whose security.can be reduced to the factoring
assumption.
Homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption is PKE with the homomorphic
property such that computation over encrypted messages can be done publicly. In
fact, the first PKE, the RSA encryption, is already multiplicative homomorphic. That
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is, given a ciphertexts C1 =M
e
1 and C2 =M
e
2 for messages M1 and M2 respectively,
we can compute a new ciphertext C1 · C2 = (M1 ·M2)e, which corresponds to the
message M1 ·M2. The PKE scheme proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [GM82] is
additively homomorphic over a message space Z2, and there has been proposed some
additively homomorphic encryption scheme whose message space is larger based on
factoring-related assumption [Cla94, NS98, Pai99, Gro05, JL13]. However, there is
no known additively homomorphic encryption scheme which can be reduced to the
factoring assumption.
In 2009, Gentry [Gen09] proposed the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme based on an ideal lattice in which arbitrary computation can be done over
encrypted messages. Thereafter, many FHE schemes have been proposed based on
lattice-based [BV11, BGV12, Bra12, GSW13, CGGI16] or integer-based assumptions
[vDGHV10, CMNT11, CNT12, CCK+13, CLT14]. On the other hand, there is still
no known FHE scheme based on a standard factoring-related assumption.
Deterministic public key encryption. Deterministic public key encryption (DPKE) is
PKE whose encryption algorithm is deterministic. Though a DPKE scheme cannot
satisfy the semantic security, Bellare et al. [BBO07] defined the PRIV security as the
best possible security of a DPKE scheme. They constructed a DPKE scheme that
satisfies the PRIV security in the random oracle model. Boldyreva et al. [BFO08]
weakened the PRIV security to define the security notion which they call the PRIV
security for block-sources, and constructed DPKE schemes with this security in the
standard model based on lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs). Bellare et al. [BFOR08]
constructed DPKE scheme with a further weaker security notion (where messages
are uniformly random) can be constructed from any one-way trapdoor permutation.
There is no known construction of a DPKE scheme that can be proven to satisfy the
PRIV security for block sources under the factoring assumption.
Non-interactive key exchange. Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a crypto-
graphic protocol where many parties share a common key without any interaction
except publishing each user’s public key. Though Diffie and Hellman [DH76]
proposed the first 2-party NIKE scheme in 1976, it was not until 2013 that a formal
definition and security models were given by [FHKP13]. In [FHKP13], they proposed
a NIKE schemes that satisfies the strongest security definition they define under
a pairing-based assumption in the standard model, or the factoring assumption in
the random oracle model. There is no known construction of 2-party NIKE scheme
that satisfies their security requirement under the factoring (or a factoring-related)
assumption in the standard model.
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For the case of more than 2 parties, Joux [Jou00] proposed a 3-party NIKE scheme
based on a pairing, and Boneh and Silverberg [BS02] (instantiated by [GGH13a])
proposed a multi-party NIKE scheme based on a multilinear map. There is no known
NIKE scheme for more than 2 parties based on a factoring-related assumption.
Digital signatures. A digital signature is a digital analogue of a handwrite signature.
The concept of digital signatures was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76], and the
first digital signature scheme was proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [RSA78]
at the same time as the first PKE scheme was proposed. Actually, their signature
scheme uses the same mechanism as the RSA encryption: The verification key consists
of a multiple N = PQ of two primes P and Q and a public exponent e, and a signing
key is a secret exponent d such that ed ≡ 1 mod (P − 1)(Q− 1). A signature σ for a
message M is generated as σ :=Md mod N , and a signature is verified by checking
whether σe = M mod N holds. Intuitively, the security of the scheme follows from
the assumption that it is hard to find a e-th root modulo N . However, there is a
vulnerability in their scheme that even without a signing key, one can first generate a
signature σ and then generate a message M := σe mod N so that (M,σ) is accepted
by the verification algorithm.
Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR88] gave a strong security definition called ex-
istential unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA). Rompel [Rom90]
constructed EUF-CMA secure digital signatures solely based on a one-way function.
However, their construction is very complicated and not practical. As a more direct
and efficient construction of digital signatures based on factoring-related assump-
tions, There have been proposed some EUF-CMA secure digital signatures based
on the strong RSA assumption, [GHR99, CS00, Fis03, HK08]. Hohenberger and
Waters [HW09] constructed EUF-CMA secure digital signatures based on the RSA
assumption for the first time. Some variants of the scheme have been proposed
[HJK11, YHK12, BHJ+13].
Homomorphic signatures Homomorphic signatures are digital signatures with a ho-
momorphic property that anyone can publicly evaluate a function on signatures to
generate a new signature for the function value on original messages. Gennaro et al.
[GKKR10] constructed a linearly homomorphic signature scheme based on the RSA
assumption. Boneh and Freeman [BF11] were the first to propose homomorphic sig-
natures that can handle a wider class of functions than linear functions. Their scheme
can handle arbitrary polynomial and security is proven in the random oracle based
on the hardness of the short integer solution (SIS) problem. Catalano et al. [CFW14]
proposed such a scheme in the standard model based on a multilinear map. Gor-
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bunov et al. [GVW15] constructed a (leveled) fully homomorphic signature, which
can handle any polynomial size function based on the learning with errors (LWE)
assumption. Xie et al. [XX14] proposed (bounded) fully homomorphic signatures
based on iO. There is no known factoring-based homomorphic signatures that can
handle a wider class of functions than linear functions.
Pseudorandom generator. Pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a cryptographic prim-
itives that is given a random seed to generate a longer pseudorandom string that
cannot be distinguished from a uniformly random string. There is a generic construc-
tion of PRG based on a one-way function [HILL99]. As a direct construction from the
factoring assumption, Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS86] constructed an efficient PRG.
Pseudorandom function. Pseudorandom function (PRF) is a efficiently computable
keyed function which is indistinguishable from a truly random function by a black-box
access. There is a generic construction of PRF based on a PRG [GGM84]. As a direct
construction from the factoring assumption, Naor and Reingold [NR04] constructed
an efficient PRF, and the scheme is further improved by Naor, Reingold and Rosen
[NRR02].
1.3 Limitations of Factoring-based Cryptography.
As summarized in the previous section, there have been wide variety of progresses in
factoring-based cryptography until now. However, there are still many open problems
in this area. Especially, we focus on the following two problems in this dissertation.
1. There is no known construction of cryptographic primitives with high func-
tionality including ABE, FE, FHE etc. though they are constructed based on
other assumptions related to pairings or lattices. It is an important problem
to consider whether it is possible to construct these primitives based on the
factoring or factoring-related assumptions.
2. There are some cryptographic primitives that can be constructed based on a
factoring-related assumption, but cannot be reduced to the factoring assump-
tion including DPKE, additively homomorphic encryption etc. It is an impor-
tant problem to consider whether these primitives can be constructed based on
the factoring assumption.
In this dissertation, we make progresses toward solving these problems.
1.4 Summary of Contributions 9
1.4 Summary of Contributions
Our contributions can be divided into the following two parts.
1. In the first part, we study a cryptographic primitive called self-bilinear map. A
self-bilinear map is a special type of a bilinear map where target and domain
groups are identical. Cheon and Lee [CL09] showed that a self-bilinear map
implies a multilinear map, which is known to imply various kinds of crypto-
graphic primitives including multiparty non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)
[BS02], broadcast encryption [BS02], attribute-based encryption [GGH+13c],
homomorphic signatures [CFW14] etc. On the other hand, they also showed
that an impossibility result on the existence of a self-bilinear map on known
prime order group. Namely, they showed that if there exists an efficiently
computable self-bilinear map on a group of known prime order, then the com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption cannot hold on the group. In this
dissertation we consider unknown order group instead of prime order group to
avoid the above impossibility result. We define a weaker variant of self-bilinear
map, which we call self-bilinear map with auxiliary information (AI-SBM). We
construct an AI-SBM based on the factoring assumption and the existence of
indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which is another cryptographic primitive
that makes a circuit totally unintelligible while keeping its functionality. We
show that we can replace a multilinear map with AI-SBM in many applications
including multiparty NIKE, BE, ABE and homomorphic signatures. More-
over, our construction of multiparty NIKE and broadcast encryption is the
first construction that admits unbounded number of users. As a side result,
we construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption for log-depth arithmetic
circuits based on the Φ-hiding assumption and the existence of iO.
Since we assume the existence of iO in addition to the factoring assumption,
the construction is not fully factoring-based one. However, our result shows
a connection between those advanced cryptographic primitives and factoring-
based cryptography, and we believe that it may be useful for factoring-based
construction of those primitives in the future.
Contents of this part are based on [YYHK14, YHK16, YYHK].
2. In the second part, we study a cryptographic primitive called a lossy trap-
door function (LTDF) introduced by Peikert and Waters [PW08]. It is known
that LTDFs imply various kinds of cryptographic primitives including collision
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resistant hash function, oblivious transfer, CPA/CCA secure PKE [PW08],
DPKE [BFO08], selective opening attack secure PKE [BHY09], universally
composable commitment [NFT09], etc. It is also known that LTDFs can
be constructed based on various kinds of assumptions including decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH), learning with errors (LWE), QR, DCR assumptions
etc. Though there are some “factoring-based construction”of LTDFs, there is
no known construction of LTDFs whose security is rigorously reduced to the
factoring assumption. In this part, we first relax the definition of an LTDF
to define an adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor functions (ad-LTDF). Then
we show that in many applications of LTDFs, we can replace LTDFs with
ad-LTDFs. Moreover, we give a construction of an ad-LTDF based on the
factoring assumption w.r.t. semi-smooth RSA subgroup moduli (SS moduli),
which is a special type of RSA moduli introduced by Groth [Gro05]. As a re-
sult, we almost automatically obtain a new constructions of collision resistant
hash function, CPA/CCA secure PKE schemes and DPKE scheme based on
the same assumption. Especially, our DPKE scheme is the first scheme that
satisfies the security notion called the PRIV security for block sources proposed
by Boldyreva et al. [BFO08] solely based on the factoring assumption.
Besides direct applications of ad-LTDFs, we construct a CCA secure PKE
scheme based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli whose ciphertext
overhead is the shortest among schemes based on the same assumption.
Contents of this part are based on [YYHK16].
1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2, we review notations and definitions of cryptographic primitives that
are used throughout this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we study constructions and
applications of AI-SBMs. In Chapter 4, we study constructions and applications of
ad-LTDFs. In Chapter 5, we give concluding remarks and open problems.
11
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We use N to denote the set of all natural numbers, and [n] to denote the set {1, . . . n}
for n ∈ N. If S is a finite set, then we use x $← S to denote that x is chosen uniformly
at random from S. If A is an algorithm, we use x← A(y; r) to denote that x is output
by A whose input is y and randomness is r. We often omit r. For a finite set S, |S|
denotes the cardinality of S. For a real number x, ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer not
smaller than x and ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer not larger than x. For a bit string
a, ℓa denotes the length of a. For a function f in λ, we often denote f to mean f(λ)
for notational simplicity. We say that a function f(·) : N→ [0, 1] is negligible if for all
positive polynomials p(·) and all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, we have f(λ) < 1/p(λ). We
say f is overwhelming if 1 − f is negligible. We say that a function f(·) : N → [0, 1]
is noticeable if there exists a polynomial p such that for all sufficiently large λ, we
have f(λ) > |1/p(λ)|. We say that an algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) if there exists a polynomial p such that the running time of A with input
length λ is less than p(λ). We use a|b to mean that a is divisor of b. For a set S and
a random variable x over S, we say that x is almost random on S if the statistical
distance between the distribution of x and the uniform distribution on S is negligible.
For a natural number N , Φ(N) denote the number of natural numbers smaller than
N that are coprime to N . For random variables X and Y , ∆(X,Y ) denote the
statistical distance between them. We use the fact that for any (probabilistic) function
f , ∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≤ ∆(X,Y ) holds, and that ∆((X1, Z), (Y1, Z)) = EZ [∆(X1, Y1)]
where E denotes the expected value. For random variables X and Y , we define min-
entropy of X as H∞(X) := − log(maxx Pr[X = x]) and average min-entropy of X
given Y as H˜∞(X|Y ) := − log(Σy Pr[Y = y]maxx Pr[X = x|Y = y]). When we treat
12 Chapter 2 Preliminaries
a circuit, we use the similar notation as in [BHR12, GGH+13c]. For a circuit f with
input length n which has v wires, We identify the set of wires with [v] and input wires
with [n], and we label the output wire by v. For a wire w which is an output wire of
a gate, we denote the first input incoming wire of the gate by A(w) and the second
incoming wire of the gate by B(w). We use λ to denote the security parameter
2.2 Syntax and Security Notions
Here, we review definitions of cryptographic primitives.
Pairwise independent hash function. We say that a family H of hash functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m is pairwise independent if for any x1 ̸= x2 ∈ {0, 1}n and
y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}m, Pr[H(x1) = y1 ∧H(x2) = y2 : H $← H] = 2−2m holds.
Collision resistant hash function. We formalize a collision resistant hash function
as a pair of PPT algorithms Π = (Gen,Eval).
Gen(1λ) It takes the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs a function descrip-
tion h.
Eval(h, x) It is a deterministic algorithm that takes a function description h and x
as input and outputs h(x).
We require that for any PPT adversary A, AdvCRA,Π(λ) := Pr[h(x) = h(x′), x ̸= x′ :
h← Gen(1λ); (x, x′)← A(h)] is negligible.
Public key encryption. A PKE scheme consists of three algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec).
Gen(1λ): It takes the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs (PK,SK), where
PK is a public key and SK is a secret key.
Enc(PK.msg): It takes a public key PK and a message msg as input and outputs
a ciphertext C.
Dec(SK,C): It takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext C as input and outputs a
massage msg.
We require that for all (PK,SK) output by Gen, all msg and all C output by
Enc(PK,msg), we have Dec(SK,C) = msg.
For ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, a public key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
is ATK secure if for all PPT adversaries A = (A1,A2), AdvATKA,PKE(λ) := |Pr[b =
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b′ : (PK,SK) ← Gen(1λ); (msg0,msg1, st) ← AO11 (PK); b $← {0, 1};C∗ ←
Enc(PK,msgb); b ← AO22 (PK,C∗, st)] − 1/2| is negligible where if ATK=CPA, then
Oi (i = 1, 2) is an oracle that always returns ⊥, and if ATK=CCA, then Oi (i = 1, 2)
is a decryption oracle that is given a ciphertext C and returns Dec(SK,C) if i = 1
or C ̸= C∗ and otherwise ⊥.
Key encapsulation mechanism. Here, we review the definition of key encapsula-
tion mechanism (KEM) and its security. It is shown that a CCA secure PKE scheme
is obtained by combining a constrained CCA (CCCA) secure KEM and a CCA secure
authenticated symmetric key encryption scheme [HK07]. In the following, we recall
the definitions of KEM and its CCCA security.
A KEM consists of three algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec).
Gen(1λ): It takes a security parameter 1λ as input and outputs (PK,SK), where
PK is a public key and SK is a secret key.
Enc(PK): It takes a public key PK as input and outputs (C,K), where C is a
ciphertext and K is a symmetric key.
Dec(SK,C): takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext C as input and outputs a key
K with length ℓK or ⊥.
We require that for all (PK,SK) output by Gen and all (C,K) output by Enc(PK),
we have Dec(SK,C) = K.
To define the CCCA security of KEM = (Gen,Enc,Dec), we consider the following
game between an adversary A and a challenger C. First, C generates (PK,SK) ←
Gen(1λ) and (C∗,K)← Enc(PK), chooses a random bit b $← {0, 1}, and setsK∗ := K
if b = 1 and otherwise K∗ $← {0, 1}ℓK . Then (PK,C∗,K∗) is given to the adversary
A. In the game, A can query pairs of ciphertexts and predicates any number of
times. When A queries (C, pred), C computes K ← Dec(SK,C) and returns K to A
if C ̸= C∗ and pred(K) = 1, and otherwise ⊥. Finally, A outputs a bit b′. We define
the CCCA advantage of A as AdvCCCAA,KEM(λ) := |Pr[b = b′] − 1/2|. We say that KEM
is CCCA secure if AdvCCCAA,KEM(λ) is negligible for any PPT valid adversary A, where
“valid” is defined below.
Before defining “valid” , we prepare two definitions. We say that a predicate pred is
non-trivial if Pr[pred(K) = 1 : K
$← {0, 1}ℓK ] is negligible. We say that an algorithm
C′ is an alternative challenger if it has the same syntax as the real challenger C. We
say that an adversary A is valid if for any PPT alternative challenger C′, all predicates
pred queried by A in the game between A and C′ are non-trivial.
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Though the above definition of the CCCA security slightly differs from the original
definition given in [HK07], we can easily prove that our definition still yields the
“hybrid encryption theorem” that a CCA secure PKE scheme can be obtained by a
CCCA secure KEM and authenticated symmetric key encryption.
Deterministic public key encryption. Here, we define deterministic public key
encryption (DPKE). A DPKE scheme consists of three algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec).
Gen(1λ) It takes a security parameter 1λ as input and outputs (PK,SK), where
PK is a public key and SK is a secret key.
Enc(PK,msg): It is a deterministic algorithm that takes a public key PK and a
message msg as input and outputs a ciphertext C.
Dec(SK,C): It takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext C as input and outputs a
message msg or ⊥.
For correctness, we require that for allmsg, (PK,SK) output by Gen and C output
by Enc(PK,msg), we have Dec(SK,C) = msg.
We recall security notions for deterministic encryption following [BFO08]. In
[BFO08], the authors considered three security notions called PRIV, PRIV1 and
PRIV1-IND, and proved all of them are equivalent. Therefore we consider only the
simplest security definition PRIV1-IND in this dissertation. A random variable X
over {0, 1}n is called a (u, n)-source if H∞(X) ≥ u. For ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, a
deterministic encryption scheme DE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) for ℓ-bit message is PRIV1-
IND-ATK secure for (t, n)-sources if for any (t, n)-sources M0 and M1 and all PPT
adversaries A, AdvPRIV1−IND−ATKA,M0,M1,DE (λ) := |Pr[b = b′ : (PK,SK) ← Gen(1λ); b
$←
{0, 1};msg∗ $← Mb;C∗ ← Enc(PK,msg∗); b′ ← AO(PK,C∗)] − 1/2| is negligible
where if ATK=CPA, then O is an oracle that always returns ⊥, and if ATK=CCA,
then O is an decryption oracle that is given a ciphertext C and returns Dec(SK,C)
if C ̸= C∗ and otherwise ⊥.
Distributed broadcast encryption. Here, we define distributed broadcast en-
cryption following [BZ14]. A distributed broadcast encryption scheme consists of
four algorithms (Setup, Join,Enc,Dec).
Setup(1λ): It takes the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs public parameters
PP .
Join(PP ): It takes public parameters PP as input and outputs a public key pk and
a secret key sk.
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Enc(PP, pk1, . . . , pkn,msg): It takes public parameters PP , a message msg, and a
public keys pk1, . . . , pkn of designated receivers and outputs a ciphertext CT .
Dec(PP, sk, pk1, . . . , pkn, CT ): It takes public parameters PP , a secret key sk, public
keys of designated receivers and a ciphertext CT and outputs a message msg.
As correctness, we require that for any security parameter λ, an integer n and a
message msg, we have Dec(PP, sk, pk1, . . . , pkn, CT ) = msg, where PP ← Setup(1λ),
(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn)← Join(PP ), CT ← Enc(PP, pk1, . . . , pkn,msg).
We define the security notion. We consider the following experiment. A challenger
runs Setup(1λ) to generate public parameters PP and runs Join(PP ) n times to
generate (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn). It gives (PP, pk1, . . . , pkn) to A. A chooses two
messages msg0 and msg1 to submit them to C. C uniformly choose b $← {0, 1} and
runs Enc(PP, pk1, . . . , pkn,msgb) to generate CT , and gives CT to A. Finally A
outputs b′. We say that A wins if b = b′ holds.
We say that a distributed broadcast encryption scheme is statically secure if for
any n (polynomially bounded in λ) and any PPT adversary A, |Pr[A wins]− 1/2| is
negligible.
Remark 1. At first glance, the above security notion seems weaker than the usual
static security of broadcast encryption because we do not allow an adversary to corrupt
receivers who are out of the target set. However, in distributed setting, secret and
public keys of such receivers can be simulated efficiently by using the public parameters.
Therefore we still capture the setting where the adversary may corrupt some receivers
(as long as the set of corrupted users is determined at the beginning of the experiment).
Remark 2. There is stronger security notion for broadcast encryption called adaptive
security, where an adversary can determine which receiver to corrupt adaptively. In
this dissertation we only consider the static security and does not consider the adaptive
security.
Attribute-based encryption for circuits. Here, we define attribute-based
encryption (ABE) and its security. An ABE scheme consists of four algorithms
(Setup,Enc,KeyGen,Dec).
Setup(1λ): It takes the security parameter 1λ, the length n of the index as input and
upper bound d of circuit depth, and outputs the public parameters PP and a
master secret key MSK.
Enc(PP, x,M): It takes the public parameters PP , an index x ∈ {0, 1}n and a
message M as input, and outputs a ciphertext CT .
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KeyGen(MSK, f): It takes a master secret key MSK and a circuit f with a single
output gate, and outputs a secret key SK.
Dec(SK,CT ): It takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext CT as input, and outputs
a message M or ⊥.
For correctness, we require that for all M , x ∈ {0, 1}n and f with depth lower
than d such that f(x) = 1, Dec(SK,CT ) = M always holds, where (PP,MSK) ←
Setup(1λ, n, d), SK = KeyGen(MSK, f) and CT = Enc(PP, x,M).
Next, we define the security of ABE. Here, we only define the selective security since
we only consider it in this dissertation. For an adversary A, we consider the following
game between A and a challenger. A first declares the target index x∗. Then the
challenger computes (PP,MSK)← Setup(1λ) and gives PP to A. Then A declares
M0 andM1. The challenger chooses b
$← {0, 1} and computes CT ← Enc(PP, x∗,Mb).
Then it gives CT to A. In the game, A can query a circuit f such that f(x∗) = 0
for key generation oracle, and the oracle returns KeyGen(MSK, f) to A. Finally, A
outputs b′. We say that A wins if b′ = b. We say that an ABE scheme is selectively
secure if for any efficient adversary A, tha probability that A wins is negligibly close
to 1/2.
It is known that any general Boolean circuit can be converted to an equivalent
monotone layered Boolean circuit [GGH+13c]. Therefore we only consider ABE for
monotone layered circuits. Here, monotone circuit is a circuit where all gates are
either AND or OR gates of two inputs, and layered circuit is a circuit where a gate
at depth j receive both of its inputs from wires at depth j − 1.
Homomorphic encryption Here, we recall some definitions for homomorphic en-
cryption. A homomorphic encryption scheme HE consists of the four algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Eval,Dec).
KeyGen(1λ): It takes the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs a public key
pk and a secret key sk.
Enc(pk,m) It takes a public key pk and a massage m ∈ {0, 1} as input, and outputs
a ciphertext c.
Eval(pk, f, ℓ, c1, . . . , cℓ) It takes a public key pk, a circuit f with input length ℓ and
a set of ℓ ciphertexts c1, . . . , cℓ as input, and outputs a ciphertext cf .
Dec(sk, c): IT takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs a
message m.
For correctness of the scheme, we require that for all security parameters λ, all
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(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ) and all m ∈ {0, 1}, we have Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) = m with
overwhelming probability.
Next, we define some properties of homomorphic encryption such as the CPA se-
curity, C-homomorphism, and compactness.
Definition 1. (CPA security) We say that a scheme HE is CPA secure if for any
efficient adversary A,
|Pr[1← A(pk,Enc(pk, 0))]− Pr[1← A(pk,Enc(pk, 1))]|
is negligible, where (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ).
Definition 2. (C-homomorphism) Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a class of circuits. A scheme
HE is C-homomorphic if for any family of circuits {fλ}λ∈N such that fλ ∈ C whose
input length is ℓ and any messages m1, . . . ,mℓ ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[Dec(sk,Eval(pk, C, c1, . . . , cℓ)) ̸= C(m1, . . . ,mℓ)]
is negligible, where (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ) and ci ← Enc(pk,mi).
Remark 3. We can also consider the additional property that an output of Eval
can be used as input of another homomorphic evaluation. This is called “multi-hop”
homomorphism, and many fully homomorphic encryption schemes have this property.
However, our scheme does not.
Definition 3. (Compactness) A homomorphic encryption scheme HE is compact if
there exists a polynomial poly such that the output length of Eval is at most poly(λ)-bit.
Multiparty non-interactive key exchange. First, we formally define multiparty
non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) and its security following [BZ14]. A multiparty
NIKE scheme consists of three algorithms (Setup,Publish,KeyGen).
Setup(1λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter 1λ as input *1. It outputs
public parameters params.
Publish(params): This algorithm takes public parameters params as input. It outputs
a public key pk and a secret key sk.
KeyGen(params, sk, pk1, . . . , pkn−1): This algorithm takes public parameter params,
a secret key sk and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn−1. It outputs a shared key k.
*1 In our definition, the setup algorithm does not take the number of maximum users as input.
This means that our scheme admits unbounded number of users.
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As correctness, we require that for any n, params ← Setup(1λ), (pki, ski) ←
Publish(params) for i ∈ [n], for any i1, i2 ∈ [n], we have
KeyGen(params, ski1 , pk1, . . . , pki1−1, pki1+1, . . . pkn)
= KeyGen(params, ski2 , pk1, . . . , pki2−1, pki2+1, . . . pkn).
We define the security notion for NIKE. In this dissertation, we consider the mini-
mum security notion against a passive adversary.
We say that a multiparty NIKE scheme is statically secure if for any in-
teger n which is polynomial in the security parameter, for any efficient ad-
versary A, |Pr[b $← A(params, pk1, . . . , pkn,Kb)] − 1/2| is negligible, where
params ← Setup(1λ), (pki, ski) ← Publish(params) for i = 1, . . . , n, K1 :=
KeyGen(params, sk1, pk2, . . . , pkn), K0
$← {0, 1}ℓK and b $← {0, 1}.
Remark 4. In some existing works [BZ14, KRS15], they consider stronger security
notion that considers adversaries actively generate malformed public keys. In this
dissertation, we do not consider such an adversary, and we assume that an adversary
only observe honestly generated public keys.
Homomorphic signature. Here, we give the definition of a homomorphic signature.
In this dissertation, we only consider a selectively secure single data homomorphic
signature for simplicity. A single data homomorphic signature for a function class C
consists of PPT algorithms (KeyGen,Sign,Verify,Eval).
KeyGen(1λ, 1n)→ (vk, sk): This algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ and a
data size 1n, and outputs a pair (vk.sk) of a verification key and a signing key.
Sign(sk, i,m)→ σ: This algorithm takes a signing key sk, an index i ∈ [n] and a
message m ∈M, and outpus a signature σ.
Eval(f, (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn))→ σ∗: This algorithm takes a function f ∈ C and
pairs (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn) of a message and a signature, and outputs a signa-
ture σ∗ for the message f(m1, . . . ,mn).
Verify(vk, f,m, σ)→ 1/0: This algorithm takes a verification key vk, a function f , a
message m and a signature σ, and outputs 1 if accepts and 0 else
Remark 5. In ordinary homomorphic signature schemes, signatures generated by
Eval can be input to Eval again to evaluate another function. On the other hand, in
our formulation, only signatures generated by Sign can be evaluated by Eval.
We require a homomorphic signature to satisfy the following properties.
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Correctness For any (vk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ, 1n)，(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ MN，
f ∈ C, if we let σi ← Sign(sk, i,mi), m∗ := f(m1, . . . ,mn)， and σ∗ :=
Eval(f, (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn)), then we always have Verify(vk, f,m
∗, σ∗) = 1.
Remark 6. In the above, we only require the correctness for signatures generated
by Eval, but if C includes the identity function, then this implies the correctness for
signatures generated by Sign.
Indistinguishability obfuscator. Here, we recall the definition of an indistin-
guishability obfuscator [GGH+13b, SW14].
Let Cλ be the class of circuits of size at most λ. An efficient randomized algorithm
iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly if the following conditions
are satisfied:
• For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ Cλ, we have that
Pr[∀x C ′(x) = C(x) : C ′ ← iO(λ,C)] = 1.
• For any (not necessarily uniform) efficient algorithm A = (A1,A2), there exists
a negligible function α such that the following holds: if A1(1λ) always outputs
(C0, C1, σ) such that we have C0, C1 ∈ Cλ and ∀x C0(x) = C1(x), then we have
|Pr[A2(σ, iO(λ,C0)) = 1 : (C0, C1, σ)← A1(1λ)]
−Pr[A2(σ, iO(λ,C1)) = 1 : (C0, C1, σ)← A1(1λ)]| ≤ α(λ)
2.2.1 RSA Modulus and Factoring Assumption
An integer N = PQ is called a RSA modulus if P and Q are distinct primes with the
same length. We define the group of quadratic residues as QRN := {u2 : u ∈ ZN ∗}
and the group of signed quadratic resides as QR+N := {|x| : x ∈ QRN}. where |x| is the
absolute value of x when it is represented as an element of {−(N−1)/2, . . . , (N−1)/2}.
This is a group with multiplication defined as x ◦ y := |(xy mod N)| for x, y ∈ QR+N .
Let RSAGen be an efficient algorithm that is given the security parameter 1λ and
outputs an ℓN -bit RSA modulus N = PQ with its factorization (P,Q). We say
that the factoring assumption holds w.r.t. RSAGen if for any PPT algorithm A,
Pr[A(N) ∈ {P,Q} : (N,P,Q)← RSAGen(1λ)] is negligible.
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Since we consider different type of RSA moduli in each chapter, we refer more
detailed structure of N to each chapter.
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Self-bilinear map
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a cryptographic primitive called a self-bilinear map. Though
a self-bilinear map is a very useful primitive, there is a negative result on the existence
of a self-bilinear map on known prime order group. We consider unknown order group
instead of prime order group to avoid the above impossibility result. We define a
weaker variant of self-bilinear map, which we call self-bilinear map with auxiliary
information (AI-SBM). We construct an AI-SBM based on the factoring assumption
and the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). We show that we can replace
a multilinear map with AI-SBM in many applications including multiparty NIKE, BE,
ABE and homomorphic signatures. Moreover, our construction of multiparty NIKE
and broadcast encryption is the first construction that admits unbounded number
of users. As a side result, we construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption for
log-depth arithmetic circuits based on the Φ-hiding assumption and the existence of
iO.
3.1.1 Background
A bilinear map is an important tool in constructions of various cryptographic primi-
tives, such as identity-based encryption (IBE)[BF01, BB04, Wat05], attribute-based
encryption (ABE) [SW05, BSW07, GPSW06], non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
proof systems [GOS06, GS08] etc. Bilinear maps which are mainly used in cryptogra-
phy, are constructed on elliptic curve groups. In these constructions, the target group
is different from the domain groups.
This leads to the natural question: is it possible to construct a bilinear map where
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the domain and target groups are identical? Such a bilinear map is called a self-bilinear
map, and has previously been studied by Cheon and Lee [CL09]. They showed that
a self-bilinear map is useful to construct cryptographic primitives by highlighting
that it can be used for constructing a multilinear map [BS02]. However, in contrast
to this useful property, they also proved an impossibility result: the computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption cannot hold in a group G of known prime order if
there exists an efficiently computable self-bilinear map on G. This is undesirable for
cryptographic applications. The overview of the proof is as follows. Let e : G×G→ G
be a self-bilinear map and g be a generator of G, then we have e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)xy =
gcxy where c is an integer such that e(g, g) = gc. Then we can compute gxy by
computing c-th root of e(gx, gy) sinceG is a prime and known order group.*1 However,
their impossibility result cannot be applied for the case that G is a unknown order
group. This is the setting we focus on in this chapter.
3.1.2 Our Contribution
We first introduce a new cryptographic primitive which we call a self-bilinear map with
auxiliary information (AI-SBM) which can be seen as a weaker variant of an ideal
self-bilinear map. Then we construct an AI-SBM by using indistinguishability obfus-
cation (iO) [GGH+13b]. Though our self-bilinear map with auxiliary information has
a limited functionality compared with an ideal self-bilinear map, we show that it is
still useful to construct various cryptographic primitives. Especially, it is sufficient to
instantiate some multilinear-map-based cryptographic primitives such as multiparty
non-interactive key exchange (NIKE), broadcast encryption, attribute-based encryp-
tion for circuits and homomorphic signatures. Our multiparty NIKE and distributed
broadcast encryption schemes are the first schemes where the number of users is not
fixed in the setup phase. We also show that our technique can be used for construct-
ing a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme for NC1 circuits.
Self-bilinear map with auxiliary information. For ideal self-bilinear map, we
require that we can publicly compute e(gx, gy) efficiently given gx and gy (and a
description of the map e). We relax the notion of self-bilinear map to define AI-SBM
so that e(gx, gy) can be computed efficiently given an auxiliary information τx or τgy
corresponding to gx or gy in addition to gx and gy. An auxiliary information τx can
*1 Here, we consider only the case in which c is known. However, [CL09] proved that the CDH
assumption does not hold even if c is unknown as long as G is a group of known prime order.
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be generated efficiently from x . Though this seems a significant relaxation, AI-SBMs
are still useful for instantiating many multilinear-map based constructions.
We introduce various hardness assumptions w.r.t. AI-SBMs which we call Multilin-
ear Computational Diffie-Hellman with Auxiliary Information (AI-MCDH), Multilin-
ear Hashed Diffie-Hellman with Auxiliary information (AI-MHDH) and Augmented
Power Multilinear Diffie-Hellman with Auxiliary Information (AI-APMDH) assump-
tion as a counter part of assumptions w.r.t. multilinear maps. Moreover, we introduce
the Mulitilinear Generalized Diffie-Hellman with Auxiliary Information (AI-GMDH)
assumption which can be seen as an “uber assumption” [Boy08] w.r.t. AI-SBMs.
We give two constructions of AI-SBM based on indistinguishability obfuscation
(iO), which we call basic and extended constructions. We prove that the AI-MCDH
assumption and AI-MHDH assumption for one-bit output hash function hold w.r.t.
the basic construction. For extended construction, we prove that the AI-MHDH
assumption for multiple-bit output hash functions. Moreover, we give a sufficient
condition such that the AI-GMDH assumption holds. As a result, we prove that the
AI-APMDH assumption holds.
Applications of AI-SBM. As applications of AI-SBMs, we construct a multiparty
NIKE, distributed broadcast encryption, ABE for circuits and homomorphic signa-
tures. The details follow.
• Multiparty NIKE. Multiparty NIKE is a cryptographic primitive which en-
able multiple users to share a common key without any interaction. We con-
struct a multiparty NIKE scheme where the maximum number of users is not
fixed in the setup phase. In particular, the size of both the public parameters
and a public key generated by a user are independent of the number of users.
The construction is a natural extension of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange by
using our multilinear map [DH76, BS02].
• Distributed broadcast encryption. Broadcast encryption is PKE where a
sender can arbitrary decide a set of receivers, and only designated receivers can
decrypt the ciphertext to obtain a message. Distributed broadcast encryption
is broadcast encryption with an additional property that a user can join the
system by himself without the assistance of a trusted third party holding a
master key. We construct a distributed broadcast encryption scheme where
the maximum number of users is not fixed in the setup phase based on our
multiparty NIKE scheme. In particular, the size of both the public parameters
and a ciphertext overhead are independent of the number of users. We apply the
generic conversion from multiparty NIKE to distributed broadcast encryption
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given in [BZ14].
• ABE for circuits. ABE is an extension of PKE which enable us an arbitrary
access control depending on attributes assigned to each receiver. We construct
an ABE scheme for general circuits by using our multilinear map. The con-
struction is a simple analogue of the scheme in [GGH+13c], which constructs
an ABE scheme based on multilinear maps.
• Homomorphic signatures. Homomorphic signatures is digital signatures
with a homomorphic property that anyone can publicly evaluate a function on
signatures to generate a new signature for the function value on original mes-
sages. We construct a homomorphic signatures for polynomial-degree poly-
nomials. The construction is a simple analogue of the scheme in [CFW14],
which constructs homomorphic signatures based on multilinear maps. We only
consider selective security for single data set for simplicity.
The above results can be interpreted as an evidence that AI-SBMs can replace
existing multilinear maps in some applications since all of the above constructions are
simple analogues of known multilinear-map-based constructions.
Somewhat homomorphic encryption. Besides direct applications of our self-
bilinear map with auxiliary information, we construct a somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption scheme by using a similar technique. Our somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme is chosen plaintext (CPA) secure, NC1 circuit homomorphic and compact
under the Φ-hiding assumption and the existence of iO.
Note that all known candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation are
far from practical, and hence, the above constructions are mostly of theoretical inter-
est.
3.1.3 Technical Overview
Here, we give a technical overview of our result. Our basic idea is to avoid the
impossibility result of self-bilinear maps which is explained above by considering a
group of unknown order. Note that even if we consider such a group, many decisional
assumptions such as the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption cannot hold if
there exists an efficiently computable self-bilinear map on the group. Therefore we
consider only computational assumptions such as the CDH assumption. For a Blum
integer N , we consider the group QR+N of signed quadratic residues [HK09a]. On this
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group, we consider a self-bilinear map e : QR+N × QR+N → QR+N which is defined as
e(gx, gy) := g2xy. The reason why we define it in this manner is that we want to
ensure that the CDH assumption holds in QR+N , even if e is efficiently computable.
That is, even if we can compute e(gx, gy) = g2xy, it is difficult to compute gxy from it
since the Rabin function is hard to invert under the factoring assumption. However,
given only the group elements gx and gy, we do not know how to compute e(gx, gy)
efficiently. To address this, we introduce auxiliary information τy for each element
gy ∈ QR+N which enables us to compute a map e(·, gy) efficiently. This leads to
the notion of self-bilinear map with auxiliary information which we introduce in this
chapter.
The problem is how to define auxiliary information τy which enables us to compute
e(·, gy) efficiently. The most direct approach is to define τy as a circuit that computes
the 2y-th power. However, if we define τy as a “natural” circuit that computes the
2y-th power, then we can extract 2y from τy, and thus we can compute y. This clearly
enables us to compute gxy, which breaks the CDH assumption.
A cleverer way is to define τy as a circuit that computes the ty-th power where
ty = 2y ± ord(QR+N ).*2 In this way, it seems that τy does not reveal y since ty is
a “masked” value of 2y by ord(QR+N ) which is an unknown odd number. This idea
is already used by Seurin [Seu13] to construct a trapdoor DDH group. Actually, he
proved that even if ty is given in addition to g
x and gy, it is still difficult to compute
gxy. In this way, it seems that we can construct a self-bilinear map with auxiliary
information. However, this creates a problem: we do not have an efficient algorithm
to compute ty from y without knowing the factorization of N . If such an algorithm
does not exist, then we cannot instantiate many bilinear map-based primitives using
the resulting map such as the 3-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Jou00].
To overcome the above difficulty, we use indistinguishability obfuscation. An in-
distinguishability obfuscator (iO) is an efficient randomized algorithm that makes
circuits C0 and C1 computationally indistinguishable if they have exactly the same
functionality.
We observe that a circuit that computes the 2y-th power and a circuit that computes
the ty-th power for an element of QR+N have exactly the same functionality since we
have ty = 2y ± ord(QR+N ). Therefore if we obfuscate these circuits by iO, then the
resulting circuits are computationally indistinguishable. Then we define auxiliary
information τy as an obfuscation of a circuit that computes the 2y-th power. With
this definition, it is clear that τy can be computed from y efficiently, and the above
*2 In the definition of ty , whether + or − is used depends on y. See [Seu13] for more details.
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mentioned problem is solved. Moreover, τy is computationally indistinguishable from
an obfuscation of a circuit that computes the ty-th power. Therefore it must still be
difficult to compute gxy even if τy is given in addition to g
x and gy.
Thus we obtain a self-bilinear map with auxiliary information on QR+N while ensur-
ing that the auxiliary information does not allow the CDH assumption to be broken.
By extending the above, we prove that the AI-MCDH assumption holds w.r.t. our
AI-SBM under the security of iO and the factoring assumption. Moreover, we slightly
modify the construction as e(gx, gy) = g2
kxy for some integer k, and give a sufficient
condition such that the AI-GMDH assumption holds.
3.1.4 Related Work
Bilinear maps. In cryptography, bilinear maps on elliptic curves were first used for
breaking the discrete logarithm problem on certain curves [MOV93]. The first con-
structive cryptographic applications of a bilinear map are given in [Jou00, SOK00,
BF01]. Since then, many constructions of cryptographic primitives based on a bilinear
map have been proposed.
Multilinear maps Boneh and Silverberg [BS02] considered a multilinear map which
is an extension of a bilinear map, and showed its usefulness for constructing cryp-
tographic primitives though they did not give a concrete construction of multilinear
maps. Garg et al. [GGH13a] proposed a candidate construction of multilinear maps
based on ideal lattices for the first time, and then some other constructions have been
proposed [CLT13, CLT15, GGH15] *3. We note that some cryptanalysis on these
schemes have been discussed [CHL+15, HJ16, CFL+16, CLLT16].
Indistinguishability Obfuscation The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation was
first proposed by Barak et al. [BGI+01]. The first candidate construction of indistin-
guishability obfuscation was proposed by Garg et al. [GGH+13b], followed by many
works [PST14, BR14, BGK+14, AGIS14, GLSW15, GMM+16]. Since then, many
applications of indistinguishability obfuscation have been proposed [SW14, BZ14,
HSW14, GGG+14, GGHR14, Hof14, PPS15]. Although some constructions are bro-
ken [MSZ16], there are some constructions that remain unbroken so far.
Multilinar map from iO. There are some works that shows the relation between multi-
linear maps and iO. Paneth and Sahai [PS15] constructed a polynomial jigsaw puzzle,
*3 More precisely, they construct graded encoding systems which can be seen as an approximate
version of multilinear maps.
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which is a variant of a multilinear map, solely based on iO. However, they does not
provide any application of polynomial jigsaw puzzles and thus it is unclear how that
is useful in constructions of cryptographic primitives. Albrecht et al. [AFH+16] con-
structed a multilinear map based on iO, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system,
and additive homomorphic encryption. Since the assumptions they rely on is incom-
parable to ours, their result is incomparable to ours. Moreover, their multilinear map
does not provide a graded encoding system [GGH13a] and thus some applications of
multilinear maps such as attribute based encryption [GGH+13c] and homomorphic
signatures [CFW14] cannot be instantiated.
Multiparty non-interactive key exchange and broadcast encryption. Boneh et al. [BS02]
observed that if there exists a cryptographic multilinear map, then we can construct a
multiparty NIKE scheme and very efficient broadcast encryption scheme. Garg et al.
[GGH13a] gave the first instantiation for the construction by proposing a multilinear
map.
Boneh and Zhandry [BZ14] constructed a multiparty NIKE based on iO and a
one-way function. Their scheme achieve stronger security than ours, in which they
consider an active adversary who generates public keys maliciously. On the other
hand, in their construction, the maximum number of users is bounded at the setup
phase unlike ours.
Subsequent to our work, Khurana et al. [KRS15] also constructed a multiparty
NIKE scheme for unbounded parties. Their scheme also achieve stronger security
than ours like [BZ14]. On the other hand, they assume a cryptographic primitive
called somewhere statistically binding commitment in addition to iO and a one-way
function.
3.2 RSA modulus and Group of Signed Quadratic Residues
Here we state structures of RSA moduli considered in this chapter. In this chapter,
for an RSA modulus N = PQ output by RSAGen, we assume that P ≡ Q ≡ 3 mod 4
holds and all prime factors of Φ(N)/4 = (P−1)(Q−1) are pairwise distinct and larger
than 2δℓN for some positive constant δ like in [HK09a]*4. In this case, QR+N is a cyclic
group of order (P−1)(Q−1)/4, and a uniformly random element ofQRN is a generator
of the group with overwhelming probability. A remarkable property of QR+N is that
the group is efficiently recognizable. That is, there exists an efficient algorithm that
*4 For example, these conditions are satisfied if N is a strong RSA modulus, i.e., P = 2p+1 and
Q = 2q + 1 for some primes p and q
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determines whether a given string is an element of QR+N or not [HK09a]. Throughout
this chapter, we assume that the factoring assumption holds w.r.t. RSAGen that
satisfies the above properties.
3.3 Self-bilinear Maps
In this section, we recall the definition of a self-bilinear map [CL09]. Next, we intro-
duce the notion of self-bilinear map with auxiliary information (AI-SBM) which is a
weaker variant of a self-bilinear map. Finally we define hardness assumptions with
respect to a multilinear map which is constructed from a self-bilinear map.
3.3.1 Definition of a Self-bilinear Map
First, we recall the definition of a self-bilinear map. A self-bilinear map is a bilinear
map where the domain and target groups are identical. The formal definition is as
follows.
Definition 4. (Self-bilinear Map [CL09]) For a cyclic group G, a self-bilinear map
e : G×G→ G has the following properties.
• For all g1, g2 ∈ G and α ∈ Z, it holds that
e(gα1 , g2) = e(g1, g
α
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
α.
• The map e is non-degenerate, i.e, if g1, g2 ∈ G are generators of G, then
e(g1, g2) is a generator of G.
As shown in [CL09], we can construct an n-multilinear map for any integer n ≥ 2
from a self-bilinear map e. We denote this n-multilinear map by en. This can be seen
by easy induction: suppose that an n-multilinear map en can be constructed from a
self-bilinear map e, then we can construct an (n+1)-multilinear map en+1 by defining
en+1(g1, . . . , gn, gn+1) := e(en(g1, . . . , gn), gn+1).
3.3.2 Self-bilinear Map with Auxiliary Information
We usually expect a self-bilinear map to be efficiently computable for cryptographic
applications. However, here we relax this requirement so that the map is efficiently
computable if “auxiliary information” is given. That is, when we compute e(gx, gy),
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we require auxiliary information τx or τy corresponding to g
x or gy, respectively. We
call this relaxed notion a self-bilinear map with auxiliary information (AI-SBM). We
formalize it as a set of algorithms SBP = (InstGen,AIGen,Map,AIMult).
InstGen(1λ)→ params = (G, e, g) : InstGen takes the security parameter 1λ as in-
put and outputs the public parameters params which consists of descriptions
of an efficiently recognizable cyclic group G on which the group operation is
efficiently computable, a self-bilinear map e on G and an element g of G. We
require that g is a generator of G with overwhelming probability and that an
approximation Approx(G) of ord(G) can be computed efficiently from params,
which is negligibly close to ord(G). By using g and Approx(G), we can generate
an almost uniform element h of G by taking x
$← [Approx(G)] and outputting
h := gx. With a slight abuse of notation, we often simply write h
$← G to
mean the above procedure. Additionally, params specifies sets TX of auxiliary
information for all X ∈ G. Since params is input for all algorithms below, we
omit it for simplicity.
AIGen(x)→ τx : AIGen takes an integer x as input, and outputs an auxiliary infor-
mation τx ∈ Tgx that corresponds to gx.
Map(gx, τy)→ e(gx, gy) : Map takes gx ∈ G and τy ∈ Tgy as input and
outputs e(gx, gy). By using this algorithm iteratively, we can compute
en(g
x1 , gx2 , . . . , gxn) if we are given gx1 , gx2 , . . . , gxn*5.
AIMult(τx, τy)→ τMult : AIMult takes τx ∈ Tgx , τy ∈ Tgy as input and outputs
τMult ∈ Tgx+y . We require that |τmult| ≤ |τx|+ |τy|+ poly(λ) holds.
AIMap(τx, τy)→ τMap : AIMap takes τx ∈ Tgx , τy ∈ Tgy as input and outputs τMap ∈
Te(gx,gy). We require that |τMap| ≤ |τx|+ |τy|+ poly(λ) holds.
AIExp(τx, α)→ τExp : AIMap takes τx ∈ Tgx and a integer α as input and outputs
τExp ∈ Tgαx . We require that |τExp| ≤ |τx|+ poly(λ, logα) holds.
AIRand(S, τx)→ τ ′x : AIRand takes a natural number S and τx ∈ Tgx such that
|τx| ≤ S as input and outputs τ ′x ∈ Tgx such that |τ ′x| ≤ poly(S, λ) .
We require for AIRand to satisfy the following property.
• Indistinguishability of auxiliary information. Intuitively, two aux-
iliary information corresponding to the same group element output by
*5 Actually, en can be computable even if one of τgx1 , . . . , τgxn is not given.
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AIRand are computationally indistinguishable. More formally, for any
params ← InstGen(1λ), gx ∈ G, if τx,i ∈ Tgx and |τx,i| ≤ S hold and we
set τ ′x,i ← AIRand(S, τx,i) (i = 0, 1), then τ ′x,0 and τ ′x,1 are computationally
indistinguishable.
Remark 7. As pointed out in [AFH+16], AI-SBMs have a significant drawback com-
pared with ideal self-bilinear maps that the size of auxiliary information grows almost
double in each computation of AIMult and AIMap. Thus if we apply these computations
recursively, then the size grows exponentially in the number of computations. Thus
we cannot compute polynomial depth circuit on auxiliary information. We remark,
however, that we can compute logarithmic depth circuits on auxiliary information. (If
randomization is required after each gate evaluation, then we can handle only constant
depth circuits.)
3.3.3 Definition of Hardness Assumptions
Here, we introduce some hardness assumptions with respect to AI-SBM. We first de-
fine Auxiliary Information Multilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (AI-MCDH) as-
sumption, Auxiliary Information Multilinear Hashed Diffie-Hellman (AI-MHDH) as-
sumption and the Auxiliary Information Augmented Power Multilinear Diffie-Hellman
(AI-APMDH) assumptions, which are counterparts of the similar assumptions defined
for multi-linear maps respectively. Finally, we define the Auxiliary Information Gen-
eralized Multilinear Diffie-Hellman (AI-GMDH) assumption, which can be seen as
a general class of Diffie-Hellman type search assumptions with respect to AI-SBMs
including the AI-MCDH and AI-APMDH assumptions.
First, we define the AI-MCDH assumption, which is an analogue of the multilinear
computational Diffie-Hellman (MCDH) assumption defined for multilinear maps.
Definition 5. (n-AI-MCDH assumption) We say that the n-Auxiliary Information
Multilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (n-MCDHAI assumption) holds if there
exists a polynomial S(λ) such that for any efficient algorithm A,
Pr[en(g, . . . , g)
∏n
i=1 xi ← A(params, {gxi}i∈[n+1], {τxi}i∈[n+1])]
is negligible, where params
$← InstGen(1λ), x1, . . . , xn+1 $← [Approx(G)] and τxi ←
AIRand(S,AIGen(xi)) for i ∈ [n+ 1].
Next, we define the AI-MHDH assumption which is the“hashed version” of the
AI-MCDH assumption.
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Definition 6. (n-AI-MHDH assumption) We say that the n-Auxiliary Information
Multilinear Hashed Diffie-Hellman (n-AI-MHDH assumption) holds with respect to a
family H = {H : G → {0, 1}k} of hash functions if there exists a polynomial S(λ)
such that for any efficient algorithm A,
Pr[1← A(params, {gxi}i∈[n], {τxi}i∈[n+1],H, T )|β = 1]
−Pr[1← A(params, {gxi}i∈[n], {τxi}i∈[n+1],H, T )|β = 0]
is negligible, where params
$← InstGen(1λ), x1, . . . , xn+1 $← [Approx(G)], τxi ←
AIRand(S,AIGen(xi)) for i ∈ [n + 1], H $← H, and T := H(en(g, . . . , g)
∏n+1
i=1 xi) if
β = 1, and otherwise T
$← {0, 1}k.
Definition 7. ((ℓ,M)-AI-APMDH assumption) We say that the (ℓ,M)-auxiliary in-
formation augmented power multilinear Diffie-Hellman((ℓ,M)-AI-APMDH) holds if
there exists a polynomial S(λ) such that for any PPT adversary A,
Pr[(c∗, F ∗c
∗
)← A(params, {Fi}i∈[4], {τfi}i∈[4]), c∗ ̸= 0, |c∗| ≤M ]
is negligible where params
$← InstGen(1λ), x1, x2, x3 $← [Approx(G)], F1 := gx2 ,
F2 := g
x3 , F3 := g
x1x2 , F4 := g
x1x2x3 , F ∗ := eℓ(g, . . . , g)x
ℓ−1
1 (x2x3)
ℓ
, τf1 ←
AIRand(S,AIGen(x2)), τf2 ← AIRand(S,AIGen(x3)), τf3 ← AIRand(S,AIGen(x1x2)),
and τf4 ← AIRand(S,AIGen(x1x2x3))．
Remark 8. In the original definition of the APMDH assumption, an adversary is
also given gx1 and gx1x3 additionally. In our application in Sec. 3.5.4, they are not
needed and thus we omit them.
Remark 9. If G is a group of known prime order, then it is the same if we only
consider the case of c∗ = 1. However, since we consider a group of unknown order,
we formulate the assumption as the above.
Next, we define the AI-GMDH assumption which generalizes the above assump-
tions.
Definition 8. (({fi}i∈[m], f∗, ℓ∗,M)-AI-GMDH assumption) Let f1, . . . , fm, f∗ be
n-variable polynomials and ℓ∗ and M be natural numbers. Then we say that the Aux-
iliary Information Generalized Multilinear Diffie-Hellman (AI-GMDH) assumption
holds if the following holds. There exists a polynomial S(λ) such that for any PPT
adversary A,
Pr[(c∗, F ∗c
∗
)← A(params, {Fi}i∈[m], {τfi}i∈[m]), c∗ ̸= 0, |c∗| ≤M ]
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is negligible, where params
$← InstGen(1λ), x1, . . . , xm $← [Approx(G)], Fi :=
gfi(x1,...,xn), τfi ← AIRand(S,AIGen(fi(x1, . . . , xn))) (for i ∈ [m]), and F ∗ :=
eℓ∗(g, . . . , g)
f∗(x1,...,xn).
Example 1. If we define fi(x1, . . . , xn+1) := xi for i ∈ [n+1], and f∗(x1, . . . , xn+1) :=∏n+1
i=1 xi, then the n-AI-MCDH assumption is equivalent to ({fi}i∈[n], f∗, n, 1)-AI-
GMDH assumption.
Example 2. If we define f1(x1, x2, x3) := x2, f2(x1, x2, x3) := x3, f3(x1, x2, x3) :=
x1x2, f4(x1, x2, x3) := x1x2x3, and f
∗(x1, x2, x3) := xℓ−11 (x2x3)
ℓ, then the (ℓ,M)-AI-
APMDH assumption is equivalent to the ({fi}i∈[4], f∗, ℓ,M)-AI-GMDH assumption.
3.4 Constructions of AI-SBM
In this section, we give two constructions of AI-SBM. We call the first one the basic
construction and the second one the extended construction. For the basic construc-
tion, we prove that the AI-MCDH assumption and the AI-MHDH assumption for a
one-bit output hash function hold under the security of iO and the factoring assump-
tion. For the extended construction, we show that the AI-MHDH assumption for a
multiple-bit output hash function holds under the same assumption, and give a easily
checkable sufficient condition for parameters such that the (({fi}i∈[m], f∗, ℓ∗,M)-AI-
GMDH assumption holds.
3.4.1 Basic Construction
First we prepare some notations for circuits on QR+N .
Notation for circuits on QR+N . In the following, for an ℓN -bit RSA modulus
N and an integer x ∈ Z, CN,x denotes a set of circuits CN,x that computes x-th
power on the group QR+N . If an input is not an element of QR
+
N , CN,x outputs 0
ℓN
(that is interpreted as ⊥). We define the canonical circuit C˜N,x in CN,x in a natural
way *6. For circuits C1, C2 whose output can be interpreted as elements of QR+N ,
Mult(C1, C2) denotes a circuit that takes a as input and outputs C1(a) ·C2(a) where
· denotes the multiplication on QR+N . C1 ◦C2 denotes a circuit that takes a as input
and outputs C1(C2(a)). The sizes of Mult(C1, C2) and C1 ◦ C2 can be bounded by
*6 There is flexibility for the definition of the canonical circuit. However, any definition works if
the size of C˜N,x is polynomially bounded in λ and |x|.
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|C1|+ |C2|+ poly(logN).
Now we are ready to describe the construction. Let k be an arbitrary natural
number. The construction is as follows.
InstGen(1λ)→ params = (N, e, g) : Run RSAGen(1λ) to obtain (N,P,Q), chooses
g
$← QR+N and outputs params = (N, g). params defines the underlying group
G := QR+N , the self bilinear map e(gx, gy) := g2xy and Approx(G) := (N−1)/4.
For any element X = gx ∈ G, the set TX is defined as the set of all circuits
that computes 2x-th power on QR+N (and outputs ⊥ for input out of QR+N ).
AIGen(x)→ τx : Take the canonical circuit C˜N,2x ∈ CN,2x, set τx := C˜N,2x and
output τx.
Map(gx, τy)→ e(gx, gy) : Compute τy(gx) and output it. (Recall that τy is a circuit
that computes the 2y-th power for an element of QR+N .)
AIMult(τx, τy)→ τMult : Compute τMult ← Mult(τx, τy) and output it.
AIMap(τx, τy)→ τMap : Compute τMap ← τx ◦ τy and output it.
AIExp(τx, α)→ τExp : Take the canonical circuit C˜N,α ∈ CN,α, compute τx ◦ C˜N,α
and output it.
AIRand(S, τx)→ τ ′x : Compute τ ′x ← iO(S, τx) and output it.
The indistinguishability of auxiliary information easily follows from the definition of
indistinguishability obfuscation.
Hardness Assumptions In this paragraph, we show that various hardness assumptions
hold w.r.t. our construction of AI-SBM.We first prove that the AI-MCDH assumption
holds with respect to our AI-SBM if iO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for
P/poly and the factoring assumption holds. Then we observe that if we use the
Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit function [GL89] as H, the AI-MHDH assumption also
holds. Finally, by extending the above proof technique, we show that more general
class of assumptions also holds with respect to our AI-SBM. In particular, we give a
sufficient condition such that the AI-GMDH assumption holds. As a corollary of the
theorem, we prove that the AI-APMDH assumption holds w.r.t. the AI-SBM.
First, we prove that the AI-MCDH assumption holds if iO is a secure indistin-
guishability obfuscator for P/poly and the factoring assumption holds. We note that
similar idea to our proof can be found in [HK09a], where it is proven that Strong
Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption on QR+N holds under the factoring assumption,
and in [Seu13], where trapdoor DDH group is constructed on QR+N .
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Theorem 1. For any integer n (polynomially bounded by the security parameter), the
n-AI-MCDH assumption holds w.r.t. the above AI-SBM if the factoring assumption
holds w.r.t. RSAGen and iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly.
Proof. For an algorithm A and an integer n (which is polynomially bounded by the
security parameter), we consider the following games.
Game 1. This game is the original n-MCDHAI game. More precisely, it is as follows.
(N,P,Q)← RSAGen(1λ)
g
$← QR+N
x1, . . . , xn+1
$← [(N − 1)/4]
τxi ← iO(S, C˜N,2xi) for i ∈ [n+ 1]
U ← A(N, g, {gxi}i∈[n+1], {τxi}i∈[n+1])
Game 1′ This game is the same as Game 1 except that x1, . . . , xn+1 are uniformly
chosen from [ord(QR+N )].
Game 2′ This game is the same as Game 1′ except that g, x1, . . . , xn+1, τx1 , . . . , τxn+1
are set differently. More precisely, they are set as follows.
(N,P,Q)← RSAGen(1λ)
h
$← QR+N
g := h2
x′0, . . . , x
′
n
$← [ord(QR+N )]
gxi := gx
′
ih for i ∈ [n+ 1]
(This implicitly defines xi ≡ x′i + 1/2 mod ord(QR+N )).
τxi ← iO(S, C˜N,2x′i+1) for i ∈ [n+ 1]
U ← A(N, g, {gxi}i∈[n+1], {τxi}i∈[n+1])
Game 2 This game is the same as Game 2′ except that x′0, . . . , x
′
n+1 are uniformly
chosen from [(N − 1)/4].
We say that A wins if it outputs U = en(g, . . . , g)Πn+1i=1 xi . For i = 1, 2, we let Ti and
T ′i be the events that A wins in Game i and Game i′, respectively. What we want to
prove is that Pr[T1] is negligible. We prove it by the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. |Pr[Ti]− Pr[T ′i ]| is negligible for i = 1, 2
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Proof. This follows since the statistical distance of uniform distributions on [(N−1)/4]
and [ord(QR+N )] are negligible.
Lemma 2. |Pr[T ′1] − Pr[T ′2]| is negligible if iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator
for P/poly.
Proof. We consider hybrid games H0, . . . Hn+1. A hybrid game Hi is the same as
Game 1′ except that the first i auxiliary information (i.e, τx1 , . . . , τxi) are generated
as in Game 2′. It is clear that H0 is identical to Game 1′ and Hn is identical to
Game 2′. Let Si be the event that A wins in Game Hi. It suffices to show that
|Pr[Si]−Pr[Si−1]| is negligible. We construct an algorithm B = (B1,B2) that breaks
the security of iO by using A that distinguishes Hi and Hi−1.
B1(1λ): B1 runs (N,P,Q) ← RSAGen(1λ), chooses h $← QR+N and x1, . . . , xn+1 $←
[ord(QR+N )] and sets g := h2. B1 computes x′0, . . . , x′n+1 ∈ ord(QR+N ) such that
xj ≡ x′j + 1/2 mod ord(QR+N ) for j ∈ [n+ 1]. (This can be computed since B1
knows the factorization of N .) Then B1 sets C0 := C˜N,2xi , C1 := C˜N,2x′i+1 and
σ := (N,P,Q, h, g, x1, . . . , xn, x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) and outputs (C0, C1, σ).
B2(σ,C∗): B2 sets
τxj ←

iO(S, C˜N,2x′j+1) if j = 0, . . . , i− 1
C∗ if j = i
iO(S, C˜N,2xj ) if j = i+ 1, . . . , n+ 1.
Then B2 runs A(N, g, {gxi}i∈[n+1], {τxi}i∈[n+1]) to obtain U . If we have U =
en(g, . . . , g)
Πn+1i=0 xi , then B2 outputs 1, and otherwise outputs 0.
The above completes the description of B. First, we show C0 and C1 output by B1 has
completely the same functionality. Since we have xj ≡ x′j + 1/2 mod ord(QR+N ), we
have 2xj ≡ 2x′j + 1 mod ord(QR+N ). Therefore 2xj-th power and (2x′j + 1)-th power
return exactly the same value on the group QR+N and thus C0 and C1 have exactly
the same functionality. We note that each of gxj (j = 0, . . . , n) is distributed in QR+N
independently of each other in all hybrid games Hi for i = 0, . . . , n. Therefore B
generates them in exactly the same way as those are generated in the hybrids Hi−1
and Hi. Then we can see that B perfectly simulates Hi−1 if C∗ ← iO(S,C0) and
Hi if C
∗ ← iO(S,C1) from the view of A. If the difference between the probability
that A wins in Hi−1 and that in Hi is non-negligible, then B succeeds in distinguish
whether C∗ is computed as C∗ ← iO(S,C0) or C∗ ← iO(S,C1), with non-negligible
advantage, and thus breaks the security of iO.
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Lemma 3. Pr[T2] is negligible if the factoring assumption holds.
Proof. Assuming that A wins in Game 2 with non-negligible probability, we construct
an algorithm B that factorizes N . This part is very similar to techniques used in
[HK09a, Seu13]. The construction of B is as follows.
B(N) : B chooses h′ $← Z∗N \ QR+N , sets h := |h′2 mod N | ∈ QR+N and
g := h2 and chooses x′1, . . . , x
′
n
$← [(N − 1)/4]. Then B sets gxi :=
gx
′
ih and τxi ← iO(M1, C˜N,2x′i+1) for all i ∈ [n + 1]. Then B runs
A(N, g, {gxi}i∈[n+1], {τxi}i∈[n+1]). Let U be the output of A. Then B
computes X := Πn+1i=1 (2x
′
i + 1) and v = Ug
−(x′0X+(X−1)/2). (Note that X is
odd and therefore (X − 1)/2 is an integer.) Then it outputs gcd(h′, V ).
Since B perfectly simulates Game 2 from the view of A, A outputs en(g, . . . , g)Πn+1i=1 xi
with non-negligible probability. If it occurs, then we have
U = en(g, . . . , g)
Πn+1i=1 xi = g2
n−1Πn+1i=1 xi = h2
nΠn+1i=1 xi = hx1Π
n+1
i=2 2xi
= h(x
′
1+1/2)Π
n+1
i=1 (2x
′
i+1) = hx
′
1X+X/2 = hx
′
1X+(X−1)/2+1/2
where we used that xi ≡ x′i + 1 mod ord(QRN ) holds for i ∈ [n + 1]. Therefore we
have V = h1/2. Since V ∈ QR+N , h′ and V are distinct square roots of h in QR+N .
Therefore gcd(h′, V ) is a non-trivial factor of N .
Theorem 1 is proven by the above lemmas.
The following is immediate from Theorem 1 and the Goldreich-Levin theorem
[GL89].
Theorem 2. The AI-MHDH assumption holds w.r.t. the above AI-SBM and the
Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit function if the factoring assumption holds with respect
to RSAGen and iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly.
3.4.2 Extended Construction
In this section, we construct a variant of the previous construction, for which various
kinds of assumptions holds. Specifically, we first prove that the AI-MHDH assumption
holds for a hash function with multi-bit output. We also show a sufficient condition
such that the AI-GMDH assumption holds. As a corollary, we show that the AI-
APMDH assumption holds w.r.t. the construction.
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The construction is actually very similar to the basic construction. The difference
from the previous construction is that we define e(gx, gy) = g2
kxy for some integer k
instead of e(gx, gy) = g2xy.
Let k be an arbitrary natural number. The construction is as follows.
InstGen(1λ)→ params = (N, e, g) : Run RSAGen(1λ) to obtain (N,P,Q), chooses
g
$← QR+N and outputs params = (N, g). params defines the underlying group
G := QR+N , the self bilinear map e(gx, gy) := g2
kxy and Approx(G) := (N −
1)/4. For any element X = gx ∈ G, the set TX is defined as the set of all
circuits that computes 2kx-th power on QR+N (and outputs ⊥ for input out of
QR+N ).
AIGen(x)→ τx : Take the canonical circuit C˜N,2kx ∈ CN,2kx, set τx := C˜N,2kx and
output τx.
Map(gx, τy)→ e(gx, gy) : Compute τy(gx) and output it. (Recall that τy is a circuit
that computes the 2ky-th power for an element of QR+N .)
AIMult(τx, τy)→ τMult : Compute τMult ← Mult(τx, τy) and output it.
AIMap(τx, τy)→ τMap : Compute τMap ← τx ◦ τy and output it.
AIExp(τx, α)→ τExp : Take the canonical circuit C˜N,α ∈ CN,α, compute τExp ←
τx ◦ C˜N,α and output it.
AIRand(S, τx)→ τ ′x : Compute τ ′x ← iO(S, τx) and output it.
The indistinguishability of auxiliary information easily follows from the definition of
indistinguishability obfuscation.
Hardness assumptions We prove that the AI-MHDH assumption holds w.r.t. the
construction.
We first define the BBS generator which we will use as a hardcore function.
Definition 9. For ℓN -bit Blum integer N , g ∈ QR+N and r ∈ {0, 1}ℓN , we define the
BBS generator as
BBSr(g) := (GLr(g), . . . ,GLr(g
k−1))
where GL denote the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit function [GL89]. That is, GLr(x) :=⊕ℓN
i=1 rixi where ri and xi are i-th bit of r and x which is represented as an integer in
{1, . . . , (N−1)/2}. We write BBS to denote the family of functions {BBSr}r∈{0,1}ℓN .
Then we show the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The AI-MHDH assumption holds w.r.t. the above AI-SBM and BBS if
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the factoring assumption holds for RSAGen and iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator
for P/poly.
Proof. For an algorithm A, we consider the following games.
Game 1. This game is the original n-MHDH game. More precisely, it is as follows.
(N,P,Q)← RSAGen(1λ)
g
$← QR+N
r
$← {0, 1}ℓN
x1, . . . , xn+1
$← [(N − 1)/4]
τxi ← iO(Mℓi , C˜N,2kxi) for i ∈ [n+ 1]
T := BBSr(g
2k(n−1)Πn+1i=1 xi)
b← A(N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , r, T )
Game 1′ This game is the same as Game 1 except that x1, . . . , xn are chosen from
[ord(QR+N )].
Game 2′. This game is the same as Game 1 except that g, x1, . . . , xn+1, τx1 , . . . , τxn+1
are set differently. More precisely, it is as follows.
(N,P,Q)← RSAGen(1λ)
h
$← QR+N
g := h2
k
x′1, . . . , x
′
n+1
$← [ord(QR+N )]
gxi := gx
′
ih for i ∈ [n+ 1]
(This implicitly defines xi ≡ x′i + 1/2k mod ord(QR+N ))
τxi ← iO(Mℓi , C˜N,2kx′i+1) for i ∈ [n+ 1]
T := BBSr(g
2k(n−1)Πn+1i=1 xi)
b← A(N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , r, T )
Game 2 This game is the same as Game 2′ except that x′1, . . . , x
′
n+1 are chosen from
[(N − 1)/4].
Game 3. This game is the same as Game 2 except that T is set as a random k-bit
string.
Let Ti be the event that A outputs 1 in Game i and T ′i be the event that A outputs
1 in Game i′. What we want to prove is |Pr[T1]−Pr[T3]| is negligible. We prove this
by the following lemmas.
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Lemma 4. |Pr[Ti]− Pr[T ′i ]| is negligible for i = 1, 2
Proof. This follows since the statistical distance between the uniform distributions of
[(N − 1)/4] and [ord(QR+N )] are negligible.
Lemma 5. |Pr[T ′1] − Pr[T ′2]| is negligible if iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator
for P/poly.
Proof. We define hybrid games H1,0, . . .H1,n+1. A hybrid game H1,i is the same as
Game 1′ except that the first i auxiliary information (i.e, τx1 , . . . , τxi) are generated
as in Game 2′. Let T1,i be the event that A outputs 1 in the hybrid H1,i. It is
clear that H1,0 is Game 1
′ and H1,n is Game 2′. Let T1,i be the event that A wins
in Game H1,i. Since we have xi ≡ x′i + 1/2k mod ord(QR+N ), CN,2kx′i+1 computes
exactly the same as CN,2kxi for any input for i = 1, . . . n + 1. (Recall that these
circuits computes the exponentiation only for an element of QR+N .) Then we can see
that |Pr[T1,i] − Pr[T1,i−1] is negligible for i ∈ [n + 1] from the security of iO. (Note
that a reduction algorithm knows the factorization of N .)
Lemma 6. |Pr[T2]−Pr[T3]| is negligible if the factoring assumption holds for RSAGen
and iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly.
Proof. We define hybrid games H2,0, . . .H2,k. For i = 0, 1, . . . , k, a hybrid game H2,i
is the same as Game 2 except that the first i-bit of T are set as in Game 2 and other bits
are set as in Game 3, i.e, T := U1|| . . . ||Ui||GLr(g2
k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj )|| . . . ||GLr(g2
kn−1Πn+1j=1 xj ),
where U1 . . . Ui
$← {0, 1}. In the following, we write GL(r, i) to denote
GLr(g
2k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj ) for notational simplicity. It is clear that H2,0 is the same as
Game 2 and H2,k is the same as Game 3. Let T2,i be the event that A outputs 1 in
the hybrid H2,i. We prove that |Pr[T2,i−1] − Pr[T2,i]| is negligible for all i ∈ [k]. To
do so, we assume that there exists an algorithm A that distinguishes H2,i and H2,i−1,
and construct a factoring algorithm by using A. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that there exists a negligible function ϵ such that Pr[T2,i−1] − Pr[T2,i] > ϵ.
This is because given A, the sign of Pr[T2,i−1] − Pr[T2,i] can be checked efficiently,
and if Pr[T2,i−1]−Pr[T2,i] < 0 then we can modify A to output inverse of the original
output so that Pr[T2,i−1]− Pr[T2,i] > 0. In the following, we use a similar argument
as in [MLLJ11].
Hardcore Predictor P. First, we construct an algorithm P that predicts
GL(r, i − 1) with non-negligible advantage when it is given (r,N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 ,
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τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , g
2k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj ) where r, N , g, x1, . . . , xn+1 and τx1 . . . , τxn+1 are
defined as in Game 2. The construction of P is as follows.
P(N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1, τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , g2
k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj , r): D′ picks b $← {0, 1}, sets
T := U1|| . . . ||Ui−1||b||GL(r, i)|| . . . ||GL(r, k − 1) and runs A(N, g, gx1 , . . . ,
gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , r, T ). Note that D’ can generate GL(r, i), . . . ,GL(r, k − 1)
since it knows g2
k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj . If A outputs 1, then P outputs b, and otherwise
it picks an independently random bit b′ $← {0, 1} and outputs it.
We define Y ′ := (N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , g
2k(n−1)+iΠn+1i=1 xi), i.e., Y ′ denotes
input of P except r and define Y := (N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1), i.e., Y de-
notes input of P except r and T . We prove that with the probability at least ϵ/2
over the choice of Y ′, P predicts GL(r, i − 1) with advantage ϵ/4. By the standard
averaging argument, with at least ϵ/2 fraction of the choice of Y , we have
Pr[1← A(Y, r, U1|| . . . ||Ui−1||GL(r, i− 1)|| . . . ||GL(r, k − 1))]
−Pr[1← A(Y, r, U1|| . . . ||Ui||GL(r, i)|| . . . ||GL(r, k − 1))] > ϵ/2.
over the choice of r and randomness of A. Conditioned on such Y is fixed, we have
Pr [GL(r, i− 1)← P(Y ′, r)]
= Pr[GL(r, i− 1)← P(Y ′, r)|b = GL(r, i− 1)] Pr[b = GL(r, i− 1)]
+Pr[GL(r, i− 1)← P(Y ′, r)|b ̸= GL(r, i− 1)] Pr[b ̸= GL(r, i− 1)]
= 1/2 + 1/2 · (Pr[1← A(Y, r, U1|| . . . ||Ui−1||GL(r, i− 1)|| . . . ||GL(r, k − 1)]
−Pr[1← A(Y, r, U1|| . . . ||Ui−1||1− GL(r, i− 1)||GL(r, i)|| . . . ||GL(r, k − 1))])
> 1/2 + ϵ/4
Reconstruction Algorithm. We obtained an algorithm P that distinguishes
GL(r, i − 1) = GLr(g2
k(n−1)+i−1Πn+1j=1 xj ) from a random bit with the advantage larger
than ϵ when it is given Y ′, r for at least ϵ/2 fraction of Y ′. Here, we use the
Goldreich-Levin theorem.
Theorem 4. (Goldreich-Levin Theorem [GL89]) Let x be an n-bit string. If there
exists a PPT algorithm P such that
|Pr[GLr(x)← P(r, z)]− 1/2|
is non-negligible where r
$← {0, 1}n, then there exists a PPT algorithm R such that
Pr[x←R(z)]
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is non-negligible.
By using this theorem, we obtain an algorithm R that computes g2k(n−1)+i−1Πn+1j=1 xj
when it is given (N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 . . . , τxn+1 , g
2k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj ) with non-
negligible probability for non-negligible fraction of its input.
Factoring Algorithm Then we construct an algorithm B that factorizes an RSA
modulus N . The construction of B is as follows.
B(N): B chooses h′ $← Z∗N \QR+N sets h := |h′2 mod N | ∈ QR+N , g := h2
k
, chooses
x′1, . . . , x
′
n+1
$← [(N − 1)/4], sets gx1 := gx′1h2k−i , τx1 ← iO(M ′1, CN,2kx′1+2k−i),
gxi := gx
′
ih, τxi ← iO(M ′1, CN,2kx′i+1) for i = 2, · · · , n + 1. Then B
can compute g2
k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj = h2
kn+iΠn+1j=1 xj = h(2
ix′1+1)Π
n+1
j=2 (2
kx′j+1). B
runs R(N, g, gx1 , . . . , gxn+1 , τx1 , . . . , τxn+1 , g2
k(n−1)+iΠn+1j=1 xj ))). Let U be
the output of R. Then B computes X := Πn+1j=2 (2kx′j + 1) and computes
V = Uh−(2
i−1x′1X+(X−1)/2). (Note that X is odd and therefore (X − 1)/2 is
an integer.) Then it outputs gcd(h′, V ).
First, we consider the distribution of input for R. Clearly, all components except
gx1 and τx1 are distributed as in Game 2. In the above algorithm, g
x1 is distributed
almost uniformly on QR+N as in Game 2 and therefore this difference causes a neg-
ligible difference on the behavior of R. τx1 is set as an obfuscation of a circuit that
computes 2kx1-th power both in the above algorithm and in Game 2, and this causes a
negligible difference by the property of indistinguishability obfuscation. Therefore R
outputs g2
k(n−1)+i−1Πn+1j=1 xj with non-negligible probability for non-negligible fraction
of its input. In this case, we have
U = g2
k(n−1)+i−1Πnj=1xj = h2
kn+i−1(x′1+1/2
i)Πn+1j=2 (x
′
j+1/2
k)
= h(2
i−1x′1+1/2)Π
n+1
j=2 (2
kx′j+1) = h2
i−1x′1X+(X−1)/2+1/2.
Therefore we have V = h1/2. Thus h′ and V are distinct square roots of h in Z∗N and
therefore gcd(h′, V ) is a non-trivial factor of N .
Theorem 3 is proven by the above lemmas.
Next, we show a sufficient condition such that the AI-GMDH assumption holds.
Before stating our result, we prepare a notation.
Definition 10. For a monic monomial f defined by f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 x
ti
i , we
define its corresponding polynomial f¯ by f¯(x1, . . . , xn) :=
∑n
i=1 tixi.
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Then our result is the following.
Theorem 5. Let f1, . . . , fm and f
∗ be functions of the form as in Def. 10. If
there exists (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Zn such that f¯i(a1, . . . , an) ≥ −1 for all i ∈ [m] and
ℓ∗ + f¯∗(a1, . . . , an) ≤ −1 hold. Then if iO is an indistinguishability obfuscation
and the factoring assumption holds w.r.t. RSAGen, then ({fi}i∈[m], f∗, ℓ∗, 2k−1)-AI-
GMDH assumption holds w.r.t. the above AI-SBM.
Proof. Assume that there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the ({fi}i∈[m], f∗,
ℓ∗, 2k−1)-AI-GMDH assumption. We construct a PPT algorithm B that computes
the square root of a random element of QR+N with non-negligible probability. (such
an algorithm yields a PPT algorithm that breaks the factoring assumption.) The
description of B is as follows.
B(N,h): Let g := h2k and params := (N, g). Pick x′i $← [(N − 1)/4] and implicitly
define xi := 2
kai(2x′i + 1) mod ord(QR
+
N ). (Since B do not know ord(QR+N ),
it cannot compute xi. It defines as above only in mind.) Then for all i ∈ [m],
we have
fi(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 2kf¯i(a1,...,an)oddi mod ord(QR+N)
f∗(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 2kf¯∗(a1,...,an)odd∗ mod ord(QR+N)
where oddi and odd
∗ are odd numbers efficiently computable from {x′i}i∈[n].
Here, we let Ai := 2
k(f¯i(a1,...,an)+1)oddi, Fi := h
Ai , and τfi := iO(S, C˜N,Ai)
where C˜N,Ai is the canonical circuit that computes Ai-th power on QR
+
N . Then
B runs (c∗, T ) ← A(params, {Fi}i∈[m], {τfi}i∈[m]). We can express c∗ as c∗ =
2voddc∗ where oddc∗ is the odd part of c
∗. Then we have v ≤ k − 1 since we
have |c∗| ≤M ≤ 2k−1. If A succeeds, then we have
T = eℓ∗(g, . . . , g)
c∗f∗(x1,...,xn)
= g2
k(ℓ∗−1)c∗f∗(x1,...,xn)
= h2
kℓ∗c∗2kf¯
∗(a1,...,an)odd∗
= h2
k(ℓ∗+f¯∗(a1,...,an))+vodd′
where we define odd′ := odd∗ ·oddc∗ . Here, since we have ℓ∗+ f¯∗(a1, . . . , an) ≤
−1 by the assumption and v ≤ k− 1, we have k(ℓ∗+ f¯∗(a1, . . . , an))+ v ≤ −1．
. Then if we define a natural number α by α := −(k(ℓ∗ + f¯∗(a1, . . . , an)) + v),
then we have T = h2
−αodd′ . Therefore we have Tα−1 = h2
−1odd′ . Then if we let
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odd′ := 2even′+1 , then we have Tα−1 = heven
′+1/2. Therefore B can compute
h1/2 by computing Tα−1h−even
′
.
This completes the description of B. In the above description, we already show that
if A succeeds, then B also succeeds. What is left is to prove the distribution of
A’s input in the above algorithm is computationally indistinguishable from that in
the AI-GMDH assumption. N is generated in the same way as in the AI-GMDH
assumption (it is generated as N ← RSAGen(1λ)). g is uniformly distributed on QR+N
as in the AI-GMDH assumption since h is uniformly distributed on QR+N and 2k is
coprime to ord(QR+N ). Since {x′i}i∈[n] are almost uniformly distributed on [ord(QR+N )]
and 2 is coprime to ord(QR+N ), {xi}i∈[n] are also almost uniformly distributed on
[ord(QR+N )]. Since we have Fi = hAi and Ai ≡ 2kfi(x1, . . . , xn) mod ord(QR+N ), we
have hAi = h2
kfi(x1,...,xn) = gfi(x1,...,xn) for i ∈ [m]. Thus we can see that gfi(x1,...,xn)
is simulated correctly. What is left is to prove that the distribution of τfi (i ∈ [m])
simulated by B is computationally indistinguishable from the real distribution in the
AI-GMDH assumption conditioned on any fixed params, {Fi}i∈[m]. τfi is generated as
τfi := iO(S, C˜N,Ai) in the simulation by B, and τfi := iO(S, C˜N,2kfi(x1,...,xn)) in the
AI-GMDH assumption. Here, since we have Ai ≡ 2kfi(x1, . . . , xn) mod ord(QR+N ),
C˜N,2kfi(x1,...,xn) and C˜N,Ai have the completely the same functionality. Therefore if
S is larger than the sizes od these circuits, then the above two are computationally
indistinguishable by the property of the indistinguishability obfuscation.
3.5 Applications of AI-SBM
In Sec. 3.4, we constructed an AI-SBM. In this section, we construct multiparty
NIKE, distributed broadcast encryption, ABE for circuits and homomorphic signa-
tures schemes by using an AI-SBM.
3.5.1 Multiparty NIKE.
Here, we construct a multiparty NIKE scheme. The idea of our construction is to use
our multilinear map (with auxiliary information) for the“multiparty” Diffie-Hellman
key exchange [DH76, BS02].
Construction. Our construction of multiparty NIKE scheme is as follows. Let H
be a family of hash functions.
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SetupNIKE(1
λ) : SetupNIKE runs params = (G, e, g) ← InstGen(1λ) and chooses H $←
H. It outputs PP = (params,H) as the public parameter.
PublishNIKE(PP): It chooses x← [Approx(G)] and sets τx ← AIRand(S,AIGen(x)). It
sets pk := (gx, τx) and sk := x, and outputs (pk, sk).
KeyGenNIKE(PP, sk, {pkj}j=1,...,n−1) : Let pkj = (gxj , τgxj ) for j ∈ [n − 1]. It first
sets k1 := g
x1 . For j = 2, . . . , n − 1, it computes kj = Map(params, kj−1, τxj ).
Finally, it computes kn = k
sk
n−1 and K = h(kn), and output K. Finally, it
outputs K := H(kn) as its derived key.
We show the correctness. Let PP ← SetupNIKE(1λ) and (gxj , τgxj ) ←
PublishNIKE(PP ) for j ∈ [n]. Then for all j∗ ∈ [n], it is easy to show that
K = h(en−1(g, . . . , g)Π
n
j=1xj ). Therefore the correctness holds.
The security of our NIKE scheme can be stated as follows.
Theorem 6. This multiparty NIKE scheme is statically secure if the AI-MHDH
assumption holds with respect to the underlying AI-SBM and H.
This is immediate from the definition of the security of NIKE and the AI-MHDH
assumption.
3.5.2 Distributed broadcast encryption.
Here, we give a construction of distributed broadcast encryption scheme based on a
multiparty NIKE scheme. This is based on the conversion proposed in [BZ14]. Let
(SetupNIKE,PublishNIKE,KeyGenNIKE) be a multiparty NIKE scheme. Then we construct
a distributed broadcast encryption scheme (SetupBE,JoinBE,EncBE,DecBE) as follows.
SetupBE(1
λ): It runs SetupNIKE(1
λ) to obtain public parameters PP and outputs PP
as its own public parameters.
JoinBE(PP ): It runs PublishNIKE(PP ) to obtain a public key pk and a secret key sk,
and outputs (pk, sk).
Enc(PP, pk1, . . . , pkn,msg): It runs PublishNIKE(PP ) to obtain (pk
∗, sk∗). Then it
runs KeyGenNIKE(PP, sk, {pkj}j=1,...,n) to obtain K. It computes Ψ := K ⊕M
and outputs a ciphertext CT = (pk∗,Ψ).
Dec(PP, sk, pk1, . . . , pkn, CT ): It parses CT as pk
∗,Ψ. It finds i such that sk is a cor-
responding secret key of pki. Then it runsK ← KeyGenNIKE(PP, sk, pk∗, pk1, . . . ,
pki−1, pki+1, . . . , pkn) and outputs msg := K ⊕Ψ.
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The security of the above scheme is immediate from the security of the underlying
multiparty NIKE scheme.
Theorem 7. If the multiparty NIKE scheme (SetupNIKE,PublishNIKE is statically se-
cure, then the distributed broadcast encryption scheme (SetupBE,JoinBE,EncBE,DecBE)
is statically secure.
3.5.3 Attribute Based Encryption for Circuits
Here, we construct an attribute based encryption scheme for general circuits. Our
construction is an analogue of [GGH+13c].
Construction. Then we give our construction of an ABE scheme. Let H be a family
of hash functions H : G→ {0, 1}ℓH and S and S1 be sufficiently large integers.
Setup(1λ, n, d): It runs params = (G, e, g) ← InstGen(1λ) and chooses
α ← [Approx(G)], h1, . . . , hn $← G and H $← H. Then it outputs
PP := (params,H, ed+1(g, . . . , g)
α, h1, . . . , hn) and MSK := (α, PP ).
Enc(PP, x ∈ {0, 1}n,M ∈ {0, 1}ℓH ): It chooses s ← [Approx(G)], sets τs ←
AIRand(S,AIGen(s)) and
CT := (M ⊕H((ed+1(g, . . . , g)α)s), τs, {hsi}i∈X)
where X is the set of all i ∈ [n] such that xi = 1. It outputs CT .
KeyGen(MSK, f): It chooses r1, . . . , rv
$← [Approx(G)] and sets
KH := ed(g, . . . , g)
α−rv
where v is the number of wires of f . Next, it generates key component for each
wire of f as follows.
• Input Wire: If w is an input wire (i.e., depth is 1), then it chooses zw $←
[Approx(G)] and sets
Kw:= g
rwh−zww
τzw← AIRand(S1,AIGen(zw)).
We let (Kw, τzw) be the key component for wire w.
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• OR Gate: If w is an output wire of an OR gate with depth j, then it
chooses aw, bw
$← [Approx(G)] and sets
Kw,1:= ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w)
Kw,2:= ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−bwrB(w)
τaw ← AIRand(S1,AIGen(aw))
τbw ← AIRand(S1,AIGen(bw)).
We let (Kw,1,Kw,2, τaw , τbw) be the key component for the wire w.
• AND Gate: If w is an output wire of an AND gate with depth j, then it
chooses aw, bw
$← [Approx(G)] and sets
Kw:= ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w)−bwrB(w)
τaw← AIRand(S1,AIGen(aw))
τbw← AIRand(S1,AIGen(bw)).
We let (Kw, τaw , τbw) be the key component for wire w.
It outputs SK which consists of description of f , KH and key components for
each wire.
Dec(PP, SK,CT ): Let SK be a secret key corresponding to f and CT be a
ciphertext corresponding to x. We can correctly decrypt it if f(x) = 1. First,
it computes E′ := e(gs,KH) = ed+1(g, . . . , g)s(α−rv) by using τs. Then it
computes as follows for all wires from wires with lower depth.
• Input Wire: Let w be an input wire. If xw=1 holds, then it computes
Ew := e(g
s,Kw)e(g
zw , hsw)
= e(gs, grwh−zww )e(g
zw , hsw)
= e(g, g)srw
by using τs and τzw .
• OR gate: Let w be an output wire of an OR gate with depth j. If fw(x) = 1
holds, then it works as follows. In this case we have fA(w) = 1 or fB(w) = 1.
If we have fA(w) = 1, then it computes
Ew := e(g
aw , EA(w))e(g
s,Kw,1)
= e(gaw , ej(g, . . . , g)
srA(w))e(gs, ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w))
= ej+1(g, . . . , g)
srw
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by using τaw and τs. If we have fA(w) ̸= 1, (in this case, we have fB(w) = 1,)
then it computes
Ew := e(g
bw , EB(w))e(g
s,Kw,2)
= e(gbw , ej(g, . . . , g)
srB(w))e(gs, ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−bwrB(w))
= ej+1(g, . . . , g)
srw
by using τbw and τs.
• AND gate: Let w be an output gate of an AND gate with depth j. If
fw(x) = 1 holds, i.e, we have fA(w) = 1 and fB(w) = 1, then it works as
follows. It computes
Ew := e(EA(w), g
aw)e(EB(w), g
bw)e(gs,Kw)
= e(ej(g, . . . , g)
srA(w) , gaw)e(ej(g, . . . , g)
srB(w) , gbw)
e(gs, ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w)−bwrB(w))
= ej+1(g, . . . , g)
srw
by using τaw , τbw and τs.
If f(x) = 1 holds, then for output wire v with depth d, it can compute
Ev = ed+1(g, . . . , g)
srv .
Next, it computes
E′′ := E′Ev
= ed+1(g, . . . , g)
s(α−rv)ed+1(g, . . . , g)srv
= ed+1(g, . . . , g)
sα.
Finally, it outputs M := CM ⊕H(E′′).
The correctness of the scheme is already checked in the above description. The
security of the scheme is as follows.
Theorem 8. Our ABE scheme is selectively secure if the AI-MHDH assumption
holds with respect to the underlying multilinear map and H.
Proof. We construct an algorithm D that breaks the (d + 1)-AI-MHDH assumption
by using A that breaks the ABE scheme. The construction of D is as follows. We
note that the label of an instance of the AI-MHDH problem is different from that in
the definition for notational convenience.
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D(params, gs, gc1 , . . . , gcd+1 , τs, τc1 , . . . , τcd+1 ,H, T ):
Setup. Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) be a target input declared by A. D sets α :=
Πd+1i=1 ci. Then it can computes ed+1(g, . . . , g)
α by iterated usage of Map by
using τc1 , . . . , τcd+1 . It chooses yi
$← [Approx(G)] for i = 1, . . . , n, and sets
hi :=
{
gyi if x∗i = 1
gyi+c1 if x∗i = 0
and PP := (params,H, ed+1(g, . . . , g)
α, h1, . . . , hn). Then it gives PP to A.
Challenge Ciphertext. For messages M0,M1 which are declared by A, D
chooses b
$← {0, 1}, and sets CT := (Mb ⊕ T, τs, {(gs)yi}i∈X∗) where X∗ is the
set of all i ∈ [n] such that x∗i = 1. It gives CT to A as a challenge ciphertext.
Key Generation. For A’s key query f such that f(x∗) = 0, D computes as
follows for all wires from wires with lower depth.
• Input Wire： Let w be an input wire. If x∗w = 1, then D chooses zw, rw $←
[Approx(G)], and computes
Kw := g
rwh−zww
τzw ← AIRand(S1,AIGen(zw)).
If x∗w = 0, then it chooses ηw, νw
$← [Approx(G)], generates τνw ←
AIGen(νw) sets zw := c2 + νw and rw := c1c2 + ηw, and computes
Kw := g
−c2yw+ηw−(yw+c1)νw
τzw := AIRand(S1,AIMult(τc2 , τνw)).
• OR Gate: Let w be an output wire of an OR gate with depth j. If fw(x∗) =
1, then D chooses aw, bw $← [Approx(G)] and computes
Kw,1 := ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w)
Kw,2 := ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−bwrB(w)
τaw := AIRand(S
′,AIGen(aw))
τbw := AIRand(S
′,AIGen(bw)).
If fw(x
∗) = 0, then it chooses ψw, φw, ηw
$← [Approx(G)], generates τψw ←
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AIGen(ψw) and τφw ← AIGen(φw), sets aw := cj+1 + ψw, bw := cj+1 + φw
and rw := Π
j+1
i=1 ci + ηw, and computes
Kw,1:= ej(g, . . . , g)
ηw−ψwηA(w)−cj+1ηA(w)−ψwΠji=1ci
Kw,2:= ej(g, . . . , g)
ηw−φwηB(w)−cj+1ηB(w)−φwΠji=1ci
τaw := AIRand(S
′,AIMult(τcj+1 , τψw))
τbw := AIRand(S
′,AIMult(τcj+1 , τφw)).
• AND Gate: Let w be an output wire of an AND gate with depth j. If
fw(x
∗) = 1, then D chooses aw, bw $← [Approx(G)], computes
Kw := ej(g, . . . , g)
rw−awrA(w)−bwrB(w)
τaw ← AIRand(S′,AIGen(aw))
τbw ← AIRand(S′,AIGen(bw)).
If fw(x
∗) = 0, then it works as follows. If fA(w)(x∗) = 0, then it
chooses ψw, φw, ηw
$← [Approx(G)], generates τψw ← AIGen(ψw) and
τφw ← AIGen(φw), sets aw := cj+1 +ψw, bw := φw and rw := Πj+1i=1 ci + ηw,
and computes
Kw:= ej(g, . . . , g)
ηw−ψwηA(w)−φwrB(w)−cj+1ηA(w)−ψwΠji=1ci
τaw := AIRand(S
′,AIMult(τcj+1 , τψw))
τbw := AIRand(S
′, τφw).
If fA(w)(x
∗) = 1 and fB(w)(x∗) = 0, it works symmetric to what is above,
with the roles of aw and bw reversed.
Remark 10. D can actually simulate the key generation oracle as the above
since ej(g, . . . , g)
Πji=1ci can be computed by iterated usage of Map by using
τc1 , . . . , τcj . Note that it need not compute ej(g, . . . , g)
Πj+1i=1ci thanks to the can-
cellation technique.
Since we have f(x∗) = 0, for the output wire v, rv is defined as Πd+1i=1 ci + ηv.
Therefore it can generate
KH = ed(g, . . . , g)
α−rv = ed(g, . . . , g)−ηv .
Thus, it can simulate the key generation oracle.
Guess. Finally, when A outputs b′, D outputs 1 if b = b′, and otherwise 0.
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The above completes the description of D. We can easily see that if β = 1, then
the CPA game and the simulated environment are computationally indistinguishable
from the view of A by the indistinguishablity of auxiliary information. (Recall that
β is a random coin that determines T is random or not.) On the other hand, if
β = 0, then information of b is completely hidden and therefore the probability that
A predicts b is equal to 1/2. Therefore |Pr[1 ← D|β = 1] − Pr[1 ← D|β = 0]| is
non-negligible if A breaks the CPA security of the scheme.
3.5.4 Homomorphic Signature
Here, we construct a selectively secure single data homomorphic signature scheme for
the class of all polynomials. Our scheme is based on the idea of [CFW14]. Namely, our
scheme is almost automatically obtained by replacing multilinear maps by AI-SBP in
the scheme of [CFW14].
Notation. In the following, we abuse the notation so that τX denotes an auxiliary
information corresponding to X, τX · τY denotes AIMult(τX , τY ), e(τX , τY ) denotes
AIMap(τX , τY ) and τ
α
X denotes AIExp(τX , α).
Our construction is as follows. We let [M ] be the message space.
KeyGen(1λ, 1n)→ (vk, sk): 　 Generate (G, e, g) = params← ParamGen(1λ), choose
ri
$← [Approx(G)] (i = 1, . . . , n) and x1, x2, x3 $← [Approx(G)], and set
Ri := g
ri (for i = 1, . . . , n), A := gx2 , B := gx3 , C := gx1x2 , U := gx1x2x3 ,
τRi := AIRand(S
′,AIGen(ri)) (for i = 1, . . . , n),
τA := AIRand(S,AIGen(x2)), τB := AIRand(S,AIGen(x3)),
τC := AIRand(S,AIGen(x1x2)), τU := AIRand(S,AIGen(x1x2x3)),
where S′ can be set as an arbitrary integer larger than the maximal size of
auxiliary information that is used as a second input of AIRand when generating
Ri through the real scheme and the security proof. Then set
vk := (params, {Ri}i∈[n], A,B,C,U, {τRi}i∈[n], τA, τB , τC , τU ), sk := (x1, x2, vk)
and output (vk.sk).
Sign(sk, i,m)→ σ:
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Compute
Λ := (RiB
−m)x2 ,Γ := Λx1 ,
τΛ := AIRand(S
′′, (τRiτ
−m
B )
x2), τΓ := AIRand(S
′′, (τRiτ
−m
B )
x1x2)
and output σ := (Λ,Γ, τΛ, τΓ), where S
′ can be set as an arbitrary integer larger
than the maximal size of auxiliary information that is used as a second input
of AIRand when generating τΓ through the real scheme and the security proof.
Eval(f, (m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn))→ σ∗: Let f be a polynomial of degree d. Then
f can be seen as an arithmetic circuit of depth O(log(d)). We let
σi = (Λi,Γi, τΛi , τΓi). We label the i-th input wire of f by (1,mi, σi).
For all i ∈ [d], compute
Ui := ei(U, . . . , U), τUi := ei(τU , . . . , τU ).
For each gate of f , compute the following.
Addition: Assume that the input wires for this gate is labeled by
(i,m(1), (Λ(1),Γ(1), τΛ(1) , τΓ(1))), (j,m
(2), (Λ(2),Γ(2), τΛ(2) , τΓ(2))).
Without loss of generality, we assume that i ≥ j. First, adjust the “degree”
of each value. That is, set
Λ′(2) := ei−j+1(Λ(2), g, . . . , g),Γ′(2) := ei−j+1(Γ(2), g, . . . , g),
τΛ′(2) := ei−j+1(τΛ(2) , τg, . . . , τg), τΓ′(2) := ei−j+1(τΓ(2) , τg, . . . , τg).
Then set
m∗ := m1 +m2,Λ∗ := Λ(1) · Λ′(2),Γ∗ := Γ(1) · Γ′(2),
τΛ∗ := τΛ(1) · τΛ′(2) , τΓ∗ := τΓ(1) · τΓ′(2) ,
and assign (i,m∗, (Λ∗,Γ∗, τΛ∗ , τΓ∗)) to the output wire of this gate.
Multiplication by constant c: Let (i,m, (Λ,Γ, τΛ, τΓ)) be the value labeled to
the input wire of this gate. Then compute
m∗ := c ·m, Λ∗ := Λc, Γ∗ := Γc, τΛ := τ cΛ, τΓ := τ cΓ
and assign (i,m∗, (Λ∗,Γ∗, τΛ∗ , τΓ∗)) to the output wire of this gate.
Multiplication: Assume that the input wires for this gate is labeled by
(i,m(1), (Λ(1),Γ(1), τΛ(1) , τΓ(1))), (j,m
(2), (Λ(2),Γ(2), τΛ(2) , τΓ(2))). Then
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compute
m∗ := mA ·mB ,
Λ∗ := e(Λ(1),Γ(2)) · e(Λ(1), Um2j ) · e(Umii ,Λ(2)),
Γ∗ := e(Γ(1),Γ(2)) · e(Γ(1), Um2j ) · e(Umii ,Γ(2)),
τΛ∗ := e(τΛ(1) , τΓ(2)) · e(τΛ(1) , τm2Uj ) · e(τm1Ui , τΛ(2)),
τΓ∗ := e(τΓ(1) , τΓ(2)) · e(τΓ(1) , τm2Uj ) · e(τm1Ui , τΓ(2)),
and assign (i+ j,m∗, (Λ∗,Γ∗, τΛ∗ , τΓ∗)) to the output wire of this gate.
We can see that the output wire of f is labeled by (d, f(m1, . . . ,mn), (Λout,Γout,
τΛout , τΓout)) for some (Λout,Γout, τΛout , τΓout). Then Eval outputs Λout.
Verify(vk, f,m, σ = Λ)→ 1/0: Set gd := ed(g, . . . , g) and compute R = gf(r1,...,rN )d
and its corresponding auxiliary information τR. This can be computed by
evaluating f on the values R1, . . . , Rn. Namely, replace an addition in f by
a multiplication in G and a multiplication by an evaluation of e. Let Bd :=
ed(B, . . . , B) and verify e(R ·B−md , gx
d−1
1 x
d
2
d ) = e(Λd, gd). If this equation holds,
then output 1, and otherwise output 0. Here, required values for the verification
can be computed as
τR·B−md := τR · e(τB , . . . , τB)
−m,
g
xd−11 x
d
2
d := ed(A,C, . . . , C),
τgd := ed(τg, . . . , τg).
Security
Theorem 9. If the (dM)-AI-APMDH assumption hold for all polynomially bounded
d then the above scheme is selectively secure.
Proof. We construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the (ℓ,M)-AI-APMDH assump-
tion by using a PPT adversary A that breaks the above homomorphic signature
scheme. Here, if f∗ output by A as a part of forgery is d, thenwe let ℓ := d. The
construction of B is as follows.
B(params, {Fi}i∈[4], {τFi}i∈F4): First, runsA to obtain a signing query (m1, . . . ,mn).
Set A := F1, B := F2, C := F3, U := F4, τA := τF1 , τB := τF2 , τC := τF3
and τU := τF4 . Choose yi
$← [Approx[G]] for i ∈ [n] and set Ri := gyiBmi ,
τRi := AIRand(S
′,AIGen(yi) · τmiB ) and vk :=
(
params, {Ri}i∈[N ], A,B,C,U,
{τRi}i∈[N ], τA, τB , τC , τU
)
.
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Set Λi := A
yi , Γi := C
yi , τΛi := AIRand(S
′′, τyiA ), τΓi := AIRand(S
′′, τyiC )
and σi := (Λi,Γi, τΛi , τΓi) for i ∈ [n]. Give (vk, {σi}i∈[n]) to A. Let
(f∗,m∗, σ∗) be a forgery output by A. Set Λ∗ := σ∗ and compute
Λ′∗ ← Eval(vk, f∗, {(mi, σi)}i∈[n]). Set c∗ := f∗(m1, . . . ,mn)−m∗ and output
(c∗,Λ∗ · Λ′∗−1).
We show that the above algorithm works well. First, we show that the distribu-
tion of vk and σi for i ∈ [n] given to A in the B’s simulation is computationally
indistinguishable from that in the game of the selective security. Each component of
vk except Ri and τRi is generated in exactly the same way as in the real scheme.It
is easy to see that Ri is distributed almost uniformly on G both in B’s simulation
and the real scheme. τRi is generated by inputting an element of TRi to AIRand
in both the simulation and the real scheme, thus they are computationally indistin-
guishable due to the indistinguishability of auxiliary information. We can see that
Λi and Γi are simulated correctly since we have (RiB
−mi)x2 = (gyi)x2 = Ayi and
(RiB
−mi)x1x2 = (gyi)x1x2 = Cyi . Moreover, the distribution of τΛi and τΓi generated
by B is computationally indistinguishable from the real one since they are generated
by inputting an element of TΛi and TΓi to AIRand, respectively. Therefore, the distri-
bution of A’s input simulated by B is computationally indistinguishable from the real
one and thus A succeeds to output a forgery with non-negligible probability in B’s
simulation. If A succeeds to output a forgery, then we have f∗(m1, . . . ,mn) ̸= m∗ and
e(R ·B−m∗d , gx
d−1
1 x
d
2
d ) = e(Λ
∗, gd). Therefore we have Λ∗ = (R ·B−m
∗
d )
xd−11 x
d
2 . On the
other hand, by the correctness of the scheme, we have e(R ·B−f∗(m1,...,mn)d , gx
d−1
1 x
d
2
d ) =
e(Λ′∗, gd). That is, we have Λ′∗ = (R · B−f
∗(m1,...,mn)
d )
xd−11 x
d
2 . Therefore we have
Λ∗ ·Λ′∗−1 = Bf∗(m1,...,mn)−m∗)x
d−1
1 x
d
2
d = g
c∗xd−11 x
d
2x
d
3 , where f∗(m1, . . . ,mn) ̸= m∗ and
thus we have c∗ ̸= 0 and |c∗| = |(f∗(m1, . . . ,mn) −m∗| < M . Therefore B succeeds
to break the (d,M)-AI-GMDH assumption.
3.6 Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme by using
an indistinguishability obfuscator. This is not a direct application of our self-bilinear
map. However, the idea behind the construction is similar.
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3.6.1 Φ-hiding Assumption
Here, we give the definition of the Φ-hiding assumption [KOS10] as follows. Let
RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e] be an efficient algorithm which takes the security parameter 1λ
as input and outputs (N,P,Q) where N = PQ is an ℓN -bit Blum integer such that
P ≡ 1 mod e and QR+N is cyclic. Let Pℓ be the set of all ℓ-bit primes.
Definition 11. For a constant c, we consider the following distributions.
R = {(e,N) : e, e′ R← PcℓN ;N ← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e′](1λ)}
L = {(e,N) : e R← PcℓN ;N ← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e](1λ)}
We say that the Φ-hiding assumption holds with respect to RSA if for any efficient
adversary A, |Pr[1← A(L)]− Pr[1← A(R)]| is negligible.
Parameters. According to [KOS10], N can be factorized in time O(N ϵ) where
e
R← PcℓN ;N ← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e](1k) and c = 1/4 − ϵ. In our scheme, we set c to
be the value such that cℓN = λ. This setting avoids the above mentioned attack in a
usual parameter setting (e.g., ℓN = 1024 for 80-bit security).
3.6.2 Our Construction
Here, we construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme by using indistin-
guishability obfuscation. We use the notation for circuits on QR+N which is given in
Sec. 3.4. In addition to that, here, we use the following notation. For circuits C1
and C2 such that an output of C1 can be interpreted as input for C2, C1 ◦C2 denotes
the composition of C1 and C2, i.e, C1 ◦ C2 is a circuit that computes C2(C1(x)) for
input x. The construction of our homomorphic encryption HEOurs = (KeyGen,Enc,
Eval,Dec) is as follows.
KeyGen(1λ): Choose e
$← Pλ and (N,P,Q) ← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e](1λ). Choose g $←
QR+N and compute an integer ρ such that ρ ≡ 0 mod ord(QR+N )/e and ρ ≡
1 mod e. It outputs a public key pk = (N, e, g) and a secret key sk = (ρ, pk).
Enc(pk,m ∈ {0, 1}): Choose r $← [(N −1)/4], set c← iO(Max, C˜N,m+re) and output
c, whereMax is defined as an integer larger than maxm∈{0,1},r∈[(N−1)/4]{|C˜N,m+re|}.
Eval(pk, f, c1, . . . , cℓ): Work only if c1, . . . , cℓ are circuits (i.e., generated by Enc).
Convert f into an arithmetic circuit f ′ on Ze. (That is, each gate of f ′ is
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addition, multiplication or negation on Ze.)*7 Compute as follows for all wires
of f ′ from wires with lower depth.
• Input: Let w be the i-th input wire. Then ci is assigned to this wire.
• Addition: Let w be an output wire of an addition gate. Set
cw := Mult(cA(w), cB(w)).
• Multiplication: Let w be an output wire of a multiplication gate. Set
cw := cA(w) ◦ cB(w).
• Negation: Let w be an output wire of a negation gate. Set cw := CN,inv ◦
cA(w) where CN,inv is a circuit that computes an inverse on QR
+
N .
Let v be the output wire. Compute ceval = cv(g) and output it. Note that it is
a group element and not a circuit. Therefore we cannot evaluate it again.
Dec(sk, c): Work differently depending on whether c is an output of Enc or Eval. If
c is an output of Enc, then compute M = c(g). If Mρ = 1, then output 0,
and otherwise output 1. If c is an output of Eval, then output 0 if cρ = 1, and
otherwise output 1.
First, we prove the correctness of the scheme. We have e|ord(QR+N ) by the choice of
N . Therefore, there exists a subgroup G+e of order e of QR
+
N . We can see that for
any element h ∈ QR+N , hρ is the G+e component of h. In the decryption, we have
M = iO(Max, CN,m+re)(g) = gm+re. Therefore Mρ is the G+e component of gm. We
can see that G+e component of g is not 1 with overwhelming probability since e is a
λ-bit prime. Therefore Mρ = 1 is equivalent to m = 0 and Mρ ̸= 1 is equivalent to
m = 1 with overwhelming probability. Thus the correctness follows.
The security of HEOurs relies on the Φ-hiding assumption. Specifically, it satisfies
the following property.
Theorem 10. HEOurs is NC
1-homomorphic, compact and CPA secure if the Φ-hiding
assumption holds with respect to RSA and iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for
P/poly.
Proof.
NC1-homomorphism. We show that HEOurs is NC
1-homomorphic. Here, NC1 is the
class of circuits with depth O(log(λ)). Note that if f is in NC1, then the depth of the
corresponding arithmetic circuit f ′ is also O(log(λ)). First, we show the correctness
of Eval. We can see that output ceval of Eval satisfies ceval = g
m by an easy induction
where m is a corresponding message. Therefore we can prove that ceval is correctly
*7 This can be done since we have a∧ b = a · b mod e and a∨ b = a+ b−a · b mod e if a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
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decrypted similarly as the above. Next, we show that Eval is computed efficiently
if the depth of f ′ is O(log(λ)). We can easily see that Eval is computed efficiently
if |cv| is polynomially bounded in the security parameter. Let Mj be the maximum
value of |cw| for a wire w with depth j. M1 is constant in |f ′|. For j ≥ 2, we have
Mj ≤ 2Mj−1+max{|CN,mult|, |CN,inv|}. Therefore if the depth of f ′ is O(log λ), then
|cv| is polynomially bounded by |f ′| (and therefore λ). Therefore Eval is efficiently
computable.
Compactness. HEOurs is compact since output of Eval is always an element of QR+N .
Security. To prove the security, we consider the following sequence of games.
Game 1: This game is the original CPA game. More formally, it is as follows.
e
$← Pλ
(N,P,Q)← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e](1λ)
g
$← Z∗N
b
$← {0, 1}
r
$← [(N − 1)/4]
c← iO(Max, C˜N,b+re)
b′ $← A(N, e, g, c)
Game 2: This is the same game as Game 1 except that N and e are set differently as
follows.
e, e′ $← Pλ
(N,P,Q)← RSA[p ≡ 1 mod e′](1λ)
Game 3: This is the same game as Game 2 except that c is set differently as follows.
c← iO(Max, C˜N,(b+re mod ord(QR+N )))
Game 4: This is the same game as Game 3 except that c is set differently as follows.
r′ $← [ord(QR+N )]
c← iO(Max, CN,r′)
Let Ti be the event that b
′ = b in Game i. What we want to prove is |Pr[T1]−
1/2| is negligible. We prove it by the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. Pr[T1]− Pr[T2] is negligible if the Φ-hiding assumption holds.
Proof. It is easy to see that an adversary that distinguishes Game 1 and Game
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2 is reduced to an adversary that breaks the Φ-hiding assumption.
Lemma 8. Pr[T2]−Pr[T3] is negligible if iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator
for P/poly.
Proof. C˜N,b+re and C˜N,(b+re mod ord(QR+N ))
compute identically for all input.
Therefore the lemma follows from the property of iO.
Lemma 9. Pr[T3]− Pr[T4] is negligible.
Proof. In Game 3, ord(QR+N ) is coprime to e with overwhelming probability.
Therefore the distribution of r mod ord(QR+N ) where r
$← [(N−1)/4] is negligi-
bly close to the uniform distribution on Zord(QR+N ) since (N − 1)/4 is negligibly
close to ord(QR+N ).
Lemma 10. Pr[T4] = 1/2
Proof. In Game 4, A obtain no information of b, therefore the probability that
A predicts b is 1/2.
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Chapter 4
Adversary-dependent Lossy Trapdoor
Function
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a cryptographic primitive called a lossy trapdoor function
(LTDF). Though there are some “factoring-based construction”of LTDFs, there is
no known construction of LTDFs whose security is rigorously reduced to the factor-
ing assumption. In this part, we first relax the definition of an LTDF to define an
adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor functions (ad-LTDF). Then we show that in many
applications of LTDFs, we can replace LTDFs with ad-LTDFs. Moreover, we give a
construction of an ad-LTDF based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. semi-smooth
RSA subgroup moduli (SS moduli), which is a special type of RSA moduli introduced
by Groth [Gro05]. As a result, we almost automatically obtain a new constructions of
collision resistant hash function, CPA/CCA secure PKE schemes and DPKE scheme
based on the same assumption. Especially, our DPKE scheme is the first scheme that
satisfies the security notion called the PRIV security for block sources proposed by
Boldyreva et al. [BFO08] solely based on the factoring assumption. Besides direct
applications of ad-LTDFs, we construct a CCA secure PKE scheme based on the fac-
toring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli whose ciphertext overhead is the shortest among
schemes based on the same assumption.
4.1.1 Background
In modern cryptography, constructing provably secure cryptographic primitives is an
important research topic. In this line of researches, Peikert and Waters [PW08] pro-
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posed lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) and constructed a number of cryptographic
primitives such as a collision resistant hash function, a chosen plaintext (CPA) and
chosen ciphertext (CCA) secure public key encryption (PKE) schemes and an oblivi-
ous transfer scheme based on LTDFs. Following the work, it is also shown that LTDFs
can be used for constructing a deterministic encryption (DE) scheme [BFO08], a se-
lective opening attack (SOA) secure PKE scheme [BHY09], universally composable
commitment [NFT09] etc. As seen above, LTDFs have many applications, and there-
fore it is important to research concrete constructions of LTDFs.
As concrete constructions of LTDFs, Peikert and Waters [PW08] constructed
schemes based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and learning with errors
(LWE) assumptions. After that, many constructions of LTDFs have been proposed
thus far. Among them, LTDFs related to the factoring are based on the quadratic
residuosity (QR) [FGK+10], decisional composite residuosity (DCR) [FGK+10],
Φ-hiding [KOS10], or general class of subgroup decision assumptions [XLL+13], all of
which are decision assumptions. On the other hand, there is no known construction of
an LTDF based on the factoring assumption or a factoring-related search assumption.
In general, search assumptions are rather weaker than decision assumptions. Thus
it is important to research the possibility of constructing LTDFs based on a search
assumption.
4.1.2 Our Result
In this chapter, though we do not construct LTDFs based on the factoring assump-
tion, we construct an adversary dependent lossy trapdoor function (ad-LTDF), which
is a new notion we introduce, based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. semi-smooth
RSA subgroup (SS) moduli, which are RSA moduli of a special form [Gro05]. Then
we show that ad-LTDFs can replace LTDFs in many applications. As a result, we im-
mediately obtain factoring-based cryptographic primitives including a hash function,
PKE scheme and DPKE scheme. Besides direct applications of ad-LTDFs, by using
similar technique, we construct CCA secure PKE scheme with compact ciphertext
based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. More details are given in the
following.
Adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor function. We first reconsider the defini-
tion of LTDFs, and introduce a notion of an ad-LTDF, which is a weaker variant
of an LTDF. Intuitively, an LTDF is a computationally indistinguishable pair of an
injective and lossy functions. Here, the description of lossy functions should be fixed
4.1 Introduction 61
by the scheme. On the other hand, for ad-LTDFs, we allow a description of lossy
function to depend on an adversary. That is, we only require that for any efficient
adversary A there exists a lossy function that A cannot distinguish from an injective
function. We observe that this significant relaxation does not harm the security of
many LTDF-based cryptographic constructions. This is because in many LTDF-based
schemes, lossy functions are used only in security proofs and they do not appear in
the real scheme. This means that even if lossy functions depend on an adversary,
we can still prove the security of the scheme. By this observation, we can see that
ad-LTDFs can replace LTDFs in many applications.
Moreover, we construct an ad-LTDF based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS
moduli, which is introduced by Groth [Gro05]. As a result, we can instantiate many
LTDF-based constructions based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. The
intuition of the construction of the ad-LTDF is given in Sec. 4.1.3.
Applications of ad-LTDFs. As stated above, ad-LTDFs can replace LTDFs in
many applications, and we give a construction of an ad-LTDF under the factoring
assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. Thus we immediately obtain new factoring-based con-
structions of many cryptographic primitives such as a collision resistant hash function,
CPA/CCA secure PKE scheme and a DPKE scheme. Among them, the DPKE scheme
obtained by this way is the first factoring-based scheme that satisfies the PRIV secu-
rity for block-sources, which is defined in [BFO08], without relying on any decision
assumption.
Table 4.1. Comparison among CCA secure PKE schemes based on the factoring
assumption: ℓN is the bit-length of an underlying composite number
N , ℓMAC denotes the bit-length of a message authentication code, Fac-
toring SS denotes the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli, and we
assume that an exponentiation with an exponent of length ℓ can be
computed by 1.5ℓ multiplications.
Schemes Ciphertext Public Computational cost for Assumption
overhead key size encryption decryption
(bit) (bit) (mult) (mult)
[HK09b] 2ℓN 3ℓN 3ℓN + 3.5λ 1.5ℓN + 10.5λ Factoring
[MLLJ11] 2ℓN 3ℓN 18.5λ 18λ Factoring SS
Ours ℓN + ℓMAC O(λ
2ℓN/ log λ) O(λℓ
2
N/ log λ) O(λℓ
2
N/ log λ) Factoring SS
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CCA secure PKE with short ciphertext. Besides direct applications of ad-
LTDFs, we construct a CCA secure PKE scheme whose ciphertext overhead is the
shortest among schemes based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. Table
4.1 shows the efficiency of CCA secure PKE schemes based on the factoring assump-
tion. Among existing schemes, the scheme proposed by Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09b]
is one of the best in regard to the ciphertext overhead, which consists of 2 elements
of Z∗N . Mei et al. [MLLJ11] improved the efficiency of the Hofheinz-Kiltz scheme
[HK09b] in regard to encryption and decryption costs by using SS moduli. However,
they did not improve the ciphertext overhead. In contrast, the ciphertext overhead
of our scheme consists of only 1 element of Z∗N and a message authentication code
(MAC), whose bit-length can be much smaller than that of N . By giving a con-
crete parameter, the ciphertext overhead of our scheme is 1360-bit for 80-bit security
whereas that of [HK09b] is 2048-bit. On the other hand, the public key size of our
scheme is much larger than that of [HK09b], and an encryption and decryption are
much less efficient than those in [HK09b]. We note that the reduction from the CCA
security of our scheme to the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli is quite loose,
but all known CCA secure PKE scheme based on the factoring assumption (including
[HK09b, MLLJ11]) also require loose reductions because they require Blum-Blum-
Shub pseudo-random number generator [BBS86].
We note that there is a strong negative result for a CCA secure PKE scheme
whose ciphertext overhead is less than 2 group elements in a prime order setting
[HMS12]. Even in a composite order setting, there are only a few CCA secure PKE
schemes whose ciphetext overhead is less than 2 group elements, all of which rely on a
subgroup decision assumption [HK07, KPSY09, HK09a] or an interactive assumption
[KMO10] stronger than the factoring assumption. Ours is the first scheme to overcome
this bound based solely on the factoring assumption (though our assumption is the
factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli, which may not be considered standard).
4.1.3 Our Technique
Difficulty of constructiing LTDFs based on a search assumption. Before
explaining our technique, we first explain why it is difficult to construct LTDFs based
on a search assumption. Recall that an LTDF is a computationally indistinguishable
pair of injective and lossy functions. Apparently, the definition of LTDFs itself re-
quires the hardness of a decision problem. Thus for constructing LTDFs based on
a search assumption, we have to rely on some “search-to-decision” reduction. As a
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general technique for such a reduction, there is the Goldreich-Levin hardcore theo-
rem [GL89], which enables us to extract “pseudorandomness” from hardness of any
search problem. However, the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit destroys algebraic struc-
tures of original problems. On the other hand, considering existing constructions
of LTDFs, algebraic structures of underlying problems are crucial for constructing
LTDFs. Thus, for constructing LTDFs based on search assumptions, we have to
establish another “search-to-decision” reduction technique that does not hurt under-
lying algebraic structures. In the context of lattice problems, this has been already
done. Namely, it is shown that search-LWE and decision-LWE assumptions are equiv-
alent [Reg05]. Thus LTDFs can be constructed based on the search-LWE assumption.
However, there is no known such a reduction in the context of the factoring problem.
Namely, we have no reduction from decision assumptions such as QR, DCR, or more
general subgroup decision assumptions to the factoring assumption.
New search-to-decision reduction technique. The core of this work is to give
a new search-to-decision reduction technique in the context of factoring w.r.t. SS
moduli. Namely, we introduce a new decision assumption that we call the adversary-
dependent decisional RSA subgroup (ad-DRSA) assumption, and reduce the ad-
DRSA assumption to the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. In the following, we
explain the technique in more detail.
We say that a composite number N is an SS modulus if it can be written as
N = PQ = (2pp′ + 1)(2qq′ + 1), where P and Q are primes with the same length, p
and q are “smooth” numbers (i.e., products of distinct small primes) and p′ and q′ are
relatively large primes. Then the group of quadratic residues QRN is a cyclic group of
order pqp′q′, and has many subgroups since pq is smooth. With respect to SS moduli,
Groth [Gro05] proposed the decisional RSA subgroup (DRSA) assumption , which
claims that any PPT adversary cannot distinguish a random element of G from that
of QRN where G is the unique subgroup of QRN of order p′q′.
Our first observation is that if there exists an algorithm that breaks the DRSA
assumption, then one can find at least one small prime that divides Φ(N). This
can be seen by the following argument: Assume that all prime factors of pq are
of ℓB-bit length. (Since pq is smooth, ℓB is relatively small. Especially, we set
ℓB = O(log λ).) Recall that the DRSA assumption claims that any PPT algorithm
cannot distinguish a random element of G from that of QRN . This is equivalent to
that the distributions of gp1...pM and g are indistinguishable where g
$← QRN and
p1, . . . , pM are the all ℓB-bit primes (and thus M is the number of the all ℓB-bit
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primes). If there exists an algorithm A that breaks the DRSA assumption, then it
distinguishes these two distributions. Thus, by the hybrid argument, there exists
j ∈ [M ] such that A distinguishes the distribution of gp1...pj−1 from gp1,...pj . By using
A, one can find this pj by the exhaustive search since M is polynomial in the security
parameter in our parameter setting. (See Sec. 4.3 for more detail.) For this pj , we
have pj |Φ(N) (with overwhelming probability) since otherwise pj-th power on QRN
is a permutation on the group and thus distributions of gp1...pj−1 and gp1,...pj are
completely identical. The above argument proves that if there exists an algorithm
that breaks the DRSA assumption, then one can find at least one small prime that
divides Φ(N). However, this fact states nothing about the reduction from the DRSA
assumption to the factoring assumption since even if one can find one small prime p
that divides Φ(N), we do not know how to factorize N .
Here, we relax the DRSA assumption to define the adversary-dependent decisional
RSA subgroup (ad-DRSA) assumption. Intuitively, the ad-DRSA assumption claims
that for any PPT adversary A, there exists a subgroup SA of QRN such that A
does not distinguish a random element of SA from that of QRN . More precisely,
the ad-DRSA assumption is parametrized by an integer m ≤ M , and m-ad-DRSA
assumption claims that for any PPT algorithm A, there exists at least one choice
of p1, . . . pm out of all ℓB-bit primes such that A cannot distinguish gp1...pm from g
where g
$← QRN . By this definition, if there exists a PPT algorithm A that breaks
the m-ad-DRSA assumption, then A distinguishes gp1...pm from g for all choices of
p1, . . . , pm. If m is sufficiently smaller than M , then there exists “many” choices of
p1, . . . , pm and thus one can find “many” primes that divides Φ(N): One can find at
least one such prime for each choice of p1, . . . , pm by the similar method as in the
case of the DRSA assumption. Then the product of these primes is a large divisor
of Φ(N) and thus one can factorize N by using the Coppersmith theorem [Cop96],
which claims that if one is given a “large” divisor of Φ(N), then one can factorize N
efficiently. Thus, the m-ad-DRSA assumption is reduced to the factoring assumption.
Remark 11. We remark that if m is so small that there exists a choice of p1, . . . , pm,
all of which are coprime to Φ(N), then the m-ad-DRSA assumption is trivial since
in that case g and gp1...pm are distributed identically. We show that there exists
a parameter choice such that m-ad-DRSA assumption is non-trivial and it can be
reduced to the factoring assumption simultaneously.
How to use the ad-DRSA assumption. As explained above, we show a reduction
from the ad-DRSA assumption, which is a certain type of a subgroup assumption,
to the factoring assumption. However, the ad-DRSA assumption is not an ordinary
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subgroup decision assumption: Roughly speaking, it only claims that for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a subgroup SA ∈ QRN such that A cannot distinguish
random elements of SA from QRN . Therefore, it cannot be used for constructions
where elements of a subgroup are used in the real descriptions of the scheme. On
the other hand, if elements of a subgroup are used only in the security proof, the
ad-DRSA assumption suffices. We give two examples of such cases.
One is ad-LTDFs. As explained in Sec. 4.1.2, ad-LTDFs is a relaxation of LTDFs
such that descriptions of lossy functions can depend on an adversary. For constructing
ad-LTDFs based on the ad-DRSA assumption, we simply imitate the construction
by Xue et al. [XLL+13], who constructed LTDFs based on the (standard) DRSA
assumption. We observe that in their construction, the descriptions of injective func-
tions consist only of elements of QRN , and elements of its subgroup are used only in
the descriptions of lossy functions. Therefore even if we replace the DRSA assumption
with the ad-DRSA assumption, only lossy functions depend on an adversary. This
meets the definition of the ad-LTDFs.
The other is the hash-proof system-based CCA secure public key encryption. Hofh-
eniz and Kiltz [HK07] introduced the concept of constraind CCA (CCCA) security,
and showed efficient constructions of CCA secure public key encryption schemes based
on a hash proof system, which can be constructed from any subgroup decision as-
sumption [CS02]. Though elements of a subgroup are used in the real protocol of
their original construction, it is easy to see that even if elements of a subgroup are
replaced with those of a larger group, the scheme is still secure because they are in-
distinguishable by the assumption. Thus that scheme can be instantiated based on
the ad-DRSA assumption.
4.1.4 Discussion
Plausibility of the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. Here, we discuss
the plausibility of the assumption we used. SS moduli was first introduced by Groth
[Gro05] in 2005 and they have been used in some works [MLLJ11, XLL+13, YYN+14].
All of these works assume the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli (or more stronger
assumptions). On the other hand, in 2011, Coron et.al. [CJM+11] gave a cryptanaly-
sis against the Groth’s work [Gro05]. However, they did not improve attacks against
SS moduli. Thus, we can say that SS moduli has attracted a certain amount of atten-
tion in the sense of both constructions and cryptanalysis, but no fatal attack is found
thus far. Therefore we believe that the hardness of factoring SS moduli is rather
reliable.
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Interpretation of our result. In this chapter, we constructed a weaker variant
of LTDF (ad-LTDF) based on the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. One may
wonder how meaningful our result is since an SS modulus is not an RSA modulus
of a standard form. We believe that our result is meaningful in terms of that we
constructed an “LTDF-like primitive” (ad-LTDF), which can replace LTDFs in many
applications, based on a search assumption (factoring w.r.t. SS moduli) rather than
a decision assumption. Although the application given in this chapter is limited to
the case of SS moduli, we hope that our new search-to-decision reduction technique
can be extended to other general settings.
Limitation of ad-LTDFs. Though ad-LTDFs can replace LTDFs in many cases,
there exist some LTDF-based primitives that cannot be obtained from ad-LTDFs. A
typical example is the oblivious transfer protocol proposed by Peikert and Waters
[PW08]. The reason why we cannot construct the scheme based on ad-LTDFs is
that in the scheme, a lossy function is explicitly required. Specifically, a receiver
sends a pair of injective and lossy functions to a sender. Since we cannot specify a
lossy function before fixing an adversary, we cannot instantiate this scheme based on
ad-LTDFs.
4.1.5 Related Work
Factoring based CCA secure PKE schemes. In 2009, Hofheinz and Kiltz
[HK09b] proposed the first practical CCA secure PKE scheme under the factoring
assumption in the standard model. After that, many variants of the scheme are pro-
posed thus far [MLLJ11, LLML12, LLL13, YYN+14]. However, none of them improve
the ciphertext overhead of the scheme. On the other hand, the ciphretext overhead
of our proposed scheme is shorter than those of them.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Known Lemmas
Here, we review known lemmas used in this chapter. First, we review a simple variant
of the Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63].
Lemma 11. (Hoeffding inequality) Let D1 and D2 be probability distributions over
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{0, 1}. Let X1, . . . , XK be K independent random variables with the distribution D1
and Y1, . . . , YK be K independent random variables with the distribution D2. If we
define ϵ := |Pr[X = 1 : X $← D1]− Pr[Y = 1 : Y $← D2]|, then Pr[| |Σ
K
k=1Xk−ΣKi=kYk|
K −
ϵ| ≥ δ] ≤ 4e−δ2K/2 holds.
The following is the generalized leftover hash lemma [DORS08].
Lemma 12. (Generalized leftover hash lemma) Let X ∈ {0, 1}n1 and Y be random
variables. Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash function from {0, 1}n1 to
{0, 1}n2 . Then we have ∆((H(X),H, Y ), (U,H, Y )) ≤ δ where H $← H as long as
H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ n2 + 2 log(1/δ).
The following is the “crooked version” of the above lemma proven by Boldyreva et
al. [BFO08].
Lemma 13. (Generalized crooked leftover hash lemma [BFO08, Lemma7.1]) Let X ∈
{0, 1}n and Y be random variables. Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash
function from {0, 1}n to R and f be a function from R to S. Then for H $← H, we have
∆((f(H(X)),H, Y ), (f(U),H, Y )) ≤ δ as long as H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ log |S|+2 log(1/δ)−2.
Finally, we review the Coppersmith theorem about bivariate integer equations. The
following lemma is a special case of [Cop96, Theorem 3].
Lemma 14. Let p(x, y) = a+ bx+ cy be a polynomial over Z. For positive integers
X,Y and W = max{a, bX, cY }, if XY < 2−8 ·W holds, then one can find all solutions
(x0, y0) such that p(x0, y0) = 0, |x0| < X and |y0| < Y in time polynomial in log2W .
4.3 Semi-smooth RSA subgroup modulus
Here, we define a semi-smooth RSA subgroup modulus (SS modulus) and state its
properties. For integers ℓB , tp and tq, We say that N = PQ = (2pp
′ + 1)(2qq′ + 1)
is an (ℓB , tp, tq)-semi-smooth RSA subgroup ((ℓB , tp, tq)-SS) modulus if the following
conditions hold.
• P and Q are distinct prime numbers with the same length that satisfy gcd(P −
1, Q− 1) = 2.
• p′ and q′ are distinct primes larger than 2ℓB .
• p and q are products of tp and tq distinct ℓB-bit primes. Here, an ℓB-bit
prime means a prime number between 2ℓB−1 and 2ℓB . We note that we have
gcd(p, q) = 1 since we have gcd(P − 1, Q− 1) = 2.
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We define t := tp+tq. Let PℓB be the set of all ℓB-bit primes, andMℓB := |PℓB |. We
define the group of quadratic residues as QRN := {u2 : u ∈ Z∗N}. This is a subgroup
of Z∗N , and a cyclic group of order pqp′q′. Then there exists unique subgroups of
order p′q′ and pq, and we denote them by G and G⊥ respectively. Then we have
QRN = G × G⊥. That is, for any element g ∈ QRN , we can uniquely represent
g = g(G)g(G⊥) by using g(G) ∈ G and g(G⊥) ∈ G⊥. Moreover, if the factorization
of N is given, then we can compute g(G) and g(G⊥) from g efficiently.
When N is an SS modulus, we cannot say that a random element g of QRN is
a generator (i.e., ord(g) = pqp′q′) with overwhelming probability. However, we can
prove that g has an order larger than a certain value with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 15. ([Gro05, Lemma2]) Let N be an (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS modulus. For any integer
d < t if (t2
1−ℓB )d+1
(1−t21−ℓB )(d+1)! is negligible, then Pr[ord(g) ≥ p′q′2(t−d)(ℓB−1) : g
$← QRN ] is
overwhelming. Especially, Pr[ord(g(G⊥)) ≥ 2(t−d)(ℓB−1) : g $← QRN ] is overwhelm-
ing.
When ℓB is small, ord(G
⊥) is smooth, and therefore the discrete logarithm on the
group can be solved efficiently by the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78].
Lemma 16. ([Gro05]) If ℓB = O(log λ), then the discrete logarithm problem on G
⊥
can be solved efficiently. More precisely, there exists a PPT algorithm that, given an
(ℓB , tp, tq)-SS modulus N , g ∈ G⊥ and gx, outputs x mod ord(g).
By combining the above lemmas, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Let N be an (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS modulus and we assume ℓB = O(log(λ)).
If (t2
1−ℓB )d+1
(1−t21−ℓB )(d+1)! is negligible and x ≤ 2(t−d)(ℓB−1) holds, then there exists a PPT
algorithm PLog that, given P ,Q, g, gx, outputs x with overwhelming probability where
g
$← QRN .
Hardness assumptions. Here, we give definitions of two hardness assumptions.
Let IGen be an algorithm that is given the security parameter 1λ and outputs an
(ℓB , tp, tq)-SS modulus with its factorization. We first define the factoring assumption.
Definition 12. We say that the factoring assumption holds with respect to IGen if
for any PPT algorithm A, Pr[A(N) ∈ {P,Q} : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ)] is negligible.
Next, we define the decisional RSA subgroup (DRSA) assumption proposed by
Groth [Gro05]. This assumption claims that any PPT algorithm cannot distinguish
a random element of G from that of QRN . We note that actually we do not use
this assumption in this dissertation. We include this only for the information of the
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reader.
Definition 13. We say that the decisional RSA subgroup (DRSA) assumption holds
with respect to IGen if for any PPT algorithm A, |Pr[1 ← A(N, g) : (N,P,Q) ←
IGen(1λ); g
$← QRN ]− Pr[1← A(N, g) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ); g $← G]| is negligible.
Attacks. We review factoring attacks against SS moduli as discussed in [Gro05].
As shown in [Gro05], by using Pollard’s ρ-method [Pol75], we can factorize an SS
modulus in time O˜(min(
√
p′,
√
q′)). As another method, by using Naccache et al.’s
algorithm [NS98], if a divisor of P − 1 or Q − 1 larger than N1/4 is given, then N
can be factorized efficiently. Thus ℓB should be large enough so that it is difficult
to guess a significant portion of factors of p or q. In 2011, Coron et al. [CJM+11]
proposed a new factoring algorithm for a certain class of RSA moduli that includes SS
moduli. For the case of SS moduli, their algorithm work in time O˜(min(
√
p′,
√
q′)),
which matches the time complexity of Pollard’s ρ-method. As observed in [Gro05],
other methods such as the baby-step giant-step algorithm [Sha71], Pollard’s λ-method
[Pol78] or Pollard’s p− 1 method [Pol74] require O(min(p′, q′)) time.
The above attacks use the structure of SS moduli. On the other hand, there are
algorithms such as the elliptic curve method [Len87] or the general number field
sieve [CP05], which can be applied to general RSA moduli. Among these algorithms,
general number field sieve is asymptotically the most efficient and its heuristic running
time is exp((1.92 + o(1)) ln(N)1/3 ln ln(N)2/3).
Parameter settings. Here, we discuss parameter settings of SS moduli. We have
to set parameters to avoid the above attacks. We first give an asymptotic parameter
setting. We set ℓp′ = ℓq′ = O(λ), ℓB = ⌊4 log λ⌋ and tp = tq = O(λ3/ log λ) (then
we have ℓN ≈ ℓp′ + ℓq′ + tℓB = O(λ3)). In this setting, we have MℓB = O(λ4/ log λ)
by the prime number theorem and thus there exists exponentially many choices of p
and q. If we set d := ⌊t/4⌋, then (t21−ℓB )d+1
(1−t21−ℓB )(d+1)! is negligible
*1. We use the fact that
in this parameter setting, given N , g ∈ QRN and p1, . . . , pm for m ≤ MℓB , gp1...pm
can be computed in polynomial time in λ. This is because we have m ≤ MℓB =
O(λ4/ log(λ)) and p1 . . . pm ≤ 2ℓBMℓB = 2O(λ4), and thus p1 . . . pm-th power can
be computed by O(λ4) multiplications. We use this asymptotic parameter setting
throughout the chapter. As a concrete parameter, Groth [Gro05] proposed to set
ℓ′p = ℓ
′
q = 160, ℓB = 15, tp = tq = 32 and d = 7 for 80-bit security (then we
have ℓN = 160 · 2 + 15 · 2 · 32 = 1280). We use this parameter for the construction
*1 In fact, d can be set as d := ⌊ct⌋ for any small enough constant c.
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of CCA secure PKE scheme with compact ciphertext (Section 4.8). However, this
parameter does not give us enough lossiness in the construction of ad-LTDFs. Thus
we propose to set ℓ′p = ℓ
′
q = 160, ℓB = 15, tp = tq = 70 and d = 8 (then we have
ℓN = 160 · 2+ 15 · 2 · 70 = 2420) for 80-bit security for other applications (Sec. 4.5 to
4.7). We note that the number of ℓB = 15-bit primes is 1612. Therefore the possible
choice of t = 64 or 140 primes out of them is much larger than 280 and thus it is hard
to guess the significant portion of their factors.
4.4 Adversary-dependent Decisional RSA Subgroup
Assumption
In this section, we generalize the DRSA assumption. Specifically, we define the m-
adversary-dependent decisional RSA subgroup (m-ad-DRSA) assumption for any in-
teger m ≤ MℓB with respect to (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS moduli. Intuitively, this assumption
claims that for any PPT algorithm A, there exist distinct ℓB-bit primes p1, . . . , pm
such that A does not distinguish g from gp1...pm where g is a random element of QRN .
We prove that under a certain condition, the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds under
the factoring assumption.
First we give the precise definition of the m-ad-DRSA assumption.
Definition 14. Let IGen be a PPT algorithm that generates an (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA
modulus. We say that for any integer m ≤ MℓB , the m-adversary-dependent deci-
sional RSA subgroup (m-ad-DRSA) assumption holds with respect to IGen if for any
noticeable function ϵ and PPT algorithm A, there exists a PPT algorithm SA,ϵ that
is given (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA modulus N and outputs distinct ℓB-bit primes p1, . . . , pm,
such that the following is satisfied. If we let
P0 := Pr
[
1← A(N, g) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1
λ)
g
$← QRN
]
P1 := Pr
1← A(N, gp1...pm) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ)g $← QRN
{p1, . . . , pm} ← SA,ϵ(N)

then we have |P0 − P1| ≤ ϵ(λ) for sufficiently large λ.
Remark 12. One may think that the assumption defined above cannot be used for
proving security of any cryptographic scheme since ϵ is noticeable. However, an im-
portant remark here is that ϵ can be an arbitrary noticeable function. Thus, in security
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proofs, we can set ϵ depending on an adversary A’s advantage against the scheme that
we want to prove secure, such that ϵ is smaller than the advantage of A (for infinitely
many security parameters). This can be done if A breaks the security of the scheme
since in these cases, the advantage of A should be non-negligible. See security proofs
in Sec. 4.7 and 4.8 to see this argument indeed works.
Remark 13. In the above definition, if m is so small that there exists a choice of
p1, . . . , pm, all of which are coprime to Φ(N), then g
p1...pm is distributed uniformly on
QRN . In this case, m-ad-DRSA assumption is trivial. This occurs if and only if we
have MℓB−m ≥ t. In this chapter, we set m to be relatively large so that m-ad-DRSA
assumption is non-trivial. (See Remark 14.)
The following theorem claims that the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds under the
factoring assumption if m is small enough.
Theorem 11. Let IGen be a PPT algorithm that generates an (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA
modulus where ℓB = O(log λ). If the factoring assumption holds with respect to IGen
and there exists a constant c such that (MℓB −m + 1)(ℓB − 1) ≥ (1/2 + c)ℓN holds,
then the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds with respect to IGen.
Remark 14. If we set m := ⌊MℓB + 1 − (1/2 + c)ℓN/(ℓB − 1)⌋ for sufficiently
small c, then by the above theorem, the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds under the
factoring assumption. Moreover, by setting the parameter as given in 4.3, we have
MℓB −m ≈ (1/2 + c)ℓN/(ℓB − 1) ≈ (1/2 + c)(ℓp′ + ℓq′ + tℓB)/ℓB ≤ t for sufficiently
large λ if c < 1/2 since t = O(λ3/ log λ) and ℓp′ = ℓq′ = O(λ). Thus the m-ad-DRSA
assumption is non-trivial.
Before proving the theorem, we prepare a lemma related to the Coppersmith attack.
Though a heuristic proof appeared in [NS98], to the best of our knowledge, this has
not been proven rigorously in the literature.
Lemma 18. Let P and Q be primes with the same length and N = PQ. Let e be
a divisor of Φ(N) = (P − 1)(Q − 1). If there exists a positive constant c such that
e > N1/2+c holds, then there exists a polynomial time algorithm that is given N and
e, and factorizes N .
Proof. We define e1 and e2 such that e = e1e2, e1|P − 1 and e2|Q − 1. (Note that
we cannot always compute e1 and e2 from e.) Then we can write P = e1k1 + 1 and
Q = e2k2+1 by using integers k1 and k2. Then we have N = PQ = (e1k1+1)(e2k2+
1) = ek1k2 + e1k1 + e2k2 + 1. Therefore if we define p(x, y) = N + ex + y, then
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p(x, y) = 0 has a solution (x0, y0) = (−k1k2,−(e1k1 + e2k2 + 1)). Let X := N1/2−c,
Y := 3N1/2 and W := max(N, eX, Y ). One can see that |x0| < X, |y0| < Y and
XY = 3N1−c < 2−8 ·N ≤ 2−8 ·W hold (for sufficiently large N). Therefore one can
compute the solution (x0, y0) = (−k1k2,−(e1k1 + e2k2 + 1)) in polynomial time in
logN by Lemma 14. Then one can compute P +Q = e1k1 + e2k2 + 2 = −y0 + 1 and
factorize N .
Intuition for the proof of Theorem 11. Here, we give an intuition for the proof
of Theorem 11. We remark that the following argument is not a rigorous one. What
we have to do is to construct a PPT algorithm SA,ϵ that is given N and outputs
{p1, . . . , pm} such that A’s advantage to distinguish g from gp1...pm is smaller than
ϵ where g
$← QRN . Let list L := PℓB , which is the set of all ℓB-bit primes. First,
SA,ϵ randomly chooses m distinct primes {p1, . . . , pm} from L and test whether A’s
advantage to distinguish g from gp1...pm is smaller than ϵ or not. More precisely,
SA,ϵ approximates A’s advantage by iterating the execution of A(g) and A(gp1...pm)
for independently random g
$← QRN a number of times and counting the number
that each of them outputs 1. We denote the approximated advantage by ϵ′. Due to
the Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63], the approximation error can be made smaller than
ϵ/4 by polynomial times iterations since ϵ is noticeable. If ϵ′ < ϵ/2, then A’s real
advantage is smaller than 3ϵ/4 < ϵ and thus SA,ϵ outputs {p1, . . . , pm} and halts.
Otherwise, A’s advantage to distinguish g from gp1...pm is larger than ϵ/4. Then
there exists pj such that A’s advantage to distinguish gp1...pj−1 from gp1...pj is larger
than ϵ/(4m) by the hybrid argument. SA,ϵ can find this pj in polynomial time since
ϵ/(4m) is noticeable. We remark that we have pj |Φ(N). This is because, otherwise
A’s advantage to distinguish gp1...pj−1 from gp1...pj is 0 since their distributions are
completely identical and thus ϵ′ should be smaller than ϵ/2. Then SA,ϵ removes pj
from L. Then it randomly chooses m distinct primes {p1, . . . , pm} from L again, and
do the same as the above. Then it outputs {p1, . . . , pm} and halts if approximated
A’s advantage to distinguish g from gp1...pm is smaller than ϵ/2, or otherwise removes
some pj′ |Φ(N) from L. SA,ϵ repeat this procedure many times. Assume that SA,ϵ
does not halts by the time it cannot choose m distinct primes from L. By that time,
MℓB −m+ 1 distinct ℓB-bit primes that divide Φ(N) are removed from L. Let e be
the product of them. Then we have e|Φ(N) and e ≥ 2(ℓB−1)(MℓB−m+1) ≥ N1/2+c.
Therefore if e is given, then we can factorize N efficiently by Lemma 18. Thus under
the factoring assumption, SA,ϵ must output some {p1, . . . , pm} before |L| becomes
smaller than m with overwhelming probability, and A’s advantage to distinguish g
from gp1...pm is smaller than 3ϵ/4 < ϵ.
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Now we give the full proof of Theorem 11
Proof. (of Theorem 11) First, we prove the following two claims.
Claim 1. For any PPT algorithm A and a noticeable function δ, there exists a PPT
algorithm ApproxA,δ that satisfies the following. Let D1 and D2 be descriptions of
distributions that are samplable in polynomial time in λ, and ϵ := |Pr[1 ← A(X) :
X
$← D1] − Pr[1 ← A(X) : X $← D2]|. Then ApproxA,δ(1λ,D1,D2) outputs ϵ′ such
that |ϵ′ − ϵ| ≤ δ(λ) with overwhelming probability. (We say that ApproxA,δ succeeds
if it outputs such ϵ′.)
Proof. The construction of ApproxA,δ is as follows.
ApproxA,δ(1
λ,D1,D2) : For i = 1 to K where K := λ/δ(λ)2, choose Xi and Yi
according to D1 and D2, respectively, and run A(Xi) and A(Yi) for each i. Let
k1 be the number of the event that A(Xi) outputs 1 and k2 be the number of
the event that A(Yi) outputs 1. Output |k1 − k2|/K.
Since δ is noticeable, K is polynomial in λ and therefore ApproxA,δ is a PPT algo-
rithm. It can be seen by Lemma 11 that ApproxA,δ satisfies the desired property.
Claim 2. For any PPT algorithm A and a noticeable function ϵ, there exists a PPT
algorithm FindA,ϵ that satisfies the following. For any (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA modulus
N and a set I = {p1, . . . , pm} of distinct ℓB-bit primes, if |Pr[1 ← A(N, g) : g $←
QRN ]− Pr[1 ← A(N, gp1...pm) : g $← QRN ]| > ϵ(λ) holds, then FindA,ϵ(N, I) outputs
pj ∈ I that divides Φ(N) with overwhelming probability. (We say that FindA,ϵ succeeds
if it outputs such pj or the inequality assumed is false.)
Proof. The construction of FindA,ϵ is as follows.
FindA,ϵ(N, I = {p1, . . . , pm}): Define distributions D0 := {(N, g) : g $← QRN} and
Dj := {(N, gp1...pj ) : g $← QRN} (j = 1, . . . ,m). For j := 1 to m, repeat the
following.
Compute ϵ′ ← ApproxA,ϵ/(2m)(1λ,Dj−1,Dj).
If ϵ′ > ϵ/(2m), then output pj and halt.
If it does not halt by the time the above loop is finished, then output ⊥.
First, we show FindA,ϵ is a PPT algorithm. Since m ≤ MℓB is polynomial in λ and
thus ϵ/(2m) is noticeable, ApproxA,ϵ/(2m) is a PPT algorithm. Therefore FindA,ϵ
is a PPT algorithm. We prove that FindA,ϵ satisfies the desired property. First,
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we assume that all executions of ApproxA,ϵ/(2m) called by FindA,ϵ succeed. The
probability that this assumption is satisfied is overwhelming since the number of
executions of ApproxA,ϵ/(2m) is polynomial in λ and each execution succeeds with
overwhelming probability. First, we prove that FindA,ϵ outputs any prime pj ∈ I if we
have |Pr[1← A(N, g) : g $← QRN ]− Pr[1← A(N, gp1...pm) : g $← QRN ]| > ϵ. By the
hybrid argument, there exists j ∈ [m] such that |Pr[1← A(X) : X $← Dj−1]−Pr[1←
A(X) : X $← Dj ]| > ϵ/m holds. For such j, if we let ϵ′ := ApproxA,ϵ/(2m)(Dj−1,Dj),
then we have ϵ′ > ϵ/m − ϵ/(2m) = ϵ/(2m) and thus pj is output. Then we prove
that if pj is output by FindA,ϵ, then pj |Φ(N) holds. If pj does not divide Φ(N),
then pj is coprime to ord(QRN ), and especially pj-th power is a permutation on the
group {gp1...pj−1 : g ∈ QRN}. Therefore Dj−1 and Dj are completely the identical
distributions. Therefore we have |Pr[1← A(X) : X $← Dj−1]− Pr[1← A(X) : X $←
Dj ]| = 0. Thus if we let ϵ′ := ApproxA,ϵ/(2m)(Dj−1,Dj), then we have ϵ′ < ϵ/(2m),
and thus such pj cannot be output.
Then we go back to the proof of Theorem 11. For any PPT algorithm A and a
noticeable function ϵ, we construct a PPT algorithm SA,ϵ such that Pr[1← A(N, g) :
(N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ); g $← QRN ]−Pr[1← A(N, gp1...pm) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ); g $←
QRN ; {p1, . . . , pm} ← SA,ϵ(N)] ≤ ϵ(λ) holds for sufficiently large λ. The construction
of SA,ϵ is as follows.
SA,ϵ(N) : Let L := PℓB . (Recall that PℓB is the set of all ℓB-bit primes.)
While |L| ≥ m, repeat the following.
Choose distinct ℓB-bit primes p1, . . . , pm from L randomly, and let I :=
{p1, p2, . . . , pm}, D0 := {(N, g) : g $← QRN} and Dm := {(N, gp1...pm) :
g
$← QRN}. Compute ϵ′ ← ApproxA,ϵ/4(1λ,D0,Dm). If ϵ′ < ϵ/2, then
output I and halts. Otherwise run p˜ ← FindA,ϵ/4(N, I). If p˜ ∈ L then
remove p˜ from L, otherwise remove a random element from L.
If it does not halt by the time the above loop finishes, then it outputs ⊥.
First, we prove that SA,ϵ(N) is a PPT algorithm. Since ϵ is noticeable, ApproxA,ϵ/4
and FindA,ϵ/4 are PPT algorithms. Moreover the number of repeat is at most MℓB −
m+ 1 ≤MℓB , which is polynomial in λ. Therefore SA,ϵ(N) is a PPT algorithm.
Then we prove that SA,ϵ(N) satisfies the desired property. In the following, we
assume that all executions of ApproxA,ϵ/4 and FindA,ϵ/4 called by SA,ϵ(N) succeed.
The probability that the above assumption holds is overwhelming since the number of
executions is polynomial and each execution succeeds with overwhelming probability.
If SA,ϵ outputs some I = {p1, . . . , pm}, then we have Pr[1 ← A(N, g) : g $← QRN ] −
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Pr[1 ← A(N, gp1...pm) : g $← QRN ]| < ϵ′ + ϵ/4 < ϵ/2 + ϵ/4 = 3ϵ/4. Next, we prove
that for overwhelming fraction of N generated by IGen, the probability that SA,ϵ(N)
outputs ⊥ is negligible. First, we prove that in each repeat, p˜ that is removed from
L divides Φ(N). We let ϵ′ ← ApproxA,ϵ/4(1λ,D0,Dm). If ϵ′ ≥ ϵ/2, then we have
|Pr[1 ← A(N, g) : g $← QRN ] − Pr[1 ← A(N, gp1...pm) : g $← QRN ]| > ϵ′ − ϵ/4 ≥
ϵ/2 − ϵ/4 = ϵ/4. Therefore FindA,ϵ/4(N, I) outputs pj ∈ I that divides Φ(N) since
it succeeds. Thus if SA,ϵ(N) outputs ⊥, then one ℓB-bit prime factor of Φ(N) is
removed from L in each repeat, and the repeat is done MℓB −m+1 times. Therefore
throughout the execution of SA,ϵ(N), MℓB −m + 1 distinct ℓB-bit prime factors of
Φ(N) are removed from L. If we let e be the product of these primes, then we have e >
(2ℓB−1)MℓB−m+1 ≥ 2(1/2+c)ℓN > N1/2+c and e|Φ(N). By Lemma 18, we can factorize
N efficiently by using e. Therefore for overwhelming fraction of N generated by IGen,
the probability that SA,ϵ(N) outputs ⊥ is negligible under the factoring assumption.
Therefore for overwhelming fraction ofN generated by IGen, we have Pr[1← A(N, g) :
g
$← QRN ] − Pr[1 ← A(N, gp1...pm) : {p1, . . . , pm} ← SA,ϵ(N); g $← QRN ]| < 3ϵ/4
with overwhelming probability over the randomness of SA,ϵ. Since ϵ is noticeable, by
the averaging argument, Pr[1← A(N, g) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ); g $← QRN ]−Pr[1←
A(N, gp1...pm) : (N,P,Q) ← IGen(1λ); g $← QRN ; {p1, . . . , pm} ← SA,ϵ(N)] ≤ ϵ(λ)
holds for sufficiently large λ.
4.5 Adversary-dependent Lossy Trapdoor Function
In this section, we define ad-LTDFs. Then we give a construction of an ad-LTDF
based on the m-ad-DRSA assumption, which can be reduced to the factoring as-
sumption by Theorem 11.
4.5.1 Definition
Here we define ad-LTDFs. Intuitively, ad-LTDFs are defined by weakening LTDFs so
that descriptions of lossy functions that cannot be distinguished from those of injective
functions may depend on a specific distinguisher. Namely, the algorithm that gener-
ates lossy functions takes a “lossy function index” I as well as a public parameter as in-
put, and we require that for any PPT algorithm A, there exists at least one I such that
A does not distinguish lossy functions generated with index I from injective functions.
Moreover, we require that such I can be efficiently computed given A. The precise def-
inition is as follows. For integers n and k such that 0 < k < n, an (n, k)-ad LTDF con-
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sists of 5 algorithms (ParamsGen,SampleInj,SampleLossy,Evaluation, Inversion) with a
family {I(λ)}λ∈N of lossy function index sets.
ParamsGen(1λ)→ (PP, SP ) : It takes a security parameter 1λ as input, and outputs
a public parameter PP and a secret parameter SP .
SampleInj(PP )→ σ : It takes a public parameter PP as input, and outputs a func-
tion description σ, which specifies an injective function fσ over the domain
{0, 1}n.
SampleLossy(PP, I)→ σ: It takes a public parameter PP and a lossy function index
I ∈ I(λ) as input, and outputs a function index σ, which specifies a “lossy”
function fσ over the domain {0, 1}n.
Evaluation(PP, σ, x)→ fσ(x): It takes a public parameter PP , function description
σ and x ∈ {0, 1}n as input, and outputs fσ(x)
Inversion(SP, σ, y)→ f−1σ (y): It takes a secret parameter SP , a function description
σ and y and outputs f−1σ (y).
We require ad-LTDFs to satisfy the following three properties.
Correctness: For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have Inversion(SP, σ,Evaluation(PP, σ, x)) = x
with overwhelming probability where (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ←
SampleInj(PP ).
Lossiness: For all λ ∈ N, (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ), I ∈ I(λ) and
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I), the image of fσ has size at most 2n−k.
Indistinguishability between injective and lossy functions. Intuitively, we
require that for any PPT adversary A, there exists at least one lossy function index
I ∈ I(λ) such that A cannot distinguish an injective function from a lossy function
with the lossy function index I.
The more precise definition is as follows. For any PPT adversary A and noticeable
function ϵ(λ), there exists a PPT algorithm SA,ϵ that takes a public parameter PP
as input and outputs I ∈ I(λ) such that the following is satisfied. If we let
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Pinj := Pr
[
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1
λ)
σ ← SampleInj(PP )
]
Plossy := Pr
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)I ← SA,ϵ(PP )
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I)

then we have |Pinj − Plossy| ≤ ϵ(λ) for sufficiently large λ.
As mentioned in Remark 12, though ϵ must be noticeable in the above definition,
ad-LTDFs can be used for many cryptographic applications. This is because ϵ can be
set depending on the advantage of an adversary in security reductions.
Remark 15. Besides what is explained above, there is a minor difference between the
definition of ad-LTDFs and that of LTDFs. In the definition of ad-LTDFs, ParamsGen
is explicitly separated from SampleInj or SampleLossy, whereas there is no separation
between them in the definition of LTDFs [PW08]. This is only for simplifying the
presentation, and there is no significant difference here.
4.5.2 Construction
We construct an ad-LTDF based on the m-ad-DRSA assumption. Let IGen be an
algorithm that generates an ℓN -bit (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA modulus with the parameter
given in Sec. 4.3 and n := (t− d)(ℓB − 1).
Definition of I(λ): I(λ) is defined as the set of allm-tuple of distinct primes of length
ℓB . That is, we define I(λ) := {{p1, . . . , pm} : p1, . . . , pm are distinct
ℓB bit primes}.
ParamsGen(1λ)→ (PP, SP ): Generate (N,P,Q) ← IGen(1λ), set PP := N and
SP := (P,Q), and output (PP, SP ).
SampleInj(PP = N)→ σ: Choose g $← QRN and output σ := g.
SampleLossy(PP = N, I = {p1, . . . , pm})→ σ: Choose g $← QRN and output σ :=
gp1...pm .
Evaluation(PP = N, σ = g, x ∈ {0, 1}n)→ fσ(x): Interpret x as an element of [2n]
and output gx.
Inversion(SP = (P,Q), σ = g, y)→ f−1σ (y): Compute x = PLog(P,Q, g, y) and out-
put x where PLog is the algorithm given in Lemma 17.
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Theorem 12. If the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds with respect to IGen, then the
above scheme is an (n, n− (ℓp′ + ℓq′ + (MℓB −m)ℓB))-ad-LTDF.
Then the following corollary follows by combining the above theorem and Theorem
11.
Corollary 1. If the factoring assumption holds with respect to IGen for the parameter
setting given in Sec. 4.3, then there exists an ad-LTDF.
Proof. (of Corollary 1.) Recall that we set ℓp′ = ℓq′ = O(λ), ℓB = ⌊4 log λ⌋, tp =
tq = O(λ
3/ log λ) (then we have ℓN ≈ ℓp′ + ℓq′ + tℓB = O(λ3)) and d := t/4. We let
m := ⌊MℓB + 1 − (1/2 + c) ℓN(ℓB−1)⌋ for a constant c < 1/4. Then we have (MℓB −
m+1)(ℓB − 1) ≥ (1/2+ c)ℓN and therefore the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds under
the factoring assumption by Theorem 11. Then we prove that the above ad-LTDF
for this m is non-trivial, i.e., we have n − (ℓp′ + ℓq′ + (MℓB − m)ℓB) > 0. Since
we have m ≈ MℓB − (1/2 + c) ℓN(ℓB−1) , we have n − (ℓp′ + ℓq′ + (MℓB − m)ℓB) ≈
(t − d)ℓB − (ℓp′ + ℓq′ + (1/2 + c) ℓN ℓB(ℓB−1) ) ≈ (1/4 − c)tℓB − (3/2 + c)(ℓp′ + ℓq′) > 0
for sufficiently large λ since tℓB = O(λ
3) and ℓp′ + ℓq′ = O(λ). Thus the obtained
ad-LTDF for this m is non-trivial.
Remark 16. If we set ℓp′ = ℓq′ = 160, ℓB = 15, t = 64, d = 7 and ℓN = 2420 as
given in Sec. 4.3, and c = 1/20 then by setting m := ⌊MℓB + 1 − (1/2 + c) ℓN(ℓB−1)⌋,
the obtained scheme is a (1848, 103)-ad-LTDF. If better lossiness is required, then one
may set t larger (as long as factorizing N is hard).
Then we prove Theorem 12.
Proof. (of Theorem 12)
Correctness. If g is generated by SampleInj, then it is a random element of QRN .
Thus Inversion((P,Q), g,Evaluation(N, σ, x)) = Inversion((P,Q), g, gx) = x holds by
the correctness of PLog given in Lemma 17.
Lossiness. Next, we prove that the above construction satisfies (n, n − (ℓp′ +
ℓq′ + (MℓB − m)ℓB))-lossiness. Let σ be a function description generated by
SampleLossy(N, I = {p1, . . . , pm}). What we should prove is that the image size of
fσ is at most 2
ℓp′+ℓq′+(MℓB−m)ℓB . There exists g ∈ QRN such that σ = gp1...pm , and
thus any output of fσ is an element of the group S := {hp1...pm : h ∈ QRN}. We
consider the order of S. S is a subgroup of QRN = G×G⊥ and p1 . . . pm is coprime
to ord(G) = p′q′. Therefore there exists a subgroup S⊥ of G⊥ such that S = G×S⊥.
We can see that ord(S⊥) is the product of some distinct ℓB-bit primes and coprime
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to p1 . . . pm by the definition. Therefore that is the product of at most MℓB −m such
primes, and can be bounded by 2(MℓB−m)ℓB . Therefore the order of S is at most
2ℓp′+ℓq′+(MℓB−m)ℓB .
Indistinguishability between injective and lossy functions. This immediately
follows from the m-ad-DRSA assumption. Indeed, clearly we have Pinj = P0 and
Plossy = P1 where P0 and P1 are defined in Def. 14, and the m-ad-DRSA assumption
requires |P0 − P1| < ϵ(λ) for sufficiently large λ.
4.6 Adversary-dependent All-but-one Lossy Trapdoor
Function.
In this section, we define adversary-dependent all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions
(ad-ABO) and construct it based on ad-LTDFs. Moreover we give more efficient
construction of ad-ABO based on the ad-DRSA assumption.
4.6.1 Definition
For integers n and k such that 0 < k < n, an (n, k)-adversary-dependent all-but-
one lossy trapdoor function (ad-ABO) consists of 5 algorithms (ParamsGen,SampleInj,
SampleABO,Evaluation, Inversion) and a family {I(λ)}λ∈N of lossy function index sets.
ParamsGen(1λ)→ (PP, SP ) : It takes a security parameter 1λ as input, and outputs
a public parameter PP and a secret parameter SP .
SampleInj(PP )→ σ : It takes a public parameter PP as input, and outputs a func-
tion description σ, which specifies an injective function fσ over the domain
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓb .
SampleABO(PP, b∗, I)→ σ: It takes a public parameter PP , a lossy branch b ∈
{0, 1}ℓb and an all-but-one function index I ∈ I(λ) as input, and outputs a
function index σ, which specifies a “all-but-one” function fσ over the domain
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓb .
Evaluation(PP, σ, b, x)→ fσ(x, b): It takes a public parameter PP , function descrip-
tion σ, a branch b and x ∈ {0, 1}n as input, and outputs fσ(x, b)
Inversion(SP, σ, b∗, b, y)→ x: It takes a secret parameter SP , a function description
σ,, b∗ ∈ {0, 1}ℓb ∪ ⊥, b and y and outputs the “inversion” x.
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We require ad-LTDFs to satisfy the following three properties.
Correctness:
1. For all x ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1}ℓb , we have Inversion(SP, σ,⊥, b,Evaluation(PP,
σ, b, x)) = x with overwhelming probability where (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)
and σ ← SampleInj(PP ).
2. For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, b∗, b ∈ {0, 1}ℓb with b ̸= b∗ and I ∈ I(λ), we have
Inversion(SP, σ, b∗, b,Evaluation(PP, σ, b, x)) = x with overwhelming probabil-
ity where (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ← SampleABO(PP, b∗, I).
All-but-one lossiness: For all λ ∈ N, (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ), b∗ ∈ B(λ),
I ∈ I(λ) and σ ← SampleABO(PP, b∗, I), the image of fσ(·, b∗) has size at most
2n−k.
Indistinguishability between injective and ABO functions. Intuitively, we
require that for any PPT adversary A, there exists at least one lossy function index
I ∈ I(λ) such that for all b∗ ∈ B(λ), A cannot distinguish an injective function from
an ABO function with the lossy branch b∗ and the lossy function index I.
The more precise definition is as follows. For any PPT adversary A and noticeable
function ϵ(λ), there exists a PPT algorithm SaboA,ϵ that takes a public parameter PP
and a lossy branch b∗ as input and outputs I ∈ I(λ) such that the following is satisfied.
For all b∗ ∈ B(λ), if we let
Pinj := Pr
[
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1
λ)
σ ← SampleInj(PP )
]
Pabo,b∗ := Pr
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)I ← SA,ϵ,b∗(PP )
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, b∗, I)

then we have |Pinj − Pabo,b∗ | ≤ ϵ(λ) for sufficiently large λ.
4.6.2 Generic Construction
Here, We construct an ad-ABO based on an ad-LTDF. Let (ParamsGengltdf ,SampleInjgltdf ,
SampleLossygltdf ,Evaluationgltdf , Inversiongltdf) be an (n, k)- ad-LTDF
Definition of I(λ): I(λ) is the same as that of the underlying ad-LTDF.
ParamsGengabo(1
λ)→ (PP, SP ): Run (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGengltdf(1λ) and output
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(PP, SP ).
SampleInjgabo(PP )→ σ: For all i ∈ [ℓb], generate σi,0, σi,1 ← SampleInjgltdf(PP ), and
output σ := {σi,j}i∈[ℓb],j∈{0,1}.
SampleABOgabo(PP, b
∗, I)→ σ: For all i ∈ [ℓb], generate σi,b∗i ← SampleLossygltdf
(PP, I) and σi,1−b∗i ← SampleInjgltdf(PP ), and output σ := {σi,j}i∈[ℓb],j∈{0,1}.
Evaluationgabo(PP, σ, b, x)→ fσ(x, b): For all i ∈ [ℓb], compute yi := Evaluationgltdf
(PP, σi,bi , x), and output y := {yi}i∈[ℓb].
Inversiongabo(SP, σ, b
∗, b, y)→ f−1σ (y): Find i ∈ [ℓb] such that b∗i ̸= bi, compute x :=
Inversionltdf(SP, σi,bi , yi) and output x.
Theorem 13. If the underlying scheme is an (n, n − r)-ad-LTDF, then the above
scheme is an (n, n− rℓB)-ad-ABO.
The proof is almost the same as the proof of generic construction of all-but-one lossy
trapdoor function from a lossy trapdoor function in [PW08]. Therefore we omit it.
4.6.3 Direct Construction
Here, we construct an ad-ABO based on the m-ad-DRSA assumption directly. Let
IGen be an algorithm that generates an ℓN -bit (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA modulus with the
parameter given in Sec. 4.3 and n := (t−d)(ℓB−1)−ℓb2 .
Definition of I(λ): I(λ) is defined as the set of allm-tuple of distinct primes of length
ℓB . That is, we define I(λ) := {{p1, . . . , pm} : p1, . . . , pm are distinct
ℓB bit primes}.
ParamsGen(1λ)→ (PP, SP ): Generate (N,P,Q) ← IGen(1λ), set PP := N and
SP := (P,Q), and output (PP, SP ).
SampleInj(PP = N)→ σ: Choose g, h $← QRN and output σ := (g, h).
SampleABO(PP = N, b∗, I = {p1, . . . , pm})→ σ: Choose g, g′ $← QRN , set
h := g−b
∗
g′p1...pm and output σ := (g, h).
Evaluation(PP = N, σ = (g, h), b, x ∈ {0, 1}n)→ fσ(x): Interpret x as an element of
[2n] and output (gbh)x.
Inversion(SP = (P,Q), σ = (g, h), b∗, by)→ f−1σ (y): Compute x = PLog(P,Q, gbh, y)
and output x where PLog is the algorithm given in Lemma 17.
Theorem 14. If the m-ad-DRSA assumption holds with respect to IGen, then the
above scheme is an (n, n− (ℓp′ + ℓq′ + (MℓB −m)ℓB))-ad-ABO.
Proof.
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Correctness.
1. If σ = (g, h) is generated by SampleInj, then they are independently uni-
form elements of QRN . In particular, for any b ∈ {0, 1}ℓb , gbh is a uniform
element of QRN . Thus Inversion((P,Q), (g, h),⊥, b,Evaluation(N, σ, b, x)) =
Inversion((P,Q), gbh, (gbh)x) = x holds by the correctness of PLog given in
Lemma 17.
2. Let (N, (P,Q)) ← ParamsGen and σ = (g, h) ← SampleABO(N, b∗, I =
{p1, . . . , pm}) for some b∗ ∈ {0, 1}ℓb . Then g is a uniform element of QRN
and h = g−b
∗
g′p1...pm for g′ $← QRN . Then for any b ̸= b∗, we have
gbh = gb−b
∗
g′p1...pm . By Lemma 15, ord(g) has at least t − d distinct ℓb-bit
prime divisors. The number of these prime divisors that are not coprime
to b − b∗ is at most log2ℓB−1(b − b∗) ≤ ℓb/(ℓB − 1). We write p′1, . . . , p′s to
denote the all ℓb-bit divisors of ord(g) that are coprime to b − b∗. Then we
have s ≥ t − d − ℓb/(ℓB − 1). For each p′i, the probability that ord(gbh) is
comprime to p′i is 1/p
′
i ≤ 2−ℓB+1 and they are all independent. Then one can
see that there exists more than s/2 p′i such that p
′
i|ord(gbh) by similar analysis
as in [Gro05, Lemma3]. Therefore one can recover x from (gbh)x as long as
x ≤ 2 (t−d)(ℓB−1)−ℓb2 ≤ (2ℓB−1)s/2.
All-but-one lossiness. Next, we prove that the above construction satisfies the
all-but-one lossiness property. Let σ = (g, h) be a function description generated
by SampleLossy(N, I = {p1, . . . , pm}). Then there exists g′ ∈ QRN such that h =
g−b
∗
g′p1...pm . In particular, we have gb
∗
h = g′p1...pm . Then any output of fσ(·, b∗) is
an element of the group S := {h′p1...pm : h′ ∈ QRN}. We consider the order of S. S
is a subgroup of QRN = G×G⊥ and p1 . . . pm is coprime to ord(G) = p′q′. Therefore
there exists a subgroup S⊥ of G⊥ such that S = G×S⊥. We can see that ord(S⊥) is
the product of some distinct ℓB-bit primes and coprime to p1 . . . pm by the definition.
Therefore that is the product of at most MℓB −m such primes, and can be bounded
by 2(MℓB−m)ℓB . Therefore the order of S is at most 2(ℓp′+ℓq′ )(MℓB−m)ℓB .
Indistinguishability between injective and all-but-one lossy functions. This
follows from the m-ad-DRSA assumption. Actually, for any PPT adversary A′ that
tries to distinguish these functions and any b∗ ∈ {0, 1}ℓb , we consider the following
adversary A′b∗ against the ad-DRSA assumption.
A′b∗(N, g¯): Generate g $← QRN , set h := gb
∗
g¯, run A(N, (g, h)) and output as A
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outputs.
For any noticeable ϵ, let SgdrsaAb∗ ,ϵ be the algorithm that is assumed to exist in Definition
14. If we let
P0 := Pr
[
1← A(N, g) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1
λ)
g
$← QRN
]
P1 := Pr
1← A(N, gp1...pm) : (N,P,Q)← IGen(1λ)g $← QRN
{p1, . . . , pm} ← SgdrsaAb∗ ,ϵ(N)

then we have |P0−P1| ≤ ϵ(λ) for sufficiently large λ by the definition of the ad-DRSA
assumption.
We let SaboA,ϵ,b∗ := SgdrsaA∗b ,ϵ . In the following, we show that it works well. If g¯ is a
uniform element of QRN , then h is a uniform on QRN and independent of g. Thus in
this case, A′b∗ simulates the environment for A where it is given an injective function.
On the other hand, if g¯ is generated as g¯ := g¯′p1...pm where {p1, . . . , pm} ← SgdrsaA∗b ,ϵ ,
then A′b∗ simulates the environment for A where it is given an all-but-one function
with lossy branch b∗ and index I := {p1, . . . , pm}.
Therefore if we let
Pinj := Pr
[
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1
λ)
σ ← SampleInj(PP )
]
Pabo,b∗ := Pr
1← A(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)I ← SA,ϵ,b∗(PP )
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, b∗, I)

then we have Pinj = P0 and Pabo,b∗ = P1. Therefore we have |Pinj −Pabo,b∗ | ≤ ϵ(λ) for
sufficiently large λ as required.
4.7 Applications
Here we discuss applications of ad-LTDFs. As mentioned before, ad-LTDFs can
replace LTDFs in many applications. Informally, ad-LTDFs can replace LTDFs if a
lossy function is used only in the security proof and not used in the real protocol. In
such cases, a lossy function may depend on an adversary that tries to distinguish it
from an injective function since an adversary is firstly fixed in security proofs. As a
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result, we can immediately obtain a collision resistant hash function [PW08], a CPA
secure PKE scheme [PW08] and a DPKE scheme [BFO08] based on ad-LTDFs by
simply replacing LTDFs by ad-LTDFs. Among them, by using our ad-LTDF based
on the factoring assumption given in Sec. 4.5, we obtain the first DPKE scheme that
satisfies the PRIV security for block-sources defined in [BFO08] under the factoring
assumption.
4.7.1 Collision Resistant Hash Function
Here, we give an analogue of the collision resistant hash function in [PW08] based
on ad-LTDFs. In fact, our scheme is obtained by simply replacing LTDFs in the
scheme in [PW08] by ad-LTDFs. The concrete construction is as follows. Let
(ParamsGen,SampleInj,SampleLossy,Evaluation, Inversion) be an (n, k)-ad-LTDF and
H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1}k to {0, 1}κn where
κ := 2ρ+ δ, ρ < 1/2 is a constant that satisfies n− k ≤ ρn and δ is some constant in
(0, 1− 2ρ),
Gencrh(1
λ): Run (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ← SampleInj(PP ), and choose
H
$← H. Output a function description h := (H,PP, σ).
Evalcrh((H,PP, σ), x): Compute H(Evaluation(PP, σ, x)) and output it.
Theorem 15. The above hash function is collision resistant.
We omit the proof since this can be proven by modifying the proof in [PW08] in a
similar way as in Sec. 4.7.3.
4.7.2 CPA Secure Public Key Encryption
Here, we give an analogue of the CPA secure PKE scheme in [PW08] based on ad-
LTDFs. In fact, our scheme is obtained by simply replacing LTDFs in the scheme in
[PW08] by LTDFs. The concrete construction is as follows.
Let (ParamsGen,SampleInj,SampleLossy,Evaluation, Inversion) be an (n, k)-ad-LTDF
and H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ,
where ℓ ≤ k − 2 log(1/δ) for some negligible δ. The construction of our scheme
PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is as follows.
Key generation : Gen(1λ) generates (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ←
SampleInj(PP ). It also chooses a hash function H
$← H. It outputs a public
key PK = (PP, σ,H) and a secret key SK = (SP,H).
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Encryption : Enc takes as input a public key PK = (PP, σ,H) and a message msg ∈
{0, 1}ℓ. It chooses x $← {0, 1}n, sets C1 := Evaluation(PP, σ, x) and C2 :=
msg ⊕H(x) and outputs C = (C1, C2)
Decryption : Dec takes as input a secret key SK = (SP,H) and a ciphertext
C = (C1, C2), computes x := Inversion(SP, σ,C1) and msg := C2 ⊕ H(x),
and outputs msg.
Theorem 16. The above scheme is CPA secure.
Proof. Assume that the scheme is not CPA secure. Then there exists a PPT adversary
A = (A1,A2) such that AdvCPAA,PKE(λ) is non-negligible. Then there exists a polynomial
poly such that for infinitely many λ, AdvCPAA,PKE(λ) > 1/poly(λ) holds. We consider the
following sequence of games.
Game 1 This is the original CPA game between A and the challenger C. That
is, C generates (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ← SampleInj(PP ),
and chooses H
$← H. Then C gives PK := (PP, σ,H), and A1 outputs
(msg0,msg1, st). Then C chooses b $← {0, 1} and x $← {0, 1}n, computes
C1 ← Evaluation(PP, σ, x) and C2 := msgb ⊕H(x) and gives C := (C1, C2) to
A2. Then A2(C, st) outputs b′.
Game 2 This game is the same as the previous game except that σ is generated by
SampleLossy(PP, I), where intuitively, I is an index such that “it is difficult to
distinguish an injective function from a lossy function with index I for A”. To
describe this precisely, we consider the following PPT algorithm B.
B(PP, σ): Choose H $← H, run (msg0,msg1, st)← A1(PP, σ,H), choose b $←
{0, 1} and x $← {0, 1}n, compute C1 ← Evaluation(PP, σ, x) and C2 :=
msgb ⊕ H(x), run b′ ← A2((C1, C2), st). If b = b′, then output 1, and
otherwise 0.
Let SB,1/(2poly) be the algorithm that is assumed to exist in the definition of
ad-LTDFs. (Note that B is a PPT algorithm and 1/(2poly) is noticeable.) In
this game, we let I ← SB,1/(2poly)(PP ) and σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I).
Game 3 This game is the same as the previous game except that C2 is set as C2 ←
msgb ⊕ U where U $← {0, 1}ℓ.
Game 4 This game is the same as the previous game except that C2 is set as C2
$←
{0, 1}ℓ.
Let Ti be the event that b = b
′ holds in Game i. By the definition, we have |Pr[T1]−
1/2| = AdvCPAA,PKE(λ). Then we prove the following lemmas.
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Lemma 19. For sufficiently large any λ, we have |Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ 1/(2poly(λ)).
Proof. By the definition of ad-LTDFs, if we let
Pinj := Pr
[
1← B(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1
λ)
σ ← SampleInj(PP )
]
Plossy := Pr
1← B(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)I ← SB,1/(2poly)(PP )
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I)

then we have |Pinj − Plossy| ≤ 1/(2poly(λ)) for sufficiently large λ. It is clear that
Pinj = Pr[T1] and Plossy = Pr[T2] hold. Therefore the lemma follows.
Lemma 20. We have |Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| ≤ δ.
In Lemma 12, we let X := x and Y := (PP, σ, fσ(X)). Then we have H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥
H˜∞(X|PP, σ) − (n − k) = k ≥ ℓ + 2 log(1/δ) since the size of the image of fσ is
at most 2n−k. Then by Lemma 12, we have ∆((H(X),H, Y ), (U,H, Y )) ≤ δ where
U
$← {0, 1}ℓ. Thus the lemma follows.
Lemma 21. We have Pr[T4] = Pr[T3].
Proof. This is clear since U is independently random string.
Lemma 22. We have Pr[T4] = 1/2.
Proof. In Game 3, A is given any information about b. Therefore the probability that
A can correctly guess b is 1/2.
By combining these lemmas, for all sufficiently large λ, we have |Pr[T1] − 1/2| ≤
1/(2poly(λ)) + δ. That is, we have AdvCPAA,PKE(λ) ≤ 1/(2poly(λ)) + δ. Since we as-
sumed for infinitely many λ, AdvCPAA,PKE(λ) > 1/poly(λ), for infinitely many λ, we have
1/(2poly(λ)) < δ. This contradicts to that δ is negligible. Therefore there does not
exist a PPT adversary that breaks the scheme.
Remark 17. If we use ad-ABO, we can construct CCA secure PKE scheme similarly
as in [PW08].
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4.7.3 Deterministic Public Key Encryption
Here, we construct a DPKE scheme based on ad-LTDFs. Construction.
The construction is a simple analogue of the scheme in [BFO08] based on
LTDFs. Indeed, our scheme is obtained by simply replacing LTDFs by
ad-LTDFs in their scheme. The concrete construction is as follows. Let
(ParamsGen,SampleInj,SampleLossy,Evaluation, Inversion) be an (n, k)-ad-LTDF
and H be a family of pairwise independent permutations on {0, 1}n, where
u ≥ n−k+2 log(1/δ)−2 holds for some negligible δ. The construction of our scheme
DE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is as follows.
Gen(1λ): Generate (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ← SampleInj(PP ) and choose
H
$← H. Output a public key PK = (PP, σ,H) and a secret key SK = (SP, σ).
Enc(PK = (PP, σ,H),msg): Compute C ← Evaluation(PP, σ,H(msg)) and output
C.
Dec(SK,C): Compute msg′ ← Inversion(SP, σ,C) and msg := H−1(msg′) and out-
put msg.
Theorem 17. The above scheme is PRIV1-IND-CPA secure deterministic encryption
for (u, n)-sources.
Proof. Assume that the above scheme is not PRIV1-IND-CPA secure. There ex-
ists (u, n)-sources M0,M1 and a PPT adversary A such that AdvPRIV−IND−CPAA,DE (λ) is
non-negligible. Then there exist a polynomial poly such that for infinitely many λ,
AdvPRIV−IND−CPAA,DE (λ) > 1/poly(λ) holds. We consider the following sequence of games.
Game 1 : This game is the original PRIV1-IND-CPA game with respect to M0, M1
and A. That is, a challenger computes (PP, SP ) ← ParamsGen(1λ) and σ ←
SampleInj(PP ), chooses H ← H, sets PK := (PP, σ,H), chooses b $← {0, 1},
msg∗ $← Mb and computes C∗ ← Evaluation(PP, σ,H(msg∗)). A is given
(PK,C∗) and outputs b′.
Game 2 : This game is the same as the previous game except that σ is generated by
SampleLossy(PP, I), where intuitively, I is an index such that “it is difficult to
distinguish an injective function from a lossy function with index I for A”. To
describe this precisely, we consider the following PPT algorithm B.
B(PP, σ) : Choose H $← H, b $← {0, 1}, msg∗ $← Mb, set PK := (PP, σ,H),
compute C∗ ← Evaluation(PP, σ,H(msg∗)), run b′ ← A(PK,C∗) and out-
put 1 if b = b′, and otherwise 0.
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Let SB,1/(2poly) be the algorithm that is assumed to exists in the definition of
ad-LTDFs. (Note that B is a PPT algorithm and 1/(2poly) is noticeable.) In
this game, we let I ← SB,1/(2poly)(PP ) and σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I).
Game 3 : This game is the same as the previous game except that a challenge
ciphertext is set as C∗ ← Evaluation(PP, σ,H(U)) where U ∈ {0, 1}n is a
uniformly random string.
Let Ti be the event that b = b
′ in Game i. Clearly we have |Pr[T1] − 1/2| =
AdvPRIV−IND−CPAA,DE (λ). Then we prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 23. For sufficiently large any λ, we have |Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ 1/(2poly(λ)).
Proof. By the definition of an adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor function, if we let
Pinj := Pr
[
1← B(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1
λ)
σ ← SampleInj(PP )
]
Plossy := Pr
1← B(PP, σ) : (PP, SP )← ParamsGen(1λ)I ← SB,1/(2poly)(PP )
σ ← SampleLossy(PP, I)

then we have |Pinj − Plossy| ≤ 1/(2poly) for sufficiently large λ. It is clear that Pinj =
Pr[T1] and Plossy = Pr[T2] holds. Therefore the lemma follows.
Lemma 24. We have |Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| ≤ δ.
In Lemma 13, we let f := Evaluation(PP, σ, ·), X := msg∗ and Y := (PP, σ). Then
by the lossiness, |S| ≤ 2n−k holds where S is the range of f . By the definition of (u, n)-
sources, we have H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ u and u ≥ n− k+2 log(1/δ)− 2 ≥ |S|+2 log(1/δ)− 2.
By Lemma 13, the statistical distance between (C∗,H, (PP, σ)) in Game 2 and that
in Game 3 is at most δ. Thus the lemma follows.
Lemma 25. We have Pr[T3] = 1/2.
Proof. In Game 3, A is given no information about b. Therefore the probability that
A can correctly guess b is 1/2.
By combining these lemmas, for all sufficiently large λ, we have |Pr[T1] − 1/2| ≤
1/(2poly(λ)) + δ, equivalently, AdvPRIV−IND−CPAA,DE (λ) ≤ 1/(2poly(λ)) + δ. On the other
hand, we assumed, AdvPRIV−IND−CPAA,DE (λ) > 1/poly(λ) for infinitely many λ. Combining
these two inequalities, we have 1/(2poly(λ)) < δ for infinitely many λ, which contra-
dicts to that δ is negligible. Therefore there does not exist a PPT adversary that
breaks the scheme.
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Remark 18. If we use ad-ABO given in Sec. 4.6, we can construct PRIV1-IND-CCA
secure DPKE scheme similarly as in [BFO08].
4.8 CCA Secure PKE with Short Ciphertext
In this section, we construct a CCCA secure KEM under them-ad-DRSA assumption.
By Theorem 11, under certain condition, this scheme is CCCA secure under the fac-
toring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli. By setting a parameter appropriately, we obtain
a PKE scheme whose ciphertext overhead is minimum among schemes that are CCA
secure under the factoring assumption by combining our KEM and an authenticated
symmetric key encryption scheme.
4.8.1 Construction
Idea of our construction. Since the m-ad-DRSA assumption is a type of subgroup
decision assumptions, we can consider an “adversary-dependent version” of hash proof
systems as in [CS02], where it is shown that a hash proof system can be constructed
based on any subgroup decision assumption. Then we construct a KEM similarly
as in [HK07], where the authors constructed a CCCA secure KEM based on a hash
proof system. Though our construction is based on the above idea, for clarity, we
give a direct construction of our KEM rather than defining the “adversary-dependent
version” of hash proof systems.
The construction of our scheme KEMCCCA is as follows. Let IGen be a PPT algorithm
that generates (ℓB , tp, tq)-SS RSA modulus, H be a family of pairwise independent
hash functions from (Z∗N )n to {0, 1}λ where n := ⌈ (2ℓN+1)λℓB−1 ⌉, and h : G→ {0, 1}λ be
a target collision resistant hash function. For simplicity, we assume that the KEM
key length is equal to the security parameter λ.
Gen(1λ) : Generate (N,P,Q) ← IGen(1λ). Choose H $← H, g $← QRN and
x
(k)
i,j
$← [(N − 1)/4] and set X(k)i,j := gx
(k)
i,j for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 1, . . . , n
and k = 0, 1. Output PK := (N,h,H, {X(k)i,j }i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}) and SK :=
({x(k)i,j }i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}, PK).
Enc(PK) : Choose r
$← [(N − 1)/4], compute C := gr, t := h(C) and K :=
H((
∏λ
i=1X
(ti)
i,1 )
r, . . . , (
∏λ
i=1X
(ti)
i,n )
r) where ti denotes the i-th bit of t. Output
(C,K).
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Dec(SK,C) : Compute t := h(C) and K := H(C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n ) where ti
denotes the i-th bit of t, and output K.
4.8.2 Security
Theorem 18. If m-ad-DRSA assumption holds with respect to IGen and (ℓB−1)(tp+
tq +m−MℓB ) ≥ λ holds, then KEMCCCA is CCCA secure.
Corollary 2. If the factoring assumption holds with respect to IGen for the parameter
setting given in 4.3, then KEMCCCA is CCCA secure for n = O(λ
4/ log(λ)).
Proof. (of Corollary 2) Let m := ⌊MℓB +1− (1/2+ c) ℓN(ℓB−1)⌋ for a constant c < 1/4.
Then we have (MℓB −m + 1)(ℓB − 1) ≥ (1/2 + c)ℓN and therefore the m-ad-DRSA
assumption holds under the factoring assumption by Theorem 11. Moreover, we have
(ℓB − 1)(tp + tq +m −MℓB ) = O(λ3) if we use the parameter setting given in Sec.
4.3. Thus the obtained scheme is CCCA secure under the factoring assumption.
Theorem 18 can be proven almost similarly as the security of the CCCA secure
KEM based on a hash proof system in [HK07]. However, for a technical reason, we
need the following variant of the leftover hash lemma unlike in [HK07]. Specifically,
in the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 12), a random variable X should be independent
fromH. On the other hand, in our proof, we need a variant in which a random variable
X may depend on H. The following lemma states that this is possible with the loss of
the number of possible random variables X. We note that this idea is already used in
some existing works [TV00, RSV13]. This lemma is necessary because in our proof,
we set X to be a decryption query, which is chosen by an adversary after seeing a
public key which includes a pairwise independent hash function H.
Lemma 26. Let X be a set of random variables X on {0, 1}n1 such that
H∞(X) ≥ n2 + 2 log(1/δ), and H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions
from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2 . Then for any computationally unbounded algorithm F ,
which is given H ∈ H and outputs a description of a distribution X ∈ X , we have
∆((H(X),H), (U,H)) ≤ |X |δ where H $← H and X ← F(H).
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Proof. We have
∆
H
$←H,X←F(H)((H(X),H), (U,H))
= E
H
$←H[∆X←F(H)(H(X), U)]
≤ E
H
$←H[
∑
X∈X
∆(H(X), U)]
=
∑
X∈X
E
H
$←H[∆(H(X), U)]
=
∑
X∈X
∆
H
$←H((H(X),H), (U,H)) ≤ |X |δ
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 12.
Then we give the proof of Theorem 18.
Proof. (of Theorem 18) Assume that there exists a valid PPT adversary A that breaks
the CCCA security of the above scheme. Then there exists a polynomial poly such
that AdvCCCAA,KEMCCCA(λ) > 1/poly(λ) for infinitely many λ. We consider the following
sequence of games.
Game 1 : This game is the original CCCA game of KEMCCCA for A. That is, a
challenger C generates (N,P,Q) ← IGen(1λ), chooses H $← H, g $← QRN and
x
(k)
i,j
$← [(N − 1)/4] and sets X(k)i,j := gx
(k)
i,j for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 1, . . . , n and
k = 0, 1 and sets PK := (N,h,H, {X(k)i,j }i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}). Then it chooses
b
$← {0, 1} and r∗ $← [(N − 1)/4], and computes C∗ := gr∗ , t∗ := h(C∗) and
K∗ := H((
∏λ
i=1X
(t∗i )
i,1 )
r∗ , . . . , (
∏λ
i=1X
(t∗i )
i,n )
r∗) where t∗i denotes the i-th bit of
t∗ if b = 1 and K∗ $← {0, 1}λ otherwise. Then it gives (PK,C∗,K∗) to A. In
the game, A can query pairs of ciphertexts and predicates to an oracle ODec.
When A queries (C, pred), ODec computes K ← Dec(SK,C) and returns K to
A if C ̸= C∗ and pred(K) = 1, and otherwise ⊥. Finally, A outputs a bit b′.
Game 2 : This game is the same as the previous game except that K∗ is set differ-
ently if b = 1. Specifically, it is set as K∗ := H(C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(t∗i )
i,1 , . . . , C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(t∗i )
i,n )
if b = 1.
Game 3 : This game is the same as the previous game except that C∗ is set differ-
ently. Specifically, it is uniformly chosen from QRN .
Game 4 : This game is the same as the previous game except that g is uniformly
chosen from a subgroup S of QRN , which is defined as follows. First, we define
a PPT algorithm B as follows.
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B(N, g): Choose H $← H, x(k)i,j $← [(N − 1)/4] and set X(k)i,j := gx
(k)
i,j for
i ∈ [λ], j ∈ [n] and k = 0, 1 and PK := (N,h,H, {X(k)i,j }i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}),
choose C∗ $← QRN and b $← {0, 1}, and set K∗ := H(C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(t∗i )
i,1 ,
. . . , C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(t∗i )
i,n ) where t∗ := h(C∗) and t∗i is the i-th bit of t
∗ if
b = 1, and K∗ $← {0, 1}ℓ otherwise. Run b′ ← AODec(PK,C∗,K∗) and
output b′. We note that B can simulate ODec for A since it knows
SK = ({x(k)i,j }i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}, PK).
Let SB,poly/2 be the algorithm that is assumed to exist in the definition of m-ad-
DRSA assumption. Note that this algorithm actually exists since B is a PPT
algorithm and poly/2 is noticeable. Then we define the subgroup S as follows:
We run {p1, . . . , pm} ← SB,poly/2 and define S := {hp1,...,pm : h ∈ QRN}.
Game 5 : This game is the same as the previous game except that the decryption
oracle ODec is replaced with an alternative decryption oracle ODec′ that works
as follows: ODec′ , given C and pred, computes t := h(C) and returns ⊥ if t = t∗.
Otherwise it computes K := H(C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n ) and outputs K if
pred(K) = 1, and otherwise ⊥.
Game 6 : This game is the same as the previous game except that x
(k)
i,j is set
differently. Specifically, it is uniformly chosen from ord(QRN ) instead of from
[(N − 1)/4] for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 1, . . . , n and k = 0, 1.
Game 7 : This game is the same as the previous game except that the decryption
oracle ODec′ is replaced with an alternative decryption oracle ODec′′ that works
as follows: ODec′′ , given C and pred, computes t := h(C) and returns ⊥ if
t = t∗ or C /∈ S, where S is the group defined in Game 4. Otherwise it
computes K := H(C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n )and outputs K if pred(K) = 1,
and otherwise ⊥.
Game 8 : This game is the same as the previous game except that K∗ is always an
independently random string.
Let Ti be the event that b = b
∗ holds in Game i. Then clearly we have AdvCCCAA,PKECCCA =
|Pr[T1]−1/2|. First, we prove that the group S defined in Game 4 is a proper subgroup
of QRN . Moreover, we prove that ord(S)/ord(QRN ) ≤ 2−λ holds. By the definition of
SS moduli, ord(QRN ) has tp+ tq distinct prime factors p′1, . . . , p′tp+tq of ℓB-bit. Since
the number of the all ℓB-bit primes is MℓB , there exist at least tp + tq +m −MℓB
distinct primes contained in both {p′1, . . . , p′tp+tq} and {p1, . . . , pm}. We denote those
primes by p′′1 , . . . p
′′
tp+tq+m−MℓB . Those primes cannot be a factor of ord(S) since
S = {hp1...pm : h ∈ QRN} by the definition whereas they are a factor of ord(QRN ).
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Thus ord(S)/ord(QRN ) ≤ 1p′′1 ...p′′tp+tq+m−MℓB
≤ 2−(tp+tq+m−MℓB )(ℓB−1) ≤ 2−λ. Then we prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 27. Pr[T2] = Pr[T1] holds.
Proof. The modification between Game 1 and 2 is only conceptual.
Lemma 28. |Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| is negligible.
Proof. This follows from the fact that the statistical distance between the uniform
distributions on [(N − 1/4)] and [ord(QRN )] are negligible.
Lemma 29. We have |Pr[T4]− Pr[T3]| ≤ 1/(2poly) for sufficiently large λ.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of m-ad-DRSA assumption.
Lemma 30. If h is collision resistant, then |Pr[T5]− Pr[T4]| is negligible.
Proof. From the view of A, Game 4 and 5 may differ only if A makes a query (C, pred)
such that h(C) = t∗. If A makes such a query, then this means that it finds a collision
of h.
Lemma 31. |Pr[T6]− Pr[T5]| is negligible.
Proof. This follows from the fact that the statistical distance between the uniform
distributions on [(N − 1/4)] and [ord(QRN )] are negligible.
Lemma 32. |Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| is negligible.
Proof. Let q be an upper bound of the number of decryption queries A makes. We
consider hybrids H0, . . . ,Hq that are defined as follows. A hybrid Hℓ is the same as
Game 6 except that the oracle to whichA accesses works similarly as ODec′′ for the first
ℓ queries, and similarly as ODec′ for the rest of queries. Let T6,ℓ be the event that b = b′
holds in the hybrid Hℓ. Clearly, We have Pr[T6,0] = Pr[T6] and Pr[T6,ℓ] = Pr[T7]. Let
Fℓ be the event that ODec′′ returns ⊥ for A’s ℓ-th query (Cℓ, predℓ) but ODec′ does not
return ⊥ for it. That is, Fℓ is the event that Cℓ ∈ QRN \ S, t ̸= t∗ and pred(Kℓ) = 1
hold where Kℓ := H(C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1
ℓ , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n
ℓ ), t := h(Cℓ) and ti denotes the i-th
bit of t. Unless Fℓ occurs, hybrids Hℓ and Hℓ−1 are exactly the same from the view
of A. Therefore we have |Pr[T6,ℓ]− Pr[T6,ℓ−1]| ≤ Pr[Fℓ]. Let viewℓ be the view from
A before it is given the response for its ℓ-th query. That is, viewℓ consists of PK,
C∗, K∗, Cℓ and decryption queries and responses for them before the ℓ-th query. We
prove the following claim.
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Claim 3. If Cℓ ∈ QRN \ S and t ̸= t∗, then Kℓ is distributed almost uniformly
on {0, 1}λ from the view of A in the hybrids Hℓ−1 and Hℓ. More precisely, we have
∆((Kℓ, viewℓ), (U, viewℓ)) ≤ 2−λ where U $← {0, 1}λ.
Assume this claim is true. Then we prove that Pr[Fℓ] is negligible for any ℓ ∈
[q]. Since A is valid, pred is non-trivial. That is, for independently uniform U ,
Pr[predi(U) = 1] is negligible. By Claim 3, if Cℓ ∈ QRN \ S and t ̸= t∗, then we
have ∆((Kℓ, view), (U, view)) ≤ 2−λ where U $← {0, 1}λ. Therefore Pr[pred(Kℓ) = 1]
is negligible and thus Pr[Fℓ] is negligible. Thus |Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| is negligible by the
hybrid argument. What is left is to prove Claim 3.
Proof. (of Claim 3) Since we assumed t ̸= t∗, there exists i ∈ [λ] such that ti ̸=
t∗i . We denote minimum such i by i
∗. Since C ∈ QRN \ S and S is a proper
subgroup of QRN , there exists an ℓB-bit prime p¯ that divides ord(C) but does
not divide ord(S). Here, we claim that the decryption oracle before ℓ-th query
can be simulated by using {x(k)i,j mod ord(S)}i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1} and PK. This can
be seen by that the oracle immediately returns ⊥ for a query (C, pred) such that
C /∈ S. If we define view′ℓ := (PK,C∗,K∗, Cℓ, {x(k)i,j mod ord(S)}i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1})
where PK denotes a public key except H, then we have ∆((Kℓ, viewℓ), (U, viewℓ)) ≤
∆((Kℓ,H, view
′
ℓ), (U,H, view
′
ℓ)). Thus it suffices to show that conditioned on any
fixed value of view′ℓ, ∆((Kℓ,H), (Uℓ,H)) ≤ 2−λ holds. One can see that view′ℓ
does not depend on (x
(ti∗ )
i∗,j mod p¯) at all for j ∈ [n]: PK does not depend on
(x
(ti∗ )
i∗,j mod p¯) since g ∈ S by the modification from Game 3 to 4. (C∗,K∗) does
not depend on (x
(ti∗ )
i∗,j mod p¯) since we assumed ti∗ ̸= t∗i∗ and thus x(ti∗ )i∗,j is not
used for generating K∗. {x(k)i,j mod ord(S)}i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1} does not depend on
(x
(ti∗ )
i∗,j mod p¯) since ord(S) is coprime to p¯. Thus conditioned on any value of
view′ℓ, (x
(ti∗ )
i∗,j mod p¯) is distributed uniformly for all j ∈ [n]. Therefore we have
H∞(C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1
ℓ , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n
ℓ |view′ℓ) ≥ n log p¯ ≥ n(ℓB − 1) ≥ λ + 2ℓNλ. Here, we
use Lemma 26: We set X := {XC}C∈QRN\S where XC denotes a random variable that
is distributed as (C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n ) conditioned on view′ℓ, δ := 2
−ℓNλ, and
F as an algorithm that simulates the game between A and the challenger and out-
puts XCℓ where Cℓ is A’s ℓ-th decryption query. Then we have ∆((Kℓ,H), (U,H)) ≤
|QRN \ S|2−ℓNλ ≤ 2−λ where U $← {0, 1}λ, conditioned on any fixed value of view′ℓ.
Thus the proof of Claim 3 is completed.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 32.
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Lemma 33. |Pr[T8]− Pr[T7]| is negligible.
Proof. Since we have Pr[C∗ ∈ S : C∗ $← QRN ] ≤ 2−λ, in the following, we assume
C∗ /∈ S. Then there exists p¯ that divides ord(C∗) but does not divide ord(S). Let
view be the view from A in Game 8 except K∗, and view′ := {PK,C∗, {x(k)i,j
mod ord(S)}i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1}}. By a similar argument as in the proof of
Claim 3, we have ∆((K∗, view), (U, view)) ≤ ∆((K∗,H, view′), (U,H, view′)) and
H˜∞(C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n |view′) ≥ n log p¯ ≥ n(ℓB − 1) ≥ (2ℓN + 1)λ.
If we let X := (C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,1 , . . . , C∗
∑λ
i=1 x
(ti)
i,n ), Y := view and δ := 2−ℓNλ
in Lemma 12, then we have ∆((K∗,H, view′), (U,H, view′)) ≤ 2−ℓNλ where
K∗ = H(C∗x1+t
∗y1 , . . . , C∗xn+t
∗yn) and U
$← {0, 1}k. Thus the lemma follows.
By the above lemmas, we have AdvCCCAA,KEMCCCA(λ) = |Pr[T1] − Pr[T8]| ≤ negl(λ) +
1/(2poly(λ)) for sufficiently large λ where negl is some negligible function. On the
other hand, we assumed that there are infinitely many λ such that AdvCCCAA,KEMCCCA(λ)
> 1/poly(λ). Therefore for infinitely many λ, we have 1/(2poly(λ)) < negl(λ), which
contradicts to that negl(λ) is negligible. Thus there does not exist a valid PPT
adversary that breaks the CCCA security of the scheme.
Discussion. Here, we discuss the efficiency of the CCA secure PKE scheme that
is obtained by combining the above KEM and an authenticated symmetric key en-
cryption scheme. Table 4.1 shows the efficiency and hardness assumption of CCA
secure PKE schemes based on the factoring in the standard model. Among existing
schemes, the scheme proposed by Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09b] is one of the best in
regard to the ciphertext overhead, which consists of 2 elements of Z∗N . In contrast, the
ciphertext overhead of our scheme consists of only 1 element of Z∗N plus a MAC. By
giving a concrete parameter (ℓ′p = ℓ
′
q = 160, ℓB = 15, tp = tq = 32 and ℓN = 1280),
the ciphertext overhead of our scheme is 1360-bit for 80-bit security whereas that of
[HK09b] is 2048-bit. On the other hand, the public key size of our scheme is much
larger than that of [HK09b], and an encryption and decryption are much less efficient
than those in [HK09b].
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97
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks and Open
Problems
In the first part of this dissertation, we define a self-bilinear map with auxiliary
information (AI-SBM) and construct it based on the factoring assumption and the
existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). There are following open problems
regarding to this part.
• The first and most important open problem is to remove iO from our construc-
tion. Though we rely on the existence of iO, there is no known construction
of iO based on the factoring assumption. Moreover, known constructions of
iO are too inefficient and far from practical. It is necessary to remove iO for
obtaining practical and solely factoring-based construction of AI-SBMs.
• The second problem is about constructing AI-SBMs with more useful proper-
ties. Though we show that an AI-SBM is useful in many applications, there
are still some limitations. The most significant drawback is that the size ex-
pansion of auxiliary information. That is, given two auxiliary information τx
and τy which correspond to g
x and gy respectively, if we compute τx+y which
corresponds to gx+y, then the size of τx+y expands to be polynomial in the
sizes of τx and τy. This unable us to apply group operations recursively more
than constant times. It is an interesting open problem to construct an AI-SBM
where there is no size expansion of auxiliary information, that would be much
more useful than our scheme.
• The third problem is to construct an AI-SBM on a different group from QR+N .
It seems that the only property we use in the proof is that it is computation-
ally hard to compute c-th root on an underlying group G where c is coprime
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to ord(G). It would be interesting future work to prove the above intuition
formally and find new instantiations.
In the second part of this dissertation, we define an adversary dependent lossy
trapdoor function (ad-LTDF) and construct it based on the factoring assumption
w.r.t. semi-smooth subgroup RSA moduli (SS moduli). There are following open
problems regarding to this part.
• The first problem is to extend our technique to more general RSA moduli. In
our result, we focus only on SS moduli, which have a special structure. We do
not know if it is possible to obtain a similar result w.r.t. another type of RSA
moduli. Since SS moduli is not a very standard form of RSA moduli, it would
be better if we could construct an ad-LTDF based on the factoring assumption
w.r.t. more general type of RSA moduli.
• The second problem is to analyze the hardness of factorizing an SS modulus.
Though SS moduli have been considered for more than 10 years, study of
efficient algorithm to factorize this type of RSA moduli is still not enough.
Since we show the usefulness of the factoring assumption w.r.t. SS moduli, it
would be important to analyze if factorizing SS moduli is really hard or not.
99
Acknowledgement
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Associate Professor Noboru Kunihiro for
his insightful suggestions. I would like to thank Professor Hirosuke Yamamoto and
Assistant Professor Junya Honda for their advice and encouragement.
I would like to thank all current and former members of Yamamoto-Kunihiro Lab-
oratory, Yao Lu, Masayuki Yoshino, Shota Yamada, Toru Akishita, Takayuki Kawai,
Takahisa Suzuki, Yuto Sogo, Yuji Nagashima, Xiaofeng Wei, Masashi Ueda, At-
sushi Takayasu, Kosei Endo, Takuma Koyama, Tomohiro Nakata, Yuka Kuwaori,
Ko Sugimoto, Yuki Takahashi, Yuho Matsunaga, Weilun Liu, Yoshinao Uchide, Van-
net Thomas Francis, Shuichi Katsumata, Ying Hwei Ming Jason, Yuki Tanigaki, Yuka
Miyazaki, Yoshiki Machino, Ken Kaminakaya, Keisuke Kinoshita, Qiqiang Liu, Enze
Ren, Shintaro Hara, Satoshi Furukawa, Kento Ohnishi, Sota Onozawa, Kazuho Kato,
Yun Sheng, Sihui Chu, Tomotaka Hiraoka, Eisuke Moriwaki, Mengce Zheng for their
friendship. I would like to thank the secretary Chiaki Sakakibara for her support.
I would like to thank all collaborators, Goichiro Hanaoka, Koji Nuida, Takahiro
Matsuda, Hajime Watanabe (from AIST), Go Ohtake, Yuki Hironaka, Kenjiro Kai,
Yosuke Endo (from NHK science and technology research laboratory), Nobuaki Kita-
jima, Takashi Nishide, Eiji Okamoto (from Tsukuba University), Yoshikazu Hanatani
(from Toshiba), Professor Hideki Imai, Kohei Kasamatsu, Ikuma Fujiwara (from Chuo
University) .
I would like to thank all members of the study group Shin-Akarui-Angou-Benkyou-
Kai for useful discussions.
I would like to thank all members of NTT Secure Platform Laboratories for accept-
ing me as an internship student. Especially, I thank Ryo Nishimaki, the mentor in
NTT, for insightful suggestions and discussions during the summer intern.
I would like to thank my family for their understanding and encouragement.
Works presented in this dissertation are supported by Research Fellowships of Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science for Young Scientists (JSPS).
100
Bibliography
[ABCP15] Michel Abdalla, Florian Bourse, Angelo De Caro, and David Pointcheval.
Simple functional encryption schemes for inner products. In PKC, pages
733–751, 2015.
[ABSV15] Prabhanjan Ananth, Zvika Brakerski, Gil Segev, and Vinod Vaikun-
tanathan. From selective to adaptive security in functional encryption.
In CRYPTO Part II, pages 657–677, 2015.
[AFH+16] Martin R. Albrecht, Pooya Farshim, Dennis Hofheinz, Enrique Larraia,
and Kenneth G. Paterson. Multilinear maps from obfuscation. In Theory
of Cryptography - 13th International Conference, TCC 2016-A, Tel Aviv,
Israel, January 10-13, 2016, Proceedings, Part I, pages 446–473, 2016.
[AGIS14] Prabhanjan Ananth, Divya Gupta, Yuval Ishai, and Amit Sahai. Opti-
mizing obfuscation: Avoiding Barrington’s theorem. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2014/222, 2014. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[Ajt96] Miklo´s Ajtai. Generating hard instances of lattice problems (extended
abstract). In STOC, pages 99–108, 1996.
[ALS16] Shweta Agrawal, Benoˆıt Libert, and Damien Stehle´. Fully secure func-
tional encryption for inner products, from standard assumptions. In
CRYPTO Part III, pages 333–362, 2016.
[BB04] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Efficient selective-ID secure identity-based
encryption without random oracles. In EUROCRYPT, pages 223–238,
2004.
[BBO07] Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Adam O’Neill. Deterministic
and efficiently searchable encryption. In CRYPTO, pages 535–552, 2007.
[BBS86] Lenore Blum, Manuel Blum, and Mike Shub. A simple unpredictable
pseudo-random number generator. SIAM J. Comput., 15(2):364–383,
1986.
[BF01] Dan Boneh and Matthew K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from
the weil pairing. In CRYPTO, pages 213–229, 2001.
101
[BF11] Dan Boneh and David Mandell Freeman. Homomorphic signatures for
polynomial functions. In EUROCRYPT, pages 149–168, 2011.
[BFO08] Alexandra Boldyreva, Serge Fehr, and Adam O’Neill. On notions of
security for deterministic encryption, and efficient constructions without
random oracles. In CRYPTO, pages 335–359, 2008.
[BFOR08] Mihir Bellare, Marc Fischlin, Adam O’Neill, and Thomas Ristenpart.
Deterministic encryption: Definitional equivalences and constructions
without random oracles. In CRYPTO, pages 360–378, 2008.
[BG84] Manuel Blum and Shafi Goldwasser. An efficient probabilistic public-
key encryption scheme which hides all partial information. In CRYPTO,
pages 289–302, 1984.
[BGG+14] Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, Sergey Gorbunov, Shai Halevi, Valeria Niko-
laenko, Gil Segev, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Dhinakaran Vinayaga-
murthy. Fully key-homomorphic encryption, arithmetic circuit ABE and
compact garbled circuits. In EUROCRYPT 2014, pages 533–556, 2014.
[BGH07] Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, and Michael Hamburg. Space-efficient identity
based encryption without pairings. In 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2007), October 20-23, 2007,
Providence, RI, USA, Proceedings, pages 647–657, 2007.
[BGI+01] Boaz Barak, Oded Goldreich, Russell Impagliazzo, Steven Rudich, Amit
Sahai, Salil P. Vadhan, and Ke Yang. On the (im)possibility of obfus-
cating programs. In CRYPTO, pages 1–18, 2001.
[BGK+14] Boaz Barak, Sanjam Garg, Yael Tauman Kalai, Omer Paneth, and Amit
Sahai. Protecting obfuscation against algebraic attacks. In EURO-
CRYPT, pages 221–238, 2014.
[BGV12] Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. (leveled)
fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping. In ITCS, pages
309–325, 2012.
[BGW05] Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, and Brent Waters. Collusion resistant broad-
cast encryption with short ciphertexts and private keys. In CRYPTO,
pages 258–275, 2005.
[BHJ+13] Florian Bo¨hl, Dennis Hofheinz, Tibor Jager, Jessica Koch, Jae Hong Seo,
and Christoph Striecks. Practical signatures from standard assumptions.
In EUROCRYPT, pages 461–485, 2013.
[BHR12] Mihir Bellare, Viet Tung Hoang, and Phillip Rogaway. Foundations of
garbled circuits. In the ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
102 Bibliography
tions Security, CCS’12, Raleigh, NC, USA, October 16-18, 2012, pages
784–796, 2012.
[BHY09] Mihir Bellare, Dennis Hofheinz, and Scott Yilek. Possibility and im-
possibility results for encryption and commitment secure under selective
opening. In EUROCRYPT, pages 1–35, 2009.
[Ble98] Daniel Bleichenbacher. Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols
based on the RSA encryption standard pkcs #1. In CRYPTO, pages
1–12, 1998.
[Boy08] Xavier Boyen. The uber-assumption family. In Pairing-Based Cryp-
tography - Pairing 2008, Second International Conference, Egham, UK,
September 1-3, 2008. Proceedings, pages 39–56, 2008.
[BP97] Niko Baric´ and Birgit Pfitzmann. Collision-free accumulators and fail-
stop signature schemes without trees. In EUROCRYPT, pages 480–494,
1997.
[BR14] Zvika Brakerski and Guy N. Rothblum. Virtual black-box obfuscation
for all circuits via generic graded encoding. In TCC, pages 1–25, 2014.
[Bra12] Zvika Brakerski. Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switch-
ing from classical gapsvp. In CRYPTO, pages 868–886, 2012.
[BS02] Dan Boneh and Alice Silverberg. Applications of multilinear forms to
cryptography. Contemporary Mathematics, 324:71–90, 2002.
[BSW07] John Bethencourt, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, pages 321–334, 2007.
[BSW11] Dan Boneh, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Functional encryption: Defi-
nitions and challenges. In Theory of Cryptography - 8th Theory of Cryp-
tography Conference, TCC 2011, Providence, RI, USA, March 28-30,
2011. Proceedings, pages 253–273, 2011.
[BV11] Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Efficient fully homomorphic
encryption from (standard) LWE. In FOCS, pages 97–106, 2011.
[BZ14] Dan Boneh and Mark Zhandry. Multiparty key exchange, efficient traitor
tracing, and more from indistinguishability obfuscation. In CRYPTO,
2014.
[CCK+13] Jung Hee Cheon, Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Jinsu Kim, Moon Sung Lee,
Tancre`de Lepoint, Mehdi Tibouchi, and Aaram Yun. Batch fully homo-
morphic encryption over the integers. In EUROCRYPT, pages 315–335,
2013.
103
[CFL+16] Jung Hee Cheon, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Changmin Lee, Brice Minaud,
and Hansol Ryu. Cryptanalysis of the new CLT multilinear map over
the integers. In EUROCRYPT 2016 Part I, pages 509–536, 2016.
[CFW14] Dario Catalano, Dario Fiore, and Bogdan Warinschi. Homomorphic sig-
natures with efficient verification for polynomial functions. In CRYPTO,
pages 371–389, 2014.
[CGGI16] Ilaria Chillotti, Nicolas Gama, Mariya Georgieva, and Malika Izabache`ne.
Faster fully homomorphic encryption: Bootstrapping in less than 0.1
seconds. In ASIACRYPT Part I, pages 3–33, 2016.
[CHL+15] Jung Hee Cheon, Kyoohyung Han, Changmin Lee, Hansol Ryu, and
Damien Stehle´. Cryptanalysis of the multilinear map over the integers.
In EUROCRYPT 2015 Part I, pages 3–12, 2015.
[CJM+11] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Antoine Joux, Avradip Mandal, David Naccache,
and Mehdi Tibouchi. Cryptanalysis of the RSA subgroup assumption
from TCC 2005. In Public Key Cryptography, pages 147–155, 2011.
[CL09] Jung Hee Cheon and Dong Hoon Lee. A note on self-bilinear maps.
Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society, 46(2):303–309, 2009.
[Cla94] Josh Benaloh Clarkson. Dense probabilistic encryption. In the Workshop
on Selected Areas of Cryptography, pages 120–128, 1994.
[CLLT16] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Moon Sung Lee, Tancre`de Lepoint, and Mehdi
Tibouchi. Cryptanalysis of GGH15 multilinear maps. In CRYPTO 2016
Part II, pages 607–628, 2016.
[CLT13] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Tancre`de Lepoint, and Mehdi Tibouchi. Practical
multilinear maps over the integers. In CRYPTO (1), pages 476–493,
2013.
[CLT14] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Tancre`de Lepoint, and Mehdi Tibouchi. Scale-
invariant fully homomorphic encryption over the integers. In PKC, pages
311–328, 2014.
[CLT15] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Tancre`de Lepoint, and Mehdi Tibouchi. New
multilinear maps over the integers. In CRYPTO 2015 Part I, pages
267–286, 2015.
[CMNT11] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, Avradip Mandal, David Naccache, and Mehdi
Tibouchi. Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers with shorter
public keys. In CRYPTO, pages 487–504, 2011.
[CMS99] Christian Cachin, Silvio Micali, and Markus Stadler. Computationally
private information retrieval with polylogarithmic communication. In
104 Bibliography
EUROCRYPT, pages 402–414, 1999.
[CNT12] Jean-Se´bastien Coron, David Naccache, and Mehdi Tibouchi. Public key
compression and modulus switching for fully homomorphic encryption
over the integers. In EUROCRYPT, pages 446–464, 2012.
[Coc01] Clifford Cocks. An identity based encryption scheme based on quadratic
residues. In Cryptography and Coding, 8th IMA International Confer-
ence, Cirencester, UK, December 17-19, 2001, Proceedings, pages 360–
363, 2001.
[Cop96] Don Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariate integer equation;
factoring with high bits known. In Advances in Cryptology - EURO-
CRYPT ’96, International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptographic Techniques, Saragossa, Spain, May 12-16, 1996, Proceed-
ing, pages 178–189, 1996.
[CP05] Richard Crandall and Carl Pomerance. Prime Numbers: A Computa-
tional Perspective. Springer, 2nd edition, 2005.
[CS00] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Signature schemes based on the strong
RSA assumption. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 3(3):161–185, 2000.
[CS02] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Universal hash proofs and a paradigm
for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption. In EURO-
CRYPT, pages 45–64, 2002.
[DDN91] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryptog-
raphy (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 542–552, 1991.
[DH76] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[DORS08] Yevgeniy Dodis, Rafail Ostrovsky, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith.
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other
noisy data. SIAM J. Comput., 38(1):97–139, 2008.
[FGK+10] David Mandell Freeman, Oded Goldreich, Eike Kiltz, Alon Rosen, and
Gil Segev. More constructions of lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor
functions. In Public Key Cryptography, pages 279–295, 2010.
[FHKP13] Eduarda S. V. Freire, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, and Kenneth G. Pa-
terson. Non-interactive key exchange. In Public Key Cryptography, pages
254–271, 2013.
[Fis03] Marc Fischlin. The cramer-shoup strong-rsasignature scheme revisited.
In PKC, pages 116–129, 2003.
[FN93] Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. Broadcast encryption. In Advances in Cryp-
105
tology - CRYPTO ’93, 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference,
Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 22-26, 1993, Proceedings, pages
480–491, 1993.
[FO99] Eiichiro Fujisaki and Tatsuaki Okamoto. How to enhance the security
of public-key encryption at minimum cost. In Public Key Cryptography,
pages 53–68, 1999.
[Gen09] Craig Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In
STOC, pages 169–178, 2009.
[GGG+14] Shafi Goldwasser, S. Dov Gordon, Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain, Jonathan
Katz, Feng-Hao Liu, Amit Sahai, Elaine Shi, and Hong-Sheng Zhou.
Multi-input functional encryption. In Eurocrypt, 2014.
[GGH13a] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, and Shai Halevi. Candidate multilinear
maps from ideal lattices. In EUROCRYPT, pages 1–17, 2013.
[GGH+13b] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova, Amit Sa-
hai, and Brent Waters. Candidate indistinguishability obfuscation and
functional encryption for all circuits. In FOCS, pages 40–49, 2013.
[GGH+13c] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Amit Sahai, and Brent Wa-
ters. Attribute-based encryption for circuits from multilinear maps. In
CRYPTO (2), pages 479–499, 2013.
[GGH15] Craig Gentry, Sergey Gorbunov, and Shai Halevi. Graph-induced multi-
linear maps from lattices. In TCC 2015 Part II, pages 498–527, 2015.
[GGHR14] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Mariana Raykova. Two-
round secure MPC from indistinguishability obfuscation. In TCC, pages
74–94, 2014.
[GGM84] Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali. How to construct
random functions (extended abstract). In FOCS, pages 464–479, 1984.
[GHR99] Rosario Gennaro, Shai Halevi, and Tal Rabin. Secure hash-and-sign
signatures without the random oracle. In EUROCRYPT, pages 123–139,
1999.
[GKKR10] Rosario Gennaro, Jonathan Katz, Hugo Krawczyk, and Tal Rabin. Se-
cure network coding over the integers. In PKC, pages 142–160, 2010.
[GL89] Oded Goldreich and Leonid A. Levin. A hard-core predicate for all one-
way functions. In STOC, pages 25–32, 1989.
[GLSW15] Craig Gentry, Allison Bishop Lewko, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. In-
distinguishability obfuscation from the multilinear subgroup elimination
assumption. In FOCS 2015, pages 151–170, 2015.
106 Bibliography
[GM82] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption and how to
play mental poker keeping secret all partial information. In Proceedings
of the 14th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, May 5-7,
1982, San Francisco, California, USA, pages 365–377, 1982.
[GMM+16] Sanjam Garg, Eric Miles, Pratyay Mukherjee, Amit Sahai, Akshayaram
Srinivasan, and Mark Zhandry. Secure obfuscation in a weak multilinear
map model. In TCC 2016-B, Part II, pages 241–268, 2016.
[GMR88] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald L. Rivest. A digital signa-
ture scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM J.
Comput., 17(2):281–308, 1988.
[GOS06] Jens Groth, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Amit Sahai. Perfect non-interactive
zero knowledge for NP. In EUROCRYPT, pages 339–358, 2006.
[GPSW06] Vipul Goyal, Omkant Pandey, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Attribute-
based encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data. In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 89–
98, 2006.
[Gro05] Jens Groth. Cryptography in subgroups of Z∗n. In TCC, pages 50–65,
2005.
[GS08] Jens Groth and Amit Sahai. Efficient non-interactive proof systems for
bilinear groups. In EUROCRYPT, pages 415–432, 2008.
[GSW13] Craig Gentry, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Homomorphic encryption
from learning with errors: Conceptually-simpler, asymptotically-faster,
attribute-based. In CRYPTO Part I, pages 75–92, 2013.
[GVW13] Sergey Gorbunov, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Hoeteck Wee. Attribute-
based encryption for circuits. In STOC, pages 545–554, 2013.
[GVW15] Sergey Gorbunov, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Daniel Wichs. Leveled
fully homomorphic signatures from standard lattices. In STOC 2015,
pages 469–477, 2015.
[HILL99] Johan H˚astad, Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A. Levin, and Michael Luby.
A pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. SIAM J. Com-
put., 28(4):1364–1396, 1999.
[HJ16] Yupu Hu and Huiwen Jia. Cryptanalysis of GGH map. In EUROCRYPT
2016 Part I, pages 537–565, 2016.
[HJK11] Dennis Hofheinz, Tibor Jager, and Eike Kiltz. Short signatures from
weaker assumptions. In ASIACRYPT, pages 647–666, 2011.
[HK07] Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz. Secure hybrid encryption from weakened
107
key encapsulation. In CRYPTO, pages 553–571, 2007.
[HK08] Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz. Programmable hash functions and their
applications. In CRYPTO, pages 21–38, 2008.
[HK09a] Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz. The group of signed quadratic residues
and applications. In CRYPTO, pages 637–653, 2009.
[HK09b] Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz. Practical chosen ciphertext secure en-
cryption from factoring. In EUROCRYPT, pages 313–332, 2009.
[HMS12] Goichiro Hanaoka, Takahiro Matsuda, and Jacob C. N. Schuldt. On
the impossibility of constructing efficient key encapsulation and pro-
grammable hash functions in prime order groups. In CRYPTO, pages
812–831, 2012.
[Hoe63] Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random
variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(301):13–
30, March 1963.
[Hof14] Dennis Hofheinz. Fully secure constrained pseudorandom functions us-
ing random oracles. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/372, 2014.
http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[HSW14] Susan Hohenberger, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Replacing a random
oracle: Full domain hash from indistinguishability obfuscation. Euro-
crypt, 2014.
[HW09] Susan Hohenberger and Brent Waters. Short and stateless signatures
from the RSA assumption. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009,
29th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA,
USA, August 16-20, 2009. Proceedings, pages 654–670, 2009.
[JL13] Marc Joye and Benoˆıt Libert. Efficient cryptosystems from 2 k -th power
residue symbols. In EUROCRYPT, pages 76–92, 2013.
[Jou00] Antoine Joux. A one round protocol for tripartite diffie-hellman. In
ANTS, pages 385–394, 2000.
[KMO10] Eike Kiltz, Payman Mohassel, and Adam O’Neill. Adaptive trapdoor
functions and chosen-ciphertext security. In EUROCRYPT, pages 673–
692, 2010.
[KOS10] Eike Kiltz, Adam O’Neill, and Adam Smith. Instantiability of rsa-oaep
under chosen-plaintext attack. In CRYPTO, pages 295–313, 2010.
[KPSY09] Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Martijn Stam, and Moti Yung. A new
randomness extraction paradigm for hybrid encryption. In Advances in
Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009, 28th Annual International Conference
108 Bibliography
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cologne,
Germany, April 26-30, 2009. Proceedings, pages 590–609, 2009.
[KRS15] Dakshita Khurana, Vanishree Rao, and Amit Sahai. Multi-party key
exchange for unbounded parties from indistinguishability obfuscation.
In ASIACRYPT 2015 I, pages 52–75, 2015.
[Len87] Jr. Lenstra, H. W. Factoring integers with elliptic curves. The Annals
of Mathematics, 126(3):pp. 649–673, 1987.
[LLL13] Xianhui Lu, Bao Li, and Yamin Liu. How to remove the exponent GCD
in HK09. In ProvSec, pages 239–248, 2013.
[LLML11] Xianhui Lu, Bao Li, Qixiang Mei, and Yamin Liu. Improved tradeoff
between encapsulation and decapsulation of hk09. In Inscrypt, pages
131–141, 2011.
[LLML12] Xianhui Lu, Bao Li, Qixiang Mei, and Yamin Liu. Improved efficiency
of chosen ciphertext secure encryption from factoring. In ISPEC, pages
34–45, 2012.
[MLLJ11] Qixiang Mei, Bao Li, Xianhui Lu, and Dingding Jia. Chosen ciphertext
secure encryption under factoring assumption revisited. In Public Key
Cryptography, pages 210–227, 2011.
[MOV93] Alfred Menezes, Tatsuaki Okamoto, and Scott A. Vanstone. Reducing
elliptic curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite field. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, 39(5):1639–1646, 1993.
[MSZ16] Eric Miles, Amit Sahai, and Mark Zhandry. Annihilation attacks for
multilinear maps: Cryptanalysis of indistinguishability obfuscation over
GGH13. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2016 - 36th Annual
International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August
14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part II, pages 629–658, 2016.
[NFT09] Ryo Nishimaki, Eiichiro Fujisaki, and Keisuke Tanaka. Efficient non-
interactive universally composable string-commitment schemes. In
ProvSec, pages 3–18, 2009.
[NP00] Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas. Efficient trace and revoke schemes. In
Financial Cryptography, pages 1–20, 2000.
[NR04] Moni Naor and Omer Reingold. Number-theoretic constructions of effi-
cient pseudo-random functions. J. ACM, 51(2):231–262, 2004.
[NRR02] Moni Naor, Omer Reingold, and Alon Rosen. Pseudorandom functions
and factoring. SIAM J. Comput., 31(5):1383–1404, 2002.
[NS98] David Naccache and Jacques Stern. A new public key cryptosystem
109
based on higher residues. In ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, pages 59–66, 1998.
[NY89] Moni Naor and Moti Yung. Universal one-way hash functions and their
cryptographic applications. In STOC, pages 33–43, 1989.
[Pai99] Pascal Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree
residuosity classes. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’99, In-
ternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic
Techniques, Prague, Czech Republic, May 2-6, 1999, Proceeding, pages
223–238, 1999.
[PH78] Stephen C. Pohlig and Martin E. Hellman. An improved algorithm for
computing logarithms over gf(p) and its cryptographic significance (cor-
resp.). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 24(1):106–110, 1978.
[Pol74] John M. Pollard. Theorems of factorization and primality testing. In
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, volume 76, pages
521–528, 1974.
[Pol75] John M. Pollard. A monte carlo method for factorization. In BIT,
volume 15, pages 331–334, 1975.
[Pol78] John M. Pollard. Monte carlo methods for index computation (mod p).
In Math.Comp., volume 32, pages 918–924, 1978.
[PPS15] Omkant Pandey, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Amit Sahai. Obfuscation-
based non-black-box simulation and four message concurrent zero knowl-
edge for NP. In TCC 2015 Part II, pages 638–667, 2015.
[PS15] Omer Paneth and Amit Sahai. On the equivalence of obfuscation and
multilinear maps. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015:791, 2015.
[PST14] Rafael Pass, Karn Seth, and Sidharth Telang. Indistinguishability ob-
fuscation from semantically-secure multilinear encodings. In CRYPTO
2014 Part I, pages 500–517, 2014.
[PW08] Chris Peikert and Brent Waters. Lossy trapdoor functions and their
applications. In STOC, pages 187–196, 2008.
[Rab79] Michael O. Rabin. Digital signatures and public key functions as in-
tractable as factorization. Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-212, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1979., 1979.
[Reg05] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and
cryptography. In STOC 2005, pages 84–93, 2005.
[Rom90] John Rompel. One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure
signatures. In STOC, pages 387–394, 1990.
110 Bibliography
[RSA78] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun.
ACM, 21(2):120–126, 1978.
[RSV13] Ananth Raghunathan, Gil Segev, and Salil P. Vadhan. Deterministic
public-key encryption for adaptively chosen plaintext distributions. In
EUROCRYPT, pages 93–110, 2013.
[Seu13] Yannick Seurin. New constructions and applications of trapdoor DDH
groups. In Public Key Cryptography, pages 443–460, 2013.
[Sha71] Daniel Shanks. Class number, a theory of factorization, and genera.
In 1969 Number Theory Institute (Proc. Sympos. Pure Math., Vol. XX,
State Univ. New York, Stony Brook, N.Y., 1969), pages 415–440. Provi-
dence, R.I., 1971.
[Sha84] Adi Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In
CRYPTO, pages 47–53, 1984.
[SOK00] Ryuichi Sakai, Kiyoshi Ohgishi, and Masao Kasahara. Cryptosystems
based on pairing (in japanese). In SCIS, 2000.
[SOK01] Ryuichi Sakai, Kiyoshi Ohgishi, and Masao Kasahara. Cryptosystems
based on pairing over elliptic curve (in japanese). In SCIS, 2001.
[SW05] Amit Sahai and Brent Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In
EUROCRYPT, pages 457–473, 2005.
[SW14] Amit Sahai and Brent Waters. How to use indistinguishability obfusca-
tion: Deniable encryption, and more. In STOC, 2014.
[TV00] Luca Trevisan and Salil P. Vadhan. Extracting randomness from sam-
plable distributions. In 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, FOCS 2000, 12-14 November 2000, Redondo Beach, Cal-
ifornia, USA, pages 32–42, 2000.
[vDGHV10] Marten van Dijk, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.
Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers. In EUROCRYPT,
pages 24–43, 2010.
[Wat05] Brent Waters. Efficient identity-based encryption without random ora-
cles. In EUROCRYPT, pages 114–127, 2005.
[Wat15] Brent Waters. CRYPTO part II. pages 678–697, 2015.
[Wee11] Hoeteck Wee. Threshold and revocation cryptosystems via extractable
hash proofs. In EUROCRYPT, pages 589–609, 2011.
[XLL+13] Haiyang Xue, Bao Li, Xianhui Lu, Dingding Jia, and Yamin Liu. Efficient
lossy trapdoor functions based on subgroup membership assumptions. In
111
CANS, pages 235–250, 2013.
[XX14] Xiang Xie and Rui Xue. Bounded fully homomorphic signature schemes.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2014:420, 2014.
[YHK12] Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Noboru Kunihiro. Space efficient
signature schemes from the RSA assumption. In PKC, pages 102–119,
2012.
[YHK16] Takashi Yamakawa, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Noboru Kunihiro. General-
ized hardness assumption for self-bilinear map with auxiliary informa-
tion. In ACISP, pages 269–284, 2016.
[YYHK] Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Noboru Ku-
nihiro. Self-bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation and its applications (to appear). Algorithmica.
[YYHK14] Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Noboru Ku-
nihiro. Self-bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation and its applications. In CRYPTO 2014 Part II, pages
90–107, 2014.
[YYHK16] Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Noboru Ku-
nihiro. Adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor function from hardness of
factoring semi-smooth RSA subgroup moduli. In CRYPTO Part II, pages
3–32, 2016.
[YYN+14] Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Koji Nuida, Goichiro Hanaoka, and
Noboru Kunihiro. Chosen ciphertext security on hard membership deci-
sion groups: The case of semi-smooth subgroups of quadratic residues.
In SCN, pages 558–577, 2014.
112
List of Publications Related to the
Dissertation
Journal Papers
1. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Self-
bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguishability obfuscation
and its applications. In Algorithmica, Springer, To appear.
Refereed Conference Papers (with Formal Proceedings)
1. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro
Adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor function from hardness of factoring
semi-smooth RSA subgroup moduli. In CRYPTO (2), pages 3–32, 2016.
2. Takashi Yamakawa, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Generalized hardness
assumption for self-bilinear map with auxiliary information. In ACISP, pages
269–284, 2016.
3. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Self-
bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguishability obfuscation
and its applications. In CRYPTO (2), pages 90–107, 2014.
113
List of All Publications
Journal Papers
1. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Self-
bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguishability obfuscation
and its applications. In Algorithmica, Springer, To appear
2. Yoshikazu Hanatani, Goichiro Hanaoka, Takahiro Matsuda, Takashi Yamakawa
Efficient key encapsulation mechanisms with tight security reductions to stan-
dard assumptions in the two security models. In Security and Communication
Networks 9(12), pages 1676-1697.
Refereed Conference Papers (with Formal Proceedings)
1. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro
Adversary-dependent lossy trapdoor function from hardness of factoring
semi-smooth RSA subgroup moduli. In CRYPTO (2), pages 3–32, 2016.
2. Takashi Yamakawa, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Generalized hardness
assumption for self-bilinear map with auxiliary information. In ACISP, pages
269–284, 2016.
3. Takashi Yamakawa, Nobuaki Kitajima, Takashi Nishide, Goichiro Hanaoka,
Eiji Okamoto A short fail-stop signature scheme from factoring. In ProvSec,
pages 309–316, 2014. (Short Paper)
4. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Koji Nuida, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru
Kunihiro Chosen ciphertext security on haed membership decision groups: The
case of semi-smooth subgroups of quadratic residues. In SCN, pages 558-577,
2014.
5. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro Self-
bilinear map on unknown order groups from indistinguishability obfuscation
and its applications. In CRYPTO (2), pages 90–107, 2014. (辻井重男セキュリ
114 List of All Publications
ティ学生論文賞受賞)
6. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Takahiro Matsuda, Goichiro Hanaoka,
Noboru Kunihiro Reducing public key sizes in bounded CCA-secure KEMs
with optimal ciphertext length. In ISC, pages 100–109, 2013. (Short Paper)
7. Go Ohtake, Yuki Hironaka, Kenjiro Kai, Yosuke Endo, Goichiro Hanaoka, Ha-
jime Watanabe, Shota Yamada, Kohei Kasamatsu, Takashi Yamakawa, Hideki
Imai Partially wildcarded attribute-based encryption and its efficient construc-
tion. In SECRYPT, pages 339–346, 2013
8. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Takahiro Matsuda, Goichiro Hanaoka,
Noboru Kunihiro Efficient variants of the Naor-Yung and Dolev-Dwork-Naor
transforms for CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism. In AsiaPKC, pages
23–32, 2013.
Non-Refereed Papers
1. 山川高志，花岡悟一郎，國廣昇，“識別不可性難読化に基づく絶対値平方剰余群上
の自己双線型写像のさらなる応用” 2016 年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポジウム
(SCIS2016), 3E2-4, 熊本, 2016年 1月．
2. 山川高志，山田翔太，花岡悟一郎，國廣昇，“Semi-smooth RSA数の素因数分解問
題に基づく一般化 Lossy Trapdoor 関数” 2015 年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポ
ジウム (SCIS2015), 3E2-2, 小倉, 2015年 1月．
3. 北島暢曜，山川高志，西出隆志，花岡悟一郎，岡本栄司，“素因数分解仮定に基
づく署名長が短い Fail-Stop 署名” 2014 年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポジウム
(SCIS2014), 2D1-3, 鹿児島, 2014年 1月．
4. 山川高志，山田翔太，花岡悟一郎，國廣昇，“セミスムース数を用いた損失落とし
戸関数の構成” 2014年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポジウム (SCIS2014), 3E2-1,
鹿児島, 2014年 1月．
5. 花谷嘉一，山川高志，花岡悟一郎，松田隆宏，“二つの安全性モデルにおいて標準
的な仮定への緊密な帰着を持つ効率的な鍵カプセル化メカニズム” 2014 年暗号と
情報セキュリティシンポジウム (SCIS2014), 4E2-3, 鹿児島, 2014年 1月．
6. 藤原育真，笠松宏平，山川高志，花岡 悟一郎，今井 秀樹，“CDH,DDH,GDH 仮
定の関係性について” 2013 年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポジウム (SCIS2013),
3B2-1, 京都, 2013年 1月．
7. 大竹剛，広中悠樹，加井謙二郎，遠藤洋介，花岡悟一郎，渡辺創，山田翔太，笠松
宏平，山川高志，今井秀樹，“Wildcard を部分的に許す効率的な属性ベース暗号
の構成に関する検討” 2013 年暗号と情報セキュリティシンポジウム (SCIS2013),
115
3F4-3, 京都, 2013年 1月．
8. 山川高志，山田翔太，花岡悟一郎，國廣昇，“素因数分解問題に基づく Semi-smooth
部分群上の CCA 安全な公開鍵暗号の安全性証明について” 2013 年暗号と情報セ
キュリティシンポジウム (SCIS2013), 4B1-1, 京都, 2013 年 1 月．（SCIS 論文賞
受賞）
Poster
1. Takashi Yamakawa, Shota Yamada, Goichiro Hanaoka, Noboru Kunihiro
Bounded CCA-secure KEM from the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption In IWSEC 2012 (Best Poster Award)
